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Kurzfassung (Deutsch)
In einer durch Policy-gesteuerten Systemverwaltung spielt die Verfeinerung
von Policies (Regelwerken) eine große Rolle. Der Verfeinerungsprozess trans-
formiert die abstrakten Policies in umsetzbaren Policies, die durch den Policy-
Enforcement-Point durchgesetzt werden. Dieser Prozess wird u¨blicherweise
manuell durchgefu¨hrt.
Der manuelle Verfeinerungsprozess hat jedoch einige Nachteile. Einer-
seits beno¨tigt dieser Prozess Expertenwissen, um die Policies zu verfeinern,
andererseits, ist dieser Aufwand dieses Prozesses so aufwa¨ndig, dass einige
Probleme, z.B. unpassende Spezifikation von umsetzbaren Policies auftreten
ko¨nnen.
Um diese Nachteile zu beseitigen wird in dieser Dissertation der automa-
tische Verfeinerungsprozess, der die Verfeinerungsmuster anwendet, vorgeschla-
gen. Durch die Adoption des Pattern Ansatzes werden Verfeinerungsmuster
konstruiert, um Expertenwissen zu dokumentieren. Weiterhin werden die
Verfeinerungsmuster, die Policies und das System formalisiert, so dass der
automatisierte Verfeinerungsprozess realisiert werden kann.
In dieser Dissertation werden folgende Bausteine pra¨sentiert: (i) For-
malisierung des Systems und der Regelwerke (Policies), (ii) Definition des
Verfeinerungsbaums der Regelwerke, (iii) formale Definition der Verfeinerungs-
muster, (iv) Kombination von temporaler Aussagenlogik CTL* und Beschrei-
bungslogik um die automatische Mustersuche zu realisieren und (v) Entwick-
lung eines Algorithmuses zur Verfeinerung der Regelwerke und zur Gener-
ierung von umsetzbaren Policies.
In dem Beispielszenario dieser Dissertation werden Workflows beru¨cksichtigt,
weil Regelwerke fu¨r Zugriffskontrolle generiert werden sollen. Diese Regelw-
erke werden aus Workflows abgeleitet. Diese Regelwerke werden u¨blicherweise
in den Terminologien, die spezifisch fu¨r bestimmte Bereiche verwendet wer-
den, ausgedru¨ckt. Diese Bereiche sind beispielsweise der Finanzbereich, die
Medizin und die Milita¨r. Daher unterstu¨tzt diese Tatsache die Anwendung
von der semantischen Technologie um das Expertenwissen zu formalisieren.
Dennoch kann der in dieser Dissertation entwickelten Ansatz in anderen Sys-
i
temen, z.B. diskreten System, eingesetzt werden.
Der Beitrag dieser Dissertation ist ein Konzept zur Automatisierung des
Policyverfeinerungsprozesses. Dazu wird das Sicherheitsexpertenwissen, das
als Verfeinerungsmuster dokumentiert wird, angewendet. Um diese Konzept
zu realisieren, Model Checking und Wissensrepra¨sentation wurden kombiniert.
ii
Abstract (English)
In a policy-based system management, a policy refinement process is required
to translate abstract policies, which are specified by human, into enforceable
policies, which are enforced by machine.
However, a manual policy refinement process imposes some problems.
The first problem is that it requires expert knowledge to perform the policy
refinement process. The second problem is that refining policies for com-
plex systems is a tedious task. Manual refinement process may cause some
negative consequences due to human errors, i.e., improper specification of
enforceable policies.
In order to solve the problems mentioned above, we envisage the auto-
mated policy refinement process by using refinement patterns. By adopting
the pattern paradigm, we define the refinement patterns to capture the ex-
pert knowledge. Furthermore, we formalize these refinement patterns, the
policies and the considered system. This approach enables the automation
of the policy refinement process, which solves the second problem.
We present these building blocks: (i) formal representations of the con-
sidered system and the policies, (ii) definition of a policy refinement tree, (iii)
definition of policy refinement patterns in formal representation, (iv) com-
bining computational tree logic-* and description logics formalisms to enable
the automated pattern matching and (v) development of the algorithm for
policy refinement and for generating the enforceable policies.
In this thesis we consider the refinement of workflow policies as our sce-
nario, since we want to specify access control policies. These access con-
trol policies are derived from workflow. These policies are usually specified
in domain-specific terminologies, such as finance, engineering, military, etc.
Thus, it underpins our approach to using semantic technology to formalize
the policy refinement patterns. Although the work presented in this thesis
deals with the refinement of workflow policies, one can adapt this approach
to refine policies for various discrete systems.
The contribution of this thesis is a concept to automate the policy refine-
ment process by using security experts knowledge, which is stored as policy
iii
refinement patterns. To realize this concept, we combine two approaches,
namely model checking and knowledge representation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The increasing complexity of IT-system demands flexibility in their manage-
ment. Hence, it requires a mechanism that allows the administrator to alter
the behavior of the managed system without modifying and compiling the
source code of the software that controls the system during the runtime. In
the past decades, some research work has been conducted [57, 92] that aim
for a flexible system configuration. Such a system is also called a policy-
driven system. The behavior of this system is controlled by the policies of
the system. Thus, the system allows the alteration of its behavior during
run-time only by pushing new policies into the system. Policy-based system
management has gained more attention in the last decades. It enables the
dynamic change of software behavior without too much effort, i.e., modifying
and recompiling the source code.
1.1 Problem Statement
A policy refinement process addresses the gap between the security policies
specified by the stakeholders (human) and the security policies that should
be enforced by the machine. The security policies specified by humans are
usually very general and abstract. For example, the scope of the target of the
security policies is very general and wide. And also, the expressed desired
property of the target is very general. On the other hand, the security policies
that should be enforced by the machine are very concrete. The low-level
security policies languages are only specific to each kind of policy enforcement
engine, i.e., XACML, IPtables configuration, Apache directives, etc. In order
to derive the enforceable policies, the abstract policies are refined manually.
However, manual policy refinement process is error-prone due to the high
complexity of the managed system.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
Based on the latest research in policy refinement, we identify the following
two major questions:
• The policy refinement process is still performed manually. How can we
refine this automatically?
• In particular, the policy refinement process is performed by security ex-
perts, who have the necessary knowledge to refine the policy. How can
we use expert knowledge to establish the automated policy refinement
process?
Analogy of Policy Refinement Process. We present an analogy be-
tween the policy refinement process and the driving activity in order to bet-
ter understand the concept of the policy refinement process. Let us consider
the driving scenario shown in Figure 1.1.
Turn 
left
Move into 
2nd gear
Rotate the 
steering wheel 
130°to the left
Managed 
system
Management 
mechanismsEnforceable policiesHigh-level policies
Policy 
refinement 
process
Decelerate 
to 30 kph
Figure 1.1: Policy refinement process: an analogy
This picture shows the scenario of a person driving a car, who wants to
turn the car to the left. We assume that there are no obstacles standing in
front of the car. In this scenario, the driver operates (or manages) the car
(managed system) by manipulating the steering wheel, gear shaft, gas and
brake pedals (management mechanisms). The intention of the driver, which
is to turn the car to the left, is similar to the high-level policy of the stake-
holders. In order to achieve this high-level policy, the driver has to refine the
high-level policy in his mind into several low-level and enforceable policies,
which can be enforced by the currently available management mechanisms.
The low-level policies would be (i) turn the steering wheel to the left, (ii)
move to the second gear, and (iii) decelerate to 30 kph.
As a proof of concept, we consider to refine workflow policies. In this
case, the workflow is the considered system.
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Sicari Project This thesis is undertaken within the framework of the
Sicari (Sicherheitsarchitektur in ubiquitre Internetnutzung) project, which
is funded by Federal Ministry of Education and Research. This project is
supported by 18 academic and industrial partners. The goal of the Sicari
project is to provide a platform consisting of security services. The security
services range from the cryptographic modules, smart card-based authenti-
cation to the policy-based system management.
1.2 State-of-the-Art
Mont et al. presented a tool for policy refinement called POWER in [65].
Prior to using this tool, the domain experts should specify a set of policy
templates, which are written in Prolog programming language. By using
the keyword search from the Graphical User Interface of the tool, the user
selects a policy template, which matches the security requirements. This
template can be assumed as the abstract policy. Each policy template con-
tains some terminologies of the information and system model, such as “em-
ployee”, “file”, “database”. Furthermore, the POWER tool has also the
database containing the hierarchies of the information and system model
(ISM) terminologies. Thus, the POWER tool proposes then the refined poli-
cies of the policy template by substituting these abstract terminologies with
more concrete terminologies with regard to the hierarchies defined in the ISM
database. In the next step, machine-enforceable policies are generated from
the refined policies. Therefore, this approach generates enforceable policies
from the abstract policy. However, it is not clear whether this approach
supports the hierarchical refinement process or not.
Bandara et al. propose a policy refinement process, which is based on
the abductive reasoning technique [10]. Abductive-reasoning is a reasoning
technique that derives the hypothesis a from the consequence b, such that
w ∧ a ⇒ b and w ∧ a is consistent and w is an existing knowledge [14].
In their work, they assume that the abstract policies are the consequences
and the refined policies are the hypotheses. As a formal foundation of this
approach, they use Event Calculus to specify the policies [63]. Thus, a, b and
w are event calculus formulas. For each refinement of an abstract policy, the
policy administrator consults the refinement patterns, which are defined in
the paper by Darimont and Lamsweerde [30]. Generally, the refined policies
are still abstract and not concrete enough, so that a set of enforceable policies
cannot be generated from these refined policies. Therefore, the refinement
process is repeated until all abstract policies are refined into a set of concrete
policies. Based on these policies, the policy administrator can generate a
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set of machine-enforceable policies. In contrast to the approach of Mont et
al., the policy refinement process should be performed manually by the user.
Furthermore, the enforceable policies should also be generated manually from
the concrete policies.
Rubio-Loyola et al. present an approach [82], which is based on the work
by Bandara et al. In their work, they use the approach, which is similar to the
approach of Bandara et al., to refine abstract policies into concrete policies.
However, they use the automated model checking technique to automatically
generate the machine-enforceable policies from concrete policies. In their
work, the concrete policies are represented in temporal logic formulas. On
the other hand, they specify the behavior of a managed system in a finite
state machine. Thus, the model checking finds the execution traces, which
should be controlled by the concrete policies and generates the enforceable
with regard to the concrete policies.
Su et al. consider another aspect of the policy refinement. Their work
deals with the refinement of the access control policies. They state that there
are hierarchies of subjects and objects, which can be used to refine access
control policies. Generally speaking, this approach is very similar to the
approach of Mont et al. [65].
1.3 Solution
In order to solve the problems mentioned above, we envisage to automate
the policy refinement process. As a proof of concept, we consider the refine-
ment of workflow policies. To achieve this goal, we envisage the following
milestones:
• Formal representations of the behavior of the system and the policies:
We require the formal representation of the behavior of the system and
the policies, since we want to perform an automated policy refinement
process.
• Definition of policy refinement tree:
Each refinement of an abstract policy generates a set of refined policies.
These policies influence the fulfillment of the corresponding abstract
policy. The abstract policy is fulfilled by fulfilling either all or some of
its refined policies. Since these refined policies can be further refined,
there exists a tree-like structure of the parent-children relationships
between the policies. Generally, a policy refinement tree has an abstract
policy as its root and a set of concrete policies as its leaves. Thus, the
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fulfillment of the abstract policy at the root can be determined by the
fulfillment of the policies in the leaves of the tree.
• Defining policy refinement patterns in formal representation adapted
from pattern paradigm:
This is one of the important building blocks that enable the automated
policy refinement process. The aim of this building block is to be able
to capture the expert knowledge of refining policies. Furthermore, this
knowledge should be machine interpretable.
• Combining CTL* and DL formalisms to facilitate the automated pat-
tern matching:
This is the other important building block. It allows the automated
pattern matching, without human supervision.
• Defining the algorithm for policy refinement and for generating the
enforceable policies:
The algorithm makes use of the previously mentioned building blocks
in order to realize the automated policy refinement process.
1.4 Scientific Contribution
The policy-based system management gives more flexibility to control the
managed system behavior. However, the increasing complexity of the man-
aged system has increased the gap between human intention and the man-
aged system behavior. The automated refinement process, which is based
on expert knowledge, should reduce the gap between human intention and
the managed system behavior. This should improve the management of the
complex systems. In particular, the change in high-level policies can be im-
mediately propagated to the managed system. Furthermore, the error-prone
task in manual policy refinement process can be avoided.
Our approach to policy refinement uses the pattern paradigm, which aims
at capturing the expert knowledge about refining policies. These patterns
are applied in the policy refinement process. Thus, a novice administrator
can refine the policies without having a deep knowledge about the managed
system.
On the other hand, the current state-of-the-art of the pattern formaliza-
tion approaches only allow us either to semi-automatically search the pat-
terns or to automatically instantiate the patterns. Our approach allows us to
fully automate the pattern matching and pattern-instantiation process. We
achieve our goal by formalizing the considered system and formalizing the
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description of the pattern. However, there are many domain specific termi-
nologies used to describe the patterns, which have equivalence and general-
ization relationships between them. Additionally, we also use the description
logic formalism in order to enable the semantic interpretation of these termi-
nologies that improves the automated pattern search. Therefore, our study
should give an insight in automating the pattern-based engineering process
in any other fields.
Finally, we also present the combination of description logic with temporal
logic, which enables to perform model checking based on the description
logic reasoning engine. This method allows us to perform model checking,
although the atomic propositions used in the model and in the formulas are
from different domains provided that the ontologies bridging the domains
are available. Although the idea of combining description logic and temporal
logic is not new, several approaches exist only as concepts, because a new
kind of reasoning engine should be built and its reasoning complexity is
still too high [7, 89, 108]. On the contrary, our method does not require
the construction of a new reasoning engine, since it can use the reasoning
engine that supports the SHK description logic language and has the fix-
point semantics.
Make use of Workflow as the Considered System It should be noted
that, as a proof of concept, this study makes use of workflow as the considered
system. Therefore, the examples and the definitions presented are in favor
of workflow. Nevertheless, one may also use the approach presented in this
study to automate the policy refinement process for any other systems, for
example, firewall router, web server, embedded systems, etc, as long as their
behavior can be formalized as Kripke models.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The relationships between the chapters in this thesis are presented in Figure
1.5.
Chapter 2: Workflow and Policies. Since we consider the refinement
of workflow policies as the proof of concept, this chapter initiates the dis-
cussion about the formalization of a workflow. Subsequently, a discussion
of the need for policies, which is caused by the gap between the design and
implementation, is presented. Finally, this chapter presents the method to
formally specify the policies, in this case, the workflow policies.
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction
Chapter 2:
Policies and 
Workflows
Chapter 3: 
Policy Refinement 
Tree
Chapter 4: 
Description Logic-
based Model 
Checking
Chapter 5: 
Refinement Patterns
Chapter 6:
Policy Refinement 
Process
Chapter 7:
Architecture
Chapter 8:
Summary and 
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Figure 1.2: The chapters and their dependencies
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
Chapter 3: Policy Refinement Tree. This chapter defines the policy
refinement tree, which should give the clear overview of the policies specified
by the stakeholders and the policies generated by the tool. At the end of this
chapter, we require that in order to automatically generate the policy refine-
ment tree, we need to capture the expert knowledge in refining policy and to
establish the formalism that supports the automated pattern matching.
Chapter 4: Description Logic-based Model Checking. We identify
that pattern matching problem is similar to the model checking problem.
Thus, in this chapter, we present the description logic-based model checking,
which facilitates the automated pattern matching. We establish the descrip-
tion logic-based model checking by combining both formalisms, namely the
description logic formalism and the temporal logic formalism.
Chapter 5: Refinement Patterns. Inspired by the pattern paradigm,
which has been successfully adapted in the software engineering area, we
want to follow the pattern paradigm to capture the expert knowledge in
refining policies as refinement patterns. Furthermore, we also present the
formalization of the refinement patterns based on the formalism, which is
defined in the previous chapter.
Chapter 6: Policy Refinement Process. This chapter proposes the pol-
icy refinement algorithm by using existing building blocks, which are defined
in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Chapter 7: Architecture. This chapter gives an overview of the imple-
mentation architecture of the tool and its module. It also explains the tools
and standards used.
Chapter 8: Summary and Outlook. This chapter summarizes and
presents the conclusion of our work and gives an outlook to the future work.
Chapter 2
Workflows and Policies
2.1 Introduction
The increasing complexity of a computer system and the flexible manage-
ment of a computer system drive the adoption of policy-driven computer
system management. This approach allows the behavior of the system to be
managed without modifying and re-compiling the source code of the system’s
software. The behavior of a policy-driven system is controlled by some pol-
icy enforcement points and a policy decision point within the system. More
specifically, each access request by subjects is intercepted by the policy en-
forcement point. To decide whether the request is denied or allowed, the
policy enforcement point consults the policy decision point by forwarding
the access request. In return, the policy decision point typically gives a yes
or no response. In other words, the policy decision point has the capability
to decide the request. To facilitate the decision process, the policy decision
point typically consists of a reasoning engine and a policy database. Each
request received by the policy decision point is immediately forwarded to the
reasoning engine. Thus, the reasoning engine retrieves the policies, which
are relevant to the considered access request.
The flexibility in the management of the complex system, using policy
mechanisms, provides a significant advantage in computer system manage-
ment. The architecture is shown in Figure 2.1.
At the same time, the adoption of information technology to support
businesses is also increasing. The business processes of the firms or organi-
zations are automated by IT systems. These automated business processes
are known as workflows. Certainly, the execution of the workflows should
be monitored and governed to avoid undesired execution of the workflows
in order to meet stakeholders’ objectives. These objectives can be achieved
9
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Figure 2.1: The common reference architecture of policy-based system man-
agemen
by employing the policy-based system management approach. Further, the
policy-based management of the workflows allows the immediate execution
of the stakeholders’ objectives.
Outline. This chapter gives a brief explanation of security policies, work-
flows and workflow security policies. The outline of this chapter is as follows:
Section 2.2 introduces the definitions of security policy from several sources.
It also presents our definition of security policy, which is used within this the-
sis. Section 2.3 introduces the workflow and explains the kind of workflow,
which is supported in this thesis. In this case, we consider only the workflow
that can be specified by the UML activity diagram. Further, we also present
the foundation of the workflow formalization. We use the Kripke model to
formalize the workflow. In Section 2.4 we argue the necessity of the workflow
policies. Additionally, we present the definition of the workflow policy in this
section. Section 2.5 closes this chapter with a summary.
2.2 Security Policy
There are several definitions of security policy. Peltier defines a security
policy as a statement of organizational goals or objectives, which aim for the
protection of organizational assets [75]. Eckert states that a security policy
describes the rules, users’ behaviors and security measures, which are should
be taken in order to achieve the security requirements of a considered system
or an organizational unit [35].
On the other hand, we define a security policy as follows:
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Definition 1 (Security Policy) Let the managed system be a finite-state
automaton. A security policy is a statement that contains the rules or security
measures that should be applied to the managed system. Furthermore, the
security policy partitions the states of the system into a set of secure states
and a set of insecure states and allows the system only to run in secure states.
In other words, the security policy governs the behavior of the system
so that it avoids the states, which can lead to the unauthorized information
modification or extraction. It should be noted that the definition of the
security policy is adopted from the security policy definition in [15] and [35].
Wies suggested the security policy life-cycle in policy-driven system man-
agement, which is depicted in Figure 2.2.
enforcement
2
6
abstract
policy
enforceable
policy
monitoring 
deactivation
1
3
4 5
6
Figure 2.2: The life-cycle of security policies (taken from [106])
The policy life-cycle begins with the specification of the high-level poli-
cies. These policies are specified by humans and typically have an informal
representation. The abstract policies are then refined into enforceable poli-
cies (step 1). Thus, the concrete policies can be interpreted by machines.
Eventually, these concrete policies are also verified in order to check whether
they conform to the security requirements or not. It should be noted that the
concrete policies can either be enforced in the managed system or be applied
as the monitoring policies. The enforcement policies first carry out certain
actions and later monitor changes (step 2). The monitoring policies pas-
sively monitor certain managed sub systems and possibly react if necessary.
It should be noted that a change in the management policies may also lead to
a change in the enforcement policies (step 4). Consequently, a change in the
enforcement policies may also lead to a change in the management policies
(step 5).These changes may happen during the runtime process. Finally, the
policies may become obsolete and be replaced with a new set of policies (step
6).
As we could see from the brief explanation of the policy life-cycle above,
this thesis is concerned with the refinement process denoted by step 1 of
Figure 2.2. Our goal is to refine abstract policies, which are specified by
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human, into enforceable policies, which can be interpreted and enforced by
machine.
2.3 Formal Representation of Workflow
Every organization has its own activities that aim to fulfill its organizational
goals. These activities are represented as business processes. However, the
rapid adoption of IT systems enables the automation of the business pro-
cesses. The automated business processes are thus called workflows.
Several workflow representation languages and models exist, such as Busi-
ness Process Execution Language (BPEL) [72], Business Process Modeling
Notation (BPMN) from Object Management Group [46], XML Process Def-
inition Language (XPDL) from Worfklow Management Coalition (WfMC)
[110], and Petri Net [76], which have their own execution semantics.
Nevertheless, in this thesis we only consider the workflows, which are
represented in UML activity diagrams [17]. Figure 2.3 shows an example of
the workflow represented in UML activity diagram.A Real-Time Execution Semantics for UML Activity Diagrams 77
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WAIT
WAIT
WAIT
WAIT
WAIT
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Fig. 1. Example activity diagram
We introduce two semantics. The first semantics supports execution of work-
flow models. Although this semantics is sufficient for executing workflow models,
it is not precise enough for the analysis of functional requirements (model check-
ing), since the behaviour of the environment is not formalised. We therefore
define a second semantics, which we will use for model checking, that extends
the first one by formalising the combined behaviour of both the system that the
activity diagram models and the system’s environment.
Our semantics is different from the OMG activity diagram semantics [16],
because we map activities into states, whereas the OMG maps them into tran-
sitions. The OMG semantics implies that activities are done by the WFS itself,
and not by the environment. In our semantics, activities are done by the envi-
ronment (i.e. actors), not by the WFS itself (see Sect. 2 for our motivation).
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we discuss workflow concepts
and we give an informal semantics of activity diagrams in terms of the domain of
workflow. In Sect. 3 we define the syntax of an activity diagram, and define and
discuss constraints on the syntax. In Sect. 4 we define our two formal semantics.
In Sect. 5 we briefly discuss other formalisations of activity diagrams. We end
with a summary and a discussion of further work. Formulas are written in the
Z notation [17].
2 Workflow Domain
Workflow concepts. The following exposition is based on literature (amongst
others [1,14]) and several case studies that we did.
Activities are done by actors. Actors are people or machines. An activity is
an uninterruptible amount of work that is performed in a non-zero span of time
by an actor. In an activity, case attributes are updated. Case attributes are data
relevant for the case. They may be present in the form of structured data, or
case documents. The effect of an activity is constrained declaratively with a pre
and post-condition. The pre-condition also functions as guard: as long as it is
false, the activity cannot be performed.
Figure 2.3: An example of Workflow represented in UML activity diagram
(taken from [38])
Such workflows are presented by Eshuis et al. [38, 39] and Duma et
al.[34]. Furthermore, Eshuis et al. also presented the formalization of the
activity diagrams into finite state machines [37], which can be translated into
Kripke models [23]. Therefore, the Kripke model can be used to formalize
the workflow. Theoretically, we can also use other notations and models
specifying the workflows, if and only if, their execution semantics can be
formaliz d using Kripke model. However, we do not consider workfl ws with
multiple execution instances introduced in [100].
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The Kripke model is named after its inventor, Saul Kripke, who invented
this model to represent the ”possible world semantics” [56]. A Kripke model
has a set of states, which represent the ”possible situations in the world”,
which may occur. Each state can be labeled by atomic propositions. The
atomic propositions represent the occurrence of some certain events within
this ”snapshot” of the world. Additionally, the model also has a set of state
transitions, which depict the possible ”changes” from one situation into other
situations. The Kripke model is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Kripke Model) A Kripke model K is defined as
K : 〈W, I, L,RL,AP 〉.
W is a set of states, I ⊆ W is a set of initial states, RL ⊆ W ×W is a set
of state transitions, AP is the set of atomic propositions and L : W → 2AP
is a labeling function that maps a state to a subset of atomic propositions.
The atomic propositions symbolize the property of the system that persists in
each particular discrete state of the system.
An execution trace1 of the Kripke model is a finite or infinite sequence
of states starting from the initial states. It indicates the ”history” of the
state transitions of the considered system that could be interpreted as the
behavior of the system. For example, an execution trace σ is described as a
sequence s0s1s2 . . .. Hence, ∀i ∈ N : (si, si+1) ∈ RL.
The definition of the Kripke model says that a state represents the oc-
currence of some certain events within this ”snapshot” of the world, or more
precisely, the system. Since we use the Kripke model to formalize the work-
flow according to Eshuis [37], the invocation of an external function is rep-
resented as an atomic proposition that labels the state of the Kripke model.
However, the exact execution details of this function is outside the scope of
the Kripke model.
The aim of the workflow formalization is to provide a foundation for the
automated refinement process of workflow policies. In the proposed auto-
mated refinement process, which will be presented later, a set of execution
traces in the workflow should be automatically matched. Therefore, the for-
malization of the workflow policies allows us to build an algorithm and to
reuse an existing algorithm that automatically finds a set of execution traces.
Our choice of the formalization method, which is the Kripke model, based
on the argument that we want to be able to characterize a class of execution
traces as a formula. Obviously, finding a class of execution traces that match
1also known as path
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a specific characteristic can also be done by employing the subgraph matching
technique [25, 61]. However, specifying a class of execution traces by defining
a graph is really impracticable, especially when specifying a complex class of
execution traces. Since we use Kripke model, we can characterize a class of
execution traces as a temporal logic formula.
2.4 Workflow Policies
As we can see in the previous section, the common workflow specification
languages only specify the task execution sequences and do not specify any
security constraints. Therefore, these workflow specification languages do
not accommodate any security requirements [107]. This fact also implies
that each state of the Kripke model only has the atomic propositions, which
denote the execution of the tasks. However, in each state of the Kripke
model, any other occurrence of significant events may also occur, for example,
a malicious event.
Let us consider the sequence σ = s1s2s3. The execution trace σ consists of
a sequence of three states. According to Section 2.3, each state contains the
execution of a certain task, which is denoted by the corresponding atomic
proposition as shown in Figure 2.4. The trace σ denotes the execution of
create loan application, check loan application and approve loan application,
subsequently.
s1 : create loan application
s2 : check loan application
s3 : approve loan application
Figure 2.4: The sequence of a loan application process
Suppose that a user performs the task sequence represented by σ by using
role ”manager”. This activity is denoted as sequence σΦ, which states are
shown in Figure 2.5.
Note that, in each state of the trace σΦ an additional proposition is in-
troduced, namely the ”user activates role manager”. The atomic proposition
indicates that in each state of the Kripke model, the user subsequently ex-
ecutes the corresponding tasks and also activates the role manager. The
execution of such a sequence may be harmful to the bank, which runs the
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s′1 : create loan application; user activates role manager
s′2 : check loan application; user activates role manager
s′3 : approve loan application; user activates role manager
Figure 2.5: The sequence of a loan application process performed by a user
workflow, since a single user may create a fictitious loan application and
approve it by himself [85].
This simple example shows the argument that the workflow constraints
are still required in the workflow. Therefore, the security experts analyze the
workflow and identify any potential security threats that may arise within
the workflow. As countermeasures against the identified security threats, the
security experts specify the workflow constraints to restrict the unwanted
behavior of the workflow in a certain sub sequence of the workflow.
Matching to our needs, we define three classes of workflow policies, they
are specified workflow policy, abstract workflow policy and concrete workflow
policy. They are defined as follows:
Definition 3 (specified workflow policy) Recall that W and AP are from
Kripke model K. A specified workflow security policy is a tuple of (γ, P ) ∈
2W × AP , which specifies that property P should hold in each state s ∈ γ.
The set of specified workflow policies is defined as Nspec.
This definition is very practical for the security administrators, since it
allows them to specify a workflow policy, which asserts that property P
should hold in every state s ∈ γ, without explicitly specifying the order of
the states.
For example, the specified workflow policy can be specified as
(W, secure application process). W contains all states of Kripke model K,
and secure application process is the desired security property, which should
hold in every state of the Kripke model.
On the other hand, the policy refinement process generates workflow poli-
cies, which explicitly denote the sequence of the states. First, we present the
definition of the set of finite traces of Kripke model K.
Definition 4 (set of finite traces) The set Fragment(K) is a set of all
possible finite traces in Kripke model K. It is defined as:
{s0..sn|∃n = 0 : sn ∈ W ∨ ∃n > 0,∀i ∈ {1, .., n} : si ∈ W ∧ (si−1, si) ∈ RL}
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where W and RL is the set of possible worlds and relations of Kripke model
K, respectively.
Thus, we propose the definition of abstract workflow policy and concrete
workflow policy as follows:
Definition 5 (abstract workflow policy) An abstract workflow policy is
a tuple (σ, P ) ∈ Fragment(K) × AP , which asserts that every state of se-
quence σ has the label P . σ is a fragment of task execution sequence in the
workflow and P is a state label representing the desired workflow security
property that should hold in every state of sequence σ. The set of abstract
workflow policies is defined as Nabs.
As an example for the abstract workflow policy, we present a policy
T = (σ, prevent fictive loan) that should prevent the fraud, which aims at
creating a fictitious loan application in task sequence σ.
Definition 6 (concrete workflow policy) A concrete workflow policy is
a tuple (σ, P ) ∈ Fragment(K) × AP , which asserts that every state of se-
quence σ has the label P . σ is a fragment of task execution sequence in the
workflow and P is a state label representing the application of a certain se-
curity mechanism or authorization constraint that should be applied within
sequence σ. The set of concrete workflow policies is defined as Ncon.
An example for the concrete workflow policy according to Definition 6 is
(σ, separate the execution of first and last task). This policy states the
application of authorization constraint within the sequence σ. The constraint
restricts the execution of the first task (create loan application) and the last
task (approve loan application) of sequence σ.
2.5 Summary
This chapter serves as a brief introduction to the security policy, workflow
formalization and workflow policy.
In the beginning, we presented some definitions of security policy, which
are not exactly the same, but have some commonalities between them. In a
nutshell, the policy controls the behavior of the managed system. We also
presented the definition of security policy. This should help the reader to get
an overview of the security policy terminology. Subsequently, we presented
the life-cycle of policies in order to understand the whole process involving
policies and to identify the step in the life-cycle, in which we make our
contribution to. This step is known as refinement process.
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The aim of the security policy is to control the behavior of the managed
system, such that it meets the security objectives of the stakeholders. Hence,
the source of the security policies is the intention of the stakeholders to
protect their asset, which is the managed system, and the target of the
security policies is the managed system, on which the security policies should
be enforced.
Since we deal with the refinement of the workflow policies, we should first
explain workflow, before we can discuss workflow policy. Here,we stated one
kind of workflow specification language, which is considered in our work. We
currently consider the workflow specified in UML activity diagram, since it
can be formalized by using the Kripke model based on the existing research
work [37]. We consider using the Kripke model to formalize the workflow,
because we can characterize a class of execution traces within the workflow
by using a formula, in particular, a temporal logic formula. This is very
useful, since we want to find a set of execution traces, in which a certain
workflow policy applies.
Finally, this chapter provides a basis for the next chapter, which presents
the policy refinement tree.
Chapter 3
Policy Refinement Tree
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we presented the approach to specify workflow poli-
cies of the stakeholders as state labels of the Kripke model and also some
classes of policies. However, analyzing the fulfillment of the specified policies
based on the application of the concrete policies is very difficult. There-
fore, we need an hierarchical representation of the relationships between the
policies.
Motivation. The term of policy hierarchy has been coined by Moffett et al.
[64] and Maullo and Calo [21]. However, only Moffett et al. pointed out that
the policy hierarchy is a result of the refinement of abstract policies into a set
of concrete policies. This is due to the fact that each refinement step of an
abstract policy generates a set of sub policies. Furthermore, they argued that
the hierarchical relationships between policies is required to determine the
satisfaction of abstract policy. In other words, the fulfillment of the abstract
policy strongly depends on the fulfillment of its sub policies. Bandara et
al. introduced the AND-branches (OR-branches) into the policy hierarchy
[10]. An abstract policy, which is connected to its sub policies through AND-
branch (OR-branch), is satisfied, if and only if, all (some) of its sub policies
are satisfied. Therefore, the policy hierarchy should help us to analyze the
fulfillment of the abstract policies.
The aim of this construction is very similar to Fault Tree Analysis [11,
105]. Fault Tree Analysis aims at finding the minimal cut set, which is a col-
lection of basic event failures that can lead to the occurrence of the top-event
[11]. On the other hands, policy refinement tree also aims at determining the
set of concrete policies, which should be applied and preserve the fulfillment
18
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of the higher policies. Usually, the administrators strive to fulfill the specified
policies only by applying a minimal set of concrete policies. This is due to
the fact that the application of concrete policies may induce additional cost
or even constrain the activities of the users participating in this workflow.
To summarize, we need an hierarchical representation of the relationships
between the policies, because we need to determine the fulfillment of the
abstract policies that depend on the application of the concrete policies.
Outline. Section 3.2 first presents our argumentation, on which our deci-
sion to consider the goal-oriented requirements engineering methods to con-
struct the policy refinement tree is based. It then subsequently continues
with the related work, which are the goal-oriented requirements engineering
methods.
Based on the definitions of workflow policies presented in Section 2.4, we
propose the construction of the policy refinement tree in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 defines the fulfillment of a policy refinement tree. Thus, Section 3.5
concludes this chapter.
3.2 Related Work
This section discusses the methods that are related to the policy refinement
tree, which will be presented later. We divide this section into two parts.
The first part discusses the Fault Tree Analysis method, which inspires the
construction of the policy refinement tree. In the second part, we discusses
some approaches that deal with the hierarchical representation of policies or
goals.
3.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis
The concept of policy refinement tree is inspired by the Fault Tree Analysis
method [11, 105]. The Fault Tree Analysis method is one of the failure
analysis methods in field of engineering, especially, safety engineering field.
This method was first developed in early 1960 to analyze the failures of
failure-critical systems, i.e., nuclear plants. Thus, the Fault Tree Analysis
method constructs a tree that depicts the event of failures.
The root node of the tree represents the “top-event of failure” of the con-
sidered (sub-)system. Starting from this node, further events, which influence
the occurrence of the top-event, should be added.
In general, there are two categories of event defined in the fault tree
analysis, they are intermediate event and basic event. The intermediate event
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results from a combination of sub-events, which are connected through a
logic gate. The “top-event” falls into this category. These gates are logical
AND- and OR-gates. The events are further decomposed until, eventually,
all intermediate events are decomposed into basic events. A basic event is
the most primitive event, which is cannot be decomposed. Thus, the root
and the inner nodes of the tree are intermediate events and the leaf nodes
are basic events.
The fulfillment of the intermediate events, especially top-event, is deter-
mined by the fulfillment of their sub events, because each intermediate events
is connected through the boolean gates. Furthermore, the fulfillment of an
intermediate event can be expressed as a logical formula, which consists of
a conjunction or disjunction of several fulfillments of the sub events. If the
sub events are still intermediate events, the fulfillments of these sub events
can be further substituted into the fulfillments of the basic events according
to the structure of the Fault Tree.
In Figure 3.1, we can see the example of an Fault Tree model. The Fault
Tree has the event called “Boiler level above limit when operating” as the
top event. The “+” and “·” gates in Figure 3.1 represents the “OR” and
“AND” gates, respectively. The fulfillment of the top-event can be expressed
as the following formula:
(((sensor 1 failure ∧ sensor 2 failure) ∨ control stuck on )
∨ pump stuck on) ∨ level > limit upon startup.
The main goal of the Fault Tree Analysis is to find a minimal cut set,
which is defined as a smallest combination of basic event failures, which, if
they all occur, will cause the top event to occur [105].
3.2.2 Hierarchical Representation of Policies or Goals
Works by Bandara and Rubio-Loyola [10, 82] about policy refinement present
the adoption of goal refinement tree [102, 101], which is introduced by Lam-
sweerde et al., to represent the policy hierarchy. In this sense, they share a
common point of view, which states that a goal is almost similar to a policy.
Furthermore, Maullo and Calo [21] define a goal as one of the abstraction
levels in the policy hierarchy.
To have a common understanding of a goal, we present the definition of
goal according to Lamsweerde et al. [102]:
Definition 7 A goal denotes the desired objective that a considered system
should meet.
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Fig. 3. A Fault Tree for the Boiler System
events). The system fault is shown as the event at the root of the tree. Event
symbols are connected in the tree by gate symbols, which are either and-gates
or or-gates.
The full fault tree notation has many more event and gate symbols, but if
we do not consider the probabilistic meaning of fault trees then the symbols we
have described are enough.
Figure 3.1: A Fault Tree for the Boiler System taken from [9]
Generally speaking, a goal is a statement that controls the behavior of the
considered system in order to achieve the desired behavior. Intui ively, the
purpose of a goal is very similar to the purpose of a policy, namely, to control
the behavior of the considered system. Although these two terminologies are
not the same, b t their purpose is the sam .
However, there are also another view that points out the differences be-
tween goal and policy. Feather pointed out in [40] that a policy is used to
specify a desired goal. It means that the goal is more general and abstract
than the policy and the policy is used to describe the goal in more detail.
Sutcliffe et al. states in their paper that a policy is a class of goals [97]. Thus,
they share the opinion that the goal is more general than the policy.
Nevertheless, both goals and policies share the same purpose, namely to
control the behavior of the considered system. Therefore, we follow the ap-
proach of Bandara and Rubio-Loyola of adopting the goal refinement tree,
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which originates from the goal-oriented requirements engineering, to repre-
sent the policy hierarchy.
The related work discussed below mainly deals with the goal-oriented
requirements engineering. That means, these approaches make use of the
concept “goal” to represent a requirement. The goal-oriented requirements
engineering approach has recently been gaining more attention. The advan-
tages offered by the goal-oriented requirements engineering are as follows
(taken from [102]):
• A goal is capable of capturing the objectives, which the system under
consideration should achieve, at different levels of abstraction.
• By specifying the requirements as goals, one could define the influence
relationships between goals that specify whether the achievement of a
goal positively or negatively influences the achievements of other goals.
This enables the analysis of the dependencies between the requirements.
• Naturally, the goals at the higher level of abstraction are subject to the
refinement process resulting in a goal refinement tree. The nature of
the goal refinement tree provides a mechanism for structuring complex
requirements documents. Thus, it also increases the readability of the
complex requirements for the stakeholders.
• Moreover, the goal refinement tree provides the traceability links from
high-level strategic objectives to the low-level technical requirements.
This will greatly help the stakeholders to focus more on the manage-
ment objectives than the technical details, but also allows the stake-
holders to take a closer look at the low-level technical requirements
fulfilling the high-level strategic objectives, if needed.
Obviously, the goal-oriented requirements engineering is not without any
disadvantage. It still, however, lacks tool support and is not yet established
as the use cases diagram of the UML standard.
KAOS
The KAOS approach has been developed by Darimont and van Lamsweerde
et al. [101, 103, 102, 28, 29] as a framework to support the requirements
engineering process by using the goal concept.
The KAOS approach captures requirements as goals, which have dual rep-
resentations. The first representation is a text, which informally describes
the goal. This representation provides the non-technical persons, such as
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stakeholders, with an easily understandable formulation of the goal. The
second representation, which corresponds to the first representation, is the
formulation of the goal in terms of Linear-time Temporal Logic formalism.
This formal representation has the purpose of enabling the precise formu-
lation of the goals. Furthermore, this representation also allows the formal
verification of the requirements and the generation of, i.e., code fragments
and test cases [101].
This approach defines four classes of goals, they are Maintain, Avoid,
Achieve and Cease. The goals of the types of Maintain and Avoid indicate
that the goals should always be fulfilled or should never be fulfilled in the
future, respectively. The goals of the types Achieve and Cease indicate that
the goals should eventually be fulfilled in future, or should cease to be fulfilled
in the future, respectively.
The interesting fact is that this approach is also used to elicit security
requirements, which is presented in [104]. The security requirements are
represented as a goal refinement tree. The elicitation of the security require-
ments is accomplished by constructing the anti-model tree. The anti-model
tree represents the malicious intention of the attackers, which follows the idea
of the attack tree presented by Schneier [90]. Nevertheless, the anti-model
tree is more sophisticated compared to the original attack tree by formally
representing the malicious intention. By considering the anti-model tree,
one can concurrently derive the security requirements in the form of the goal
refinement tree.
In Figure 3.2, we present an example of a goal refinement tree, which is
taken from [28]. Each goal is represented by the rectangle node. It should be
noted that there are two types of goals, ordinary goals and operationalizable
goals. The ordinary goal resembles the abstract policy, which cannot be
enforced and thus should be refined. On the other hand, the operationalizable
goal, which is represented as a rectangle with bold line, resembles the concrete
policy, which can be interpreted and thus enforced by the machine. It should
be noted that each goal has either an AND-joint connection or an OR-joint
connection with its sub-goals. These connections denote the fulfillment of
the goals.
I-star
A similar framework that follows the KAOS approach is the I-star framework
(I-*) introduced by Yu [111]. The I-* framework makes use of conceptual
modeling to capture the requirements as goals. An actor, which can either
be a human or an active software entity, plays a central role in this model.
Every actor considered relevant in the requirement process is depicted as a
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objects which are relevant to goals are under consideration.
HOW: The identification and reduction of goals is a non-trivial, but critical, task. Analysts and cli-
ents must interact a lot at this stage. The following tactics help the analyst to refine the goal struc-
ture.
1) Reuse relevant generic goals and reductions by specializing/instantiating their description.  Ge-
neric goals are retrieved in the domain knowledge base; the indexing scheme for retrieval is based
on goal category, goal pattern, and IsA links between the Concerned objects already identified and
their generalizations in the domain models available. The retrieved goals and their reductions are
then considered for specialization and adaptation to the specific composite system being modeled.
For example, the BookRequestSatisfied introduced in Section 2.7 was handled in that way. This
goal was classified in the "SatisfactionGoal" category and was declared to have an Achieve pattern;
the Concerned Borrower and Book objects were declared to be IsA specializations of the generic
User and Resource objects in the resource management domain model, respectively. The following
requirements fragment is then retrieved in the domain knowledge base on that basis:
   SystemGoal  Achieve [ResourceRequestSatisfied]
    InstanceOf  SatisfactionGoal
Concerns   User, Resource, Using, ...
FormalDef  (∀ u: User, res: Resource, rep: Repository)
           Requesting (u, res) ∧  InScope (res, rep)
              ⇒ ◊ (∃ ru: ResourceUnit ) (Unit (ru, res) ∧ Using (u, ru))
         ReducedTo  EnoughUnits, UnitsAvailable, AvailabilityNotified
The generic concept names are then instantiated to their library-specific counterpart, and the ge-
neric InScope predicate has to be specialized in an appropriate fashion to the library-specific con-
 = goal
Figure 3: Portion of a Goal Structure for borrower goals
= operationalizable goal
Achieve
Maintain
Maintain
BibliographyRequestSatisfied
Achieve
BorrowerPrivacyBorrowerRequestSatisfied
BookRequestSatisfied
Maintain
LongBorrowingPeriod
Maintain
AccurateClassification
Maintain
RegularAvailability
Achieve
AvailabilityNotified
Maintain
EnoughCopies
Maintain
AsManyCopiesAsNeeded
Maintain
GoodCoverage
  = AND reduction links
  = OR reduction links
....
= conflict
...
... ...
Figure 3.2: An example of goal refinement tree taken from [28]
node. These actors depend on each other and the dependency relationships
between them are depicted as directed edges between the nodes. Each depen-
dency rel tionsh p always has a depender and a pende . These depend ncy
relationships are classified into four categories: resource dependency, task
dependency, goal dependency and soft-goal dependency. Nevertheless, our
interest lies in the goal and soft-goal depe dency relationships.
Both goal and soft-goal dependency relationships denotes t at an actor
(depender) depends on another actor (dependee) to make a certain goal true.
Since the goal expresses only the d sired pr p rties or st tes of the consid-
ered s stem, the depende has fr edom to choose how it achieves the goal.
The particular type of goal dependency, namely the soft-goal dependency,
represents the requi ement that can not be directly achieved by means of
any implementation. Such a requirement is also known as a non-functional
requirement and typically deals with the quality of a particular property of
the system. With this fact, we learn that the goal is always related to the de-
pender, who claims the achievement of the requirement, and to the dependee,
who guarantees the achievement of this goal.
The usage of the conceptual modeling method in this approach gives
an easy understanding to the stakeholders, although it lacks in the formal
representation of the requirements.
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AGORA
AGORA is an abbreviation of attributed goal-oriented requirements analy-
sis, which is presented by Kaiya et al. [54]. Basically, it is an extension
of the previously mentioned goal-oriented requirements engineering methods
by introducing attributes to the goal refinement tree. They found out that
the existing goal-oriented requirements engineering does not support some
features, such as prioritizing and solving the conflicting goals, analyzing the
impacts when the requirements change, etc. These shortcomings are ad-
dressed by adding contribution value and preference matrix to each edge and
each node, respectively. The contribution value, which is represented as in-
teger value, represents the degree of a sub-goal to the fulfillment of its parent
goal, while the preference matrix represents the preference of the goal for
stakeholders, for example, customer and developer.
3.2.3 Risk Assessment Using SemanticLIFE
Mansoor Ahmed et al. presented in [2] an approach to risk assessment in
collaborative environments, which makes use of semantic web technology.
The risk assessment process is realized by using the SemanticLIFE platform
[3]. The extensibility of the platform is achieved through its modular ar-
chitecture. The platform acquires the data containing the user annotations
through some input plug-ins, such as Google Desktop2 captured data, com-
munication logs, etc. The information about managed or analyzed objects
are also passed by the corresponding plug-in. Both data objects are passed
on to the analysis plug-in, which can perform the feature extraction methods
and indexing techniques. This information is stored as meta-store, which
schema is structurally defined as ontologies. The pre-defined core ontologies,
which are used in the risk assessment process, are already defined in the
repository.
Through the appropriate plug-ins one can define and modify the seman-
tic relationships between the objects and more importantly, construct the
semantic relationships to build the risk assessment model. As its proof of
concept, the SemanticLIFE has been used to calculate the Annual Loss Ex-
pectancy.
Surely this approach would be such a great extension to our policy re-
finement tree model, since it incorporates a set of useful core ontologies.
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3.3 Policy Refinement Tree
The related work discussed in the previous section influences our proposal
for the policy refinement tree. Basically, the policy refinement tree is similar
to the original Fault Tree Analysis. However, we use the set of previously
defined policies as the nodes of the tree and present the formal semantics of
the policy refinement tree. In the following we will define the structure of
the policy refinement tree and then its formal semantics.
3.3.1 Structure of the Policy Refinement Tree
A policy refinement tree consists of policies representing specified (Nspec),
abstract (Nabs) and concrete (Ncon) policies. These policies are connected
together through gates. More precisely, the “out-pin” of a gate is connected
to a policy and the “in-pins” of the gate are connected to sub policies. By
using the gates to connect the policies, we will expect a hierarchical structure
of the tree. In the following, we present the definitions of the policies and
the gates.
Definition 8 (policies of the tree) Recall the definitions of Nspec, Nabs
and Ncon from Definition 3, 5 and 6. N = Nspec ∪ Nabs ∪ Ncon ∪ {ω} is the
set of policies, whereas ω is the root policy.
Definition 9 (AND-gates) AndGate ⊂ N × 2N is the set of AND-gates.
Let x, y1, . . . , yn ∈ N . If the fulfillment of x is equivalent to the logical con-
junction of the fulfillments of y1, . . . , yn, then an AND-gate is specified. x is
the output of the gate and y1, . . . , yn are the inputs of the gate.
Definition 10 (OR-gates) OrGate ⊂ N × 2N is the set of OR-gates.
Let x, y1, . . . , yn ∈ N . If the fulfillment of x is equivalent to the logical dis-
junction of the fulfillments of y1, . . . , yn, then an OR-gate is specified. x is
the output of the gate and y1, . . . , yn are the inputs of the gate.
Definition 8 specifies the set of policies N , which consists of previously
defined policies (specified, abstract and concrete policies) and a root policy
ω.
Definition 9 and Definition 10 define the gates that connect a policy with
its sub policies. Thus, the gates determine the decompositions of the policies.
However, the semantics of these gates will be defined in the next section.
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Example 1 Let Nspec, Nabs and Ncon be defined as follows:
Nspec = {({s1, s2, s3, s4}, secure loan appl process)}
Nabs = {(s1s2s3, prevent fictive appl), (s1s2s3s4, prevent unauth access)}
Ncon = {(s1s2s3, separate first and last tasks),
(s1s2s3, access only for role employee)}
For the sake of brevity, we substitute the policies with symbols:
P1
def
= (s1s2s3s4, secure loan appl process)
P2
def
= (s1s2s3, prevent fictive appl)
P3
def
= (s1s2s3, prevent unauth access)
P4
def
= (s1s2s3, separate first and last tasks)
P5
def
= (s1s2s3, access only for role employee)
Then, the gates are specified as follows:
AndGate = {(ω, {P1}), (P1, {P2, P3}), (P2, {P4}), (P3, {P5})}
OrGate = ∅
Furthermore, we impose some restrictions to the gates. Before we intro-
duce the restriction, we define the following relation:
Definition 11 (sub policies relation) Let d, e ∈ N . We define the tran-
sitive relation
sub
⇁ as
d
sub
⇁ e
def
= ∃(u, V ) ∈ AndGate ∪OrGate : d = u ∧ e ∈ V.
Informally, this definition specifies the sub policy relation between a policy
and its sub policy. Thus, d
sub
⇁ e says that e is one of the sub policies of d.
Example 2 Recall the set AndGate from Example 1. Thus we have that
ω
sub
⇁ P1 and also ω
sub
⇁ P5.
After defining the sub policies relation
sub
⇁, we can define the relationships
between the policies from different classes.
Definition 12 (sub policies of the root policy) ω can only have speci-
fied policies Nspec as its sub policies.
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Example 3 Let us consider Example 1. The sub policy of ω is P1, which is
an element of Nspec.
Definition 13 (sub policies of specified policies) Each policy of speci-
fied policies Nspec can only have either abstract or concrete policies (Nabs or
Ncon) as its sub policies.
Example 4 Let us consider Example 1. The sub policies of P1 are P2 and
P3, which are elements of Nabs.
Definition 14 (sub policies of abstract policies) Each policy of abstract
policies Nabs can only have either abstract or concrete policies (Nabs or Ncon)
as its sub policies.
Example 5 Let us consider Example 1. The sub policy of P2 is P4, which
is an element of Ncon.
Definition 12 - Definition 13 define the sub policies relationships between
the classes of policies. These relationships can be depicted in Figure 3.3
root
policy
abstract
policy
specified
policy
concrete
policy
policy
sub policies relationship
Figure 3.3: relationships between the classes of policies
Restriction to the gates The following restriction rules apply to the
gates:
• if (a, b) ∈ AndGate∪OrGate∧ (a, c) ∈ AndGate∪OrGate, then b = c
This restriction ensures the functional mapping relationship from each
policy to a set of policies. It also implies that each policy can only have
a single set of sub policies, which is connected through a gate.
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• @xn ∈ N : x1 sub⇁ x2 sub⇁ . . . sub⇁ xn sub⇁ x1
This restriction forbids the cyclic sub policies relationships between the
policies.
• ∀x ∈ N : ω sub⇁ x→ x ∈ Nspec
This restriction says that all sub policies of the root policy ω are spec-
ified policies.
• ∀x ∈ Nspec,∀y ∈ N : x sub⇁ y → y ∈ Nabs ∨ y ∈ Ncon
This restriction says that all sub policies of each specified policy are
either abstract policies or concrete policies.
• ∀x ∈ Nabs, ∀y ∈ N : x sub⇁ y → (y ∈ Nabs ∧ y ∈ Ncon)
This restriction says that all sub policies of each abstract policy are
either abstract policies or concrete policies.
3.3.2 Formal Semantics of the Policy Refinement Tree
Previously, we defined the structure of the policy refinement tree without any
semantics. Therefore, we will present some definitions to build the formal
semantics of the policy refinement tree.
Definition 15 (signature) Since N is finite set, then N is also a countable
set. Thus, we define N as the signature.
Definition 16 (symbols) We define the following symbols:
• T represents “true”,
• F represents “false”,
• ⊗ represents the conjunction symbol,
• ⊕ represents the disjunction symbol.
Definition 17 (formula) Form is the set of formulas over Signature N .
Form is inductively defined as:
1. T ∈ Form
F ∈ Form
N ⊆ Form
2. if A, B ∈ Form, then
A⊗B ∈ Form
A⊕B ∈ Form.
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Definition 15 - Definition 17 construct the building blocks for the formulas
over N . Example 6 shows us the formulas, which are constructed by these
definitions.
Example 6 Recall the set of policies {P1, . . . , P5} from Example 1. Thus,
P2⊗P3, P3⊕P4⊕P5 and P1⊗P2⊗P3⊗P4⊗P5 are the elements of Form.
Definition 18 (substitution) subst : N → Form substitutes a policy,
which is decomposed into several sub policies, into a conjunction or disjunc-
tion of its sub policies. It is defined as:
subst(n)
def
=

subst(a1)⊗ . . .⊗ subst(an), ∃(n, {a1, . . . , an}) ∈ AndGate
subst(a1)⊕ . . .⊕ subst(an), ∃(n, {a1, . . . , an}) ∈ OrGate
n, otherwise.
Example 7 Recall the set AndGate and OrGate from Example 1. Then we
have:
subst(ω) = subst(P1)
= subst(P2)⊗ subst(P3)
= subst(P4)⊗ subst(P5)
= P4 ⊗ P5
In the previous example we see that the subst function substitutes each
policy with a conjunction of its sub policies. This function is recursively
applied to the policies until the policy does not have any sub policies. This
function is used when we want to evaluate the fulfillment of the policies.
Now we define the functions that are used to evaluate the fulfillment of
the policies.
Definition 19 (policy application function) app : N → {true, false}
determines the application of concrete policy.
app(n)
def
=
{
true, if policy n is applied,
false, if policy n is not applied.
Example 8 Suppose that all concrete policies from Example 1 are enforced.
Thus, we define app as {P4 7→ true, P5 7→ true}.
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Definition 20 (evaluation function) eval : Form → {true, false} eval-
uates each formula with the following rules:
eval(T ) = true
eval(F ) = false
eval(Ncon) = app(Ncon)
eval(a1 ⊗ . . .⊗ an) =
∧
i∈{1,...,n}
eval(ai)
eval(a1 ⊕ . . .⊕ an) =
∨
i∈{1,...,n}
eval(ai)
Example 9 let us consider the assignment of app function from Example 8.
If we want to evaluate P4 ⊗ P5, then
eval(P4⊗P5) = eval(P4)∧eval(P5) = app(P4)∧app(P5) = true∧true = true.
Now we can define the policy refinement tree.
Definition 21 (policy refinement tree) A policy refinement tree Tpol is
defined as:
Tpol : 〈ω,N,AndGate,OrGate, app〉.
Example 10 Recall N , AndGate and OrGate from Example 1 and app
function from Example 8. Tpol is a policy refinement tree with:
N = {ω, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}
AndGate = {(ω, {P1}), (P1, {P2, P3}), (P2, {P4}), (P3, {P5})}
OrGate = ∅
app = {P4 7→ true, P5 7→ true}
The fulfillment of the policy refinement tree is defined as follows.
Definition 22 (fulfillment of the policy refinement tree) The policy re-
finement tree is fulfilled if and only if, eval(subst(ω)) = true.
Example 11 Consider the policy refinement tree Tpol from Example 11. We
want to determine the value of eval(subst(ω)).
eval(subst(ω))
Example7
= eval(P4 ⊗ P5)
Example9
= true
Since eval(subst(ω)) = true, then the policy refinement tree is fulfilled.
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3.4 The Fulfillment of the Policy Refinement
Tree
The policy refinement tree is very similar to the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
tree [105], which is widely used in industrial and mechanical engineering.
Therefore, the fulfillment of the root policy of a policy refinement tree is also
similar to the root event of a FTA tree. The fulfillment of the root policy
depends on the application of the concrete policies denoted by the leaves of
the tree.
Intuitively, one could fulfill the root policy by applying all concrete poli-
cies. But this assumption only holds if there is no conflict between the policies
represented in the refinement tree. On the other hand, applying all concrete
policies seems impractical. As a matter of fact, the presence of conflicts
between the policies prevents the application of all concrete policies. There-
fore, the security experts and administrators strive to find the minimal set
of concrete policies, which can be applied to satisfy the root policy. Clearly,
the set of concrete policies should be free from any conflicts. This problem
is also known in the FTA research community as minimal cut-set. However,
we consider this problem as beyond of this thesis.
3.5 Summary
We know that the common practices in representing security policies use dif-
ferent representations for different abstraction levels. However, this thesis
tries to answer the following question: “Is it possible, to perform an auto-
matic refinement of the security policies?” In our attempt to answer this
question, we investigate the research work in the requirements engineering
fields and adopt some ideas from this work. The most obvious adoption is
the refinement tree that allows a uniform representation of security policies
across different abstraction levels.
In this chapter, we present the definition of the refinement tree of the
workflow security policy. Each node of this tree represents a security policy,
which expresses the desired property within a fragment of an execution path
of the workflow design. It specifies that all states within this fragment of
execution path are labeled with the atomic proposition representing the de-
sired behavior. It should be noted that the existence of the policy refinement
tree always depends on the Kripke model representing the behavior of the
workflow design. As a matter of fact, a policy refinement tree shows the
hierarchical structure of the state labels representing the desired properties
within the Kripke model.
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We also present an example of the refinement tree of a security policy
pertaining to the loan application process. As we can see from the example,
the root security policy refers to a very broad fragment of the workflow
execution path and also specifies a very general desired property. On the
other hand, the security policies represented by the leaves of the tree refer
only to small fragments of the workflow execution path and specify concrete
workflow policies. This is made possible by the refinement process, which
is performed by the security experts. This process analyzes the abstract
security policies and specifies the sub-policies by attaching sub-nodes to the
corresponding node.
We shall now raise two questions in regard to this refinement problem:
(i) how can we automate the refinement process, and (ii) how can we capture
the expert knowledge in refining the abstract security policies?
To continue our quest in answering these questions, the next two chapters
present the methods we have developed, which enable the automated con-
struction of the refinement process and facilitate the acquisition of security
experts’ knowledge in refining the workflow security policies.
Chapter 4
Description Logic-based Model
Checking
4.1 Introduction
The policy refinement process constructs the security policy refinement tree
introduced in Chapter 3 by attaching new nodes on to the lowest nodes of the
tree. The new nodes represent the less abstract sub policies and the lowest
nodes represent the unrefined abstract policies. Simultaneously, attaching
new sub policies also defines some new state labels in the particular states of
the Kripke model, which represents the workflow’s behavior and the abstract
workflow policies. These sub policies are proposed by the expert knowledge,
which is documented as refinement patterns.
Thus, the policy refinement process can be generally seen as an iteration,
which consists of two steps. They are the pattern matching and the pattern
instantiation steps. The pattern matching step checks whether some par-
ticular refinement patterns can be used to refine the abstract policies. The
pattern instantiation step adds new sub policies in the policy refinement tree
and also adds some state labels into some particular states of the Kripke
model. In this chapter, however, we will focus more on the pattern matching
step.
The pattern matching step takes a refinement pattern and the Kripke
model as its input and generates a set of fragments of the execution paths,
which match the description of the abstract policies described in the refine-
ment pattern. If the pattern matching step generates only an empty set,
then the refinement pattern cannot be used to refine the currently available
abstract policies.
Since we want to automate the pattern refinement process, we also want
34
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to automate the pattern matching step. There are several approaches that
can be used to perform the automated pattern matching, namely: (i) sub-
graph isomorphism matching, (ii) intersection between two automata and
(iii) temporal logic model checking. The first and the second approaches only
allow us to specify the pattern in the form of a graph or of an automaton,
respectively.
We opted for the latter, namely the temporal logic model checking be-
cause it allows us to specify the pattern as a set of temporal logic formulas,
which is more convenient to the pattern authors. The concept presented in
this chapter has already been presented in [80].
Motivation. Our goal is to automate the pattern matching by using tem-
poral logic model checking. The model checking technique is widely used in
the software verification process. The purpose of model checking technique
is to verify whether the implemented computer program (the model) satis-
fies the specified requirements (the formulas). The model checking technique
has three basic steps, they are: (i) modeling the behavior of a system into a
formalism accepted by a model checking tool, (ii) specification of the desired
properties in terms of temporal logic formulas and (iii) the model check-
ing process. The verification process checks whether the model satisfies the
properties represented in temporal logic formulas. In this thesis, we focus our
work only on state-based model checking, which relies heavily on a Kripke
model.
Let K be a Kripke model, Req be a set of formulas and Σ be a set of
execution paths. The model checking process verifies whether every formula
in Req is satisfied by the model. Formally, it checks whether ∀f ∈ Req, ∀pi ∈
Σ : K, pi  f is true or not. Further, we can also retrieve the set of execution
paths, which satisfy the formulas in Req [23, 22].
As we can see, this approach can also be used to identify the fragment of
the execution path as described above. One can also interpret that the for-
mula is the characterization of the execution path, which should be identified
by the refinement process.
However, the model checking process cannot be performed if the set of
atomic propositions used to model the behavior of the system (the first step of
the model checking) differs from the set of atomic propositions used to specify
the desired properties (the second step of model checking). Therefore, we
propose the combination of the temporal logic formalism with the description
logic formalism to solve this problem.
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Outline. We begin this chapter with Section 4.2 introducing the back-
ground. This involves the introduction of the description logic theory and
temporal logic. We also present some related work with regard to our ap-
proach in description logic-based model checking in Section 4.3. Section 4.4
explains the concept of the description logic-based model checking. Section
4.5 defines a partially ordered relationship between temporal logic formula
represented in description logic formalism, which is very useful to compare
between two temporal logic formulas. Section 4.6 presents the algorithm
to find the execution paths that are characterized by the temporal formula.
Section 4.7 presents the proof that the algorithm always generates a finite
set of traces. Section 4.8 presents the example of the description logic-based
model checking. Section 4.9 concludes this chapter with a summary.
4.2 Background
The description logic-based model checking combines two formalisms, namely
description logic and temporal logic. We briefly explain both formalisms as
follows.
4.2.1 Description Logic
The description logic theory provides a formalism to represent domain-specific
knowledge. It stems from the research of semantic networks [77], which was
enriched with the logic foundation to achieve the desired formalism. This
formalism defines a family of description logic language to represent the
knowledge. Since the description logic-based knowledge representation in-
herits the semantic networks method, it has an advantage, which lies in the
intuitive, easy and practical method of representing knowledge compared to
the rule-based approach [7].
In this thesis we will only explain the description logic language, knowl-
edge representation system and the reasoning services provided by the knowl-
edge representation system. A more comprehensive discussion of description
logic theory can be found in [7].
Description Logic Language
The description logic formalism defines a family of description logic language
to represent the knowledge. The language is constructed by the language
constructors. The most basic description logic language is the language class
AL, which can be extended by adding new constructors. This extension is
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performed in order to achieve more expressiveness in representing the knowl-
edge.
Representing the Knowledge
Since the DL-based knowledge representation originates from semantic net-
work, both methods to represent knowledge are very similar. A semantic
network can be roughly identified as a connected graph. The nodes and the
edges of the graph represent the terminologies and the relationships between
terminologies, respectively. In terms of DL-knowledge representation, the
terminology and its relationship are referred to as concept and role, respec-
tively. To avoid confusion with the role terminology, we shall use the term
relationship instead.
In practice, DL language is used to describe the concepts, ranging from
atomic concepts to complex concepts to build the knowledge. For example,
the concepts represented by the DL language AL are constructed according
to the following syntax rules [7]:
C,D −→ A|>|⊥|¬A|C uD|∀R.D|∃R.>
C and D are arbitrary concepts and A is an atomic concept. In DL-
knowledge representation, there always exist two default concepts, they are
> and ⊥, which serve as the most general and the most specific concepts
that bound the taxonomy from the top and the bottom, respectively. The
¬ operator defines the complement of the concept. The u binary operator
denotes the intersection between two concepts. ∀R.C constructor denotes
that the concept has only relationships called R with the concept C. ∃R.>
constructor means that the concept has some relationships called R with any
arbitrary concept.
If we want to describe the term “rich employee” as employees, who only
have expensive cars and have (at least) a house, then we can describe this
as:
RichEmployee ≡ Person u Employee u ∀hasCar .ExpensiveCar u ∃hasHouse.>.
DL-based Knowledge Representation System
A DL-based knowledge representation system consists of three parts.
• terminology box (Tbox)
Intuitively, this container stores all definition of the terminologies or
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concepts, such as the concept RichEmployee introduced above. It con-
tains the domain specific knowledge, which is not bound to any partic-
ular real-world situation.
• assertion box (Abox)
The purpose of this container is to store the knowledge about a partic-
ular real-world situation with respect to a Tbox. It contains individuals
representing the real-world entities, which are asserted as a member of
the concepts defined in the Tbox. For example, john is a rich person.
Therefore, we insert the assertion RichPerson(john) in the Abox.
• reasoning service
The most important part of the DL-based knowledge representation
system is its reasoning services. Currently, the actual list of DL-
reasoner maintained by Sattler can be found on her website [84]. The
most commonly used reasoning services are subsumption and instance
checking. The first service checks whether a concept is more general
than another concept. Formally, let KB be the knowledge base and
C and D be the two concepts, which will be compared. According
to knowledge base KB, concept C is more general than concept D, if
and only if, KB  C w D. In other words, the knowledge base entails
the statement C w D. This reasoning service uses only the knowledge
stored in Tbox to perform the reasoning process.
The knowledge base KB has also an Abox containing the individuals,
which are asserted to be the instances of particular concepts defined
in Tbox. Therefore, the second reasoning service, instance checking, is
very useful. For example, let x be an individual defined in the Abox of
knowledge base KB. In order to determine, whether x is an instance of
concept C, we would perform instance checking. Formally, this process
is written as KB  C(x).This service uses both the Tbox and the Abox.
In our work, we make use of the instance checking service to realize the
model checking by using description logic reasoning engine.
Description Logic SHK
We use the description logic language SHK to realize the description logic
based model checking. This language is constructed from the base language
ALC by adding some extensions. The first extension allows the definition of
role transitivity. We call this language as ALCR+, which is often abbreviated
as S. The second extension allows the definition of hierarchy in relationships.
Due to this extension the language is called SH. Thus, H indicates the
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>I = ∆
⊥I = ∅
AI ,W = AI
RI ,W = RI
(¬A)I,W = ∆ \ AI,W
(C uD)I,W = CI,W ∩DI,W
(C unionsqD)I,W = CI,W ∪DI,W
(∀R.C)I,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∀b : (a, b) ∈ RI,W → b ∈ CI,W}
(∃R.C)I,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∃b : (a, b) ∈ RI,W ∧ b ∈ CI,W}
(KC)I,W =
⋂
J∈W
CJ ,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∀J ∈ W : a ∈ CI,W}
(KR)I,W =
⋂
J∈W
RJ ,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∀J ∈ W : (a, b) ∈ RI,W}
Figure 4.1: Formal semantics of SHK
hierarchical relationships. The last extension allows the usage of epistemic
operator K [31]. Thus, the language used in this thesis is called SHK. We
require the epistemic operator due to the fact that model checking relies on
closed-world reasoning.
The formal semantics of description logic is determined by interpretation
function I and interpretation domain ∆. The epistemic operator K defines
an epistemic interpretation as a pair of (I,W). Under the common domain
assumption and rigid term assumption, the setW contains the interpretation
functions that are restricted only to the known assertions in the knowledge
base. Let C and R be a concept and a relationship defined in description
logic language. The interpretation function I maps each concept into a set
of interpretation elements in ∆ and each relationship into a set of binary
relations ∆ × ∆. For example, the interpretation of concept C is CI ⊂ ∆
and the interpretation of R is RI ⊂ ∆×∆. The complete formal semantics
of SHK is shown in Figure 4.1.
Now let us discuss further the entailment semantics () of description
logic, which has already been introduced. We say that knowledge base KB
entails the query C w D (KB  C w D), if and only if, there exists a
set of interpretation functions, so that for each interpretation function I,
each interpretation element of DI is also an interpretation element of CI .
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Formally, ∀I : CI ⊇ DI .
4.2.2 CTL* logic
The computation tree logic-* (CTL*) is a class of temporal logics that defines
the CTL* formula representing the desired property of the modeled system.
Further, temporal logic is a derivation of the modal logic [52]. The CTL*
formula is capable of expressing both linear-time and branching-time prop-
erty of the execution path of the system. The formula is evaluated either
over a path or on a state. Thus, CTL* formulas are categorized into path
formulas and state formulas. Both path and state formulas have the standard
boolean operators. Let fi, gi be the path formula and state formula, respec-
tively. The CTL* formulas are constructed by using the following rules: A
g1 ::= f1|¬g1|(g1 ∧ g2)|(g1 ∨ g2)|
(g1Ug2)|X g1|G g1|F g1 (4.1)
f1 ::= p|>|¬f1|(f1 ∧ f2)|(f1 ∨ f2)|
A [g1]|E [g1]. (4.2)
Figure 4.2: Syntax rules of the CTL* formula
path formula characterizes the linear-time property of an execution path by
using the following temporal logic operators: U (until), X (next), G (holds
globally) and F (finally). Complementary to this, a state formula charac-
terizes the branching-time property of the execution paths that start from a
state by using path quantifiers A (all possible paths) and E (some paths).
Therefore, a state formula is constructed by adding the path quantifiers be-
fore the path formula. The CTL* formulas have more expressive power than
both computation tree logic (CTL) and linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas
combined. Thus, ΣCTL∗ ⊃ ΣCTL ∪ ΣLTL. A more comprehensive discussion
of CTL* logic can be found in [24].
Let s and pi = s0s1s2 . . . be the state and the execution path in Kripke
model K, respectively. The i-th state within the path pi is denoted as pii.
Furthermore, let p be the atomic proposition, f1, f2 be the state formula and
g1 and g2 be the path formula, respectively. The CTL* semantics are defined
in Figure 4.3.
The equations in Figure 4.3 are inductively defined. Thus, some equations
are defined by using the previously defined equations. Let us begin with the
basic equation. Equation 4.3 says that state s satisfies the formula, which
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s  p ⇔ p ∈ L(s) (4.3)
s  ¬f1 ⇔ s 2 f1 (4.4)
s  f1 ∨ f2 ⇔ s  f1 ∨ s  f2 (4.5)
s  f1 ∧ f2 ⇔ s  f1 ∧ s  f2 (4.6)
s  E (g1) ⇔ there exists a path pi starting with s
such that s  g1 (4.7)
pi  f1 ⇔ pi0  f1 (4.8)
pi  ¬g1 ⇔ pi 2 g1 (4.9)
pi  g1 ∨ g2 ⇔ pi  g1 ∨ s  g2 (4.10)
pi  g1 ∧ g2 ⇔ pi  g1 ∧ s  g2 (4.11)
pi  X g1 ⇔ pi1  g1 (4.12)
pi  G g1 ⇔ ∀i ∈ N0 : pii  g1 (4.13)
pi  F g1 ⇔ ∃i ∈ N0 : pii  g1 (4.14)
pi  g1Ug2 ⇔ ∃j ∈ N0 : pij  g2 ∧
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , j − 1} : pii  g1 (4.15)
Figure 4.3: CTL* semantics
consists only of proposition p, if and only if, the state s has the label named
p.
The Equation 4.4, 4.9, 4.5, 4.10, 4.6 and 4.11 define the semantics of the
common boolean logic operators in CTL* (¬,∨,∧).
Equation 4.4 and 4.9 say that state s or path pi satisfies the negation of
formula f or g, if and only if, s or pi does not satisfy the formula f or g,
respectively. Both equations determine the closed-world semantics of CTL*.
Equation 4.5 (4.10) says that state s (path pi) satisfies the disjunction (∨) of
formula f1 and f2 (g1 and g2), if and only if, state s (path pi) satisfies one of
the formulas, respectively. On the other hand, Equation 4.6 (4.11) says that
state s (path pi) satisfies the conjunction (∧) of formula f1 and f2 (g1 and
g2), if and only if, state s (path pi) satisfies both formulas, respectively.
Equation 4.7 and 4.8 determine the semantic entailments of a path for-
mula from a state and vice versa. Equation 4.7 says that state s can satisfy
path formula g1, if and only if, there exists a path pi starting with state s, so
that s  g1. Further, Equation 4.8 says that path pi can satisfy state formula
f1, if and only if, the first state of path pi satisfies state formula f1.
The next four equations (Equation 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 define the
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semantics of temporal logic operators. Equation 4.12 says that path pi satis-
fies formula X g1, if and only if, the path starting from state pi1 satisfies g1.
This operator is also called the “Next” operator, since the next state after
the first state satisfies g1.
Equation 4.13 says that path pi satisfies formula G g1, if and only if, all
paths starting from each state within path pi satisfy formula g1. Clearly, pi
must be a path with infinite length in order to satisfy this condition. This
operator is also called the “Globally” operator, since the fulfillment of g1
must hold in every sub path of pi.
Equation 4.14 says that path pi satisfies formula F g1, if and only if,
there exists a sub path in pi, which satisfy formula g1. It should be noted
that F operator is the complement of G operator. This operator is also
called “Future” operator, since the fulfillment of formula g1 must only hold
in a future sub path of pi.
Equation 4.15 says that path pi satisfies g1Ug2, if and only if, all sub
paths of pi from the first state to a certain state satisfy g1 and a sub path
starting immediately after this state satisfies g2. This operator is also called
“Until” operator, since formula g1 must always hold, until formula g2 holds.
Lastly, it should be noted that A f = ¬E ¬f , since A is the complement
of E .
Model Checking Model checking is a very useful technique, which is of-
ten used in the system verification process. It is an automated process that
verifies whether a system satisfies certain requirement specification. Typi-
cally, the behavior of the system is modeled as a Kripke model or finite state
machine and the requirements specification is written as a set of formulas.
Formally, the behavior of the system is represented by model K and the
requirements specification is written as a set of formulas Req. Thus, model
checking finds the set {s ∈ W |∀f ∈ Req : K, s  f}, where for each s ∈ I,
s fulfills all formulas f ∈ Req. This performs model checking of the path
formula. On the other hand, if we replace s, I and f with pi, Σ and g,
respectively, then we perform model checking of the state formula.
The fulfillment relationship () is derived from the formal semantics pre-
sented in Figure 4.3.
4.3 Related Work
In this section we present several approaches, which either are useful to our
approach or have a similar motivation to ours. The first approach, which
is presented in Section 4.3.1, extends the description logics semantics with
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temporal semantics. The big disadvantage of this approach is its lacks of
proof of concept. There exists no implementation of the reasoning engine
for this class of description logic language. Therefore, we cannot use this
approach to support our work.
The second and the third approaches are presented in Section 4.3.2. These
approaches address the matchmaking process of the web service behavior.
The matchmaking process aims at finding a pair of web services, which
have similar behavior. The second approach uses the intersection of two
automata to determine whether two web services have similar behavior or
not. The third approach uses the graph matching algorithm to realize the
matchmaking process. Although the implementations of these two last ap-
proaches exist, they have a disadvantage. It is very difficult to match the
service against a specification. In these approaches, the specification should
be written either as an automaton or a graph, which is very impracticable.
Furthermore, these two approaches do not support a matchmaking process,
which is based on ontology. Therefore, a matchmaking process between two
web services from different domains is not possible. This implies that we
cannot use these approaches to perform the pattern matching, which heavily
relies on the ontology.
4.3.1 Introducing Temporal Operator to the Descrip-
tion Logics
Basically, this approach tries to combine temporal logic formalism with de-
scription logic formalism. However, the idea to integrate temporal logic for-
malism with description logics formalism is not new. Several works [88, 89]
attempt to integrate temporal logic formalism by extending the description
logic formalism. In contrast, our approach combines both formalisms by
expressing the temporal logic formalism in terms of the description logics
language, which has the description logic language formalism. As a sim-
ple case, we consider only the restricted CTL* temporal logic. It is clear
that the previous works aim for the temporal extension of description logic
formalisms, which have more expressive power than our work.
The work of Baader et al. [8] incorporates action formalism to represent
the dynamic behavior of a system. Again, we use another approach by using
the Kripke model to represent the dynamic behavior of a system.
Another approach which is very relevant to us is the work of Ben-David et
al. [13]. In their work, the state transitions model, which is a transformation
of the Kripke model, is represented as a set of the Tbox concept definitions.
In our work, the Kripke model is represented as a set of assertions in the
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Abox. Furthermore, we consider the ontology of the atomic propositions in
our work.
4.3.2 Matchmaking of the Behavior of Web Services
Matchmaking of the behavior of web services [45, 58] is a very useful mech-
anism in finding the desired web services, whose behaviors comply with the
requirements of service consumers. If we represent the behavior of the web
service and the service consumer’s requirements as a finite state machine and
temporal logic formulas, respectively, we claim that the matchmaking prob-
lem is similar to the model checking problem. Thus, we can say that the
matchmaking problem is also similar to the pattern matching problem. In
this sub section we present several approaches that deal with the matchmak-
ing problem. These approaches address the problem using different methods.
Grigori et al. presented in [45] an approach to compare and match web
services behaviors by using a graph matching algorithm. In their approach,
they specify the requirements of the service consumers and the behavior of
the web service as two separate graphs. By using the existing graph matching
algorithm, they aim at solving the matchmaking problem.
Mahleko presented in his Ph. D. thesis [58] the approach that addresses
the same problem, namely matchmaking of the webservices behaviors. How-
ever, he used a different approach to solve this problem. In his approach, he
represents both the web service behavior and the consumer’s requirements
as finite state automata. If the intersection of these two finite state au-
tomata is not empty, then the web service behavior matches the consumer’s
requirements.
4.4 Description Logic-based Model Checking
Recall the model checking process, which is discussed in Section 4.2.2. We
have already stated in our motivation that we want to use the reasoning
service of the description logic-based knowledge base in order to perform
the model checking. Therefore, we propose an approach to establish the
description logic-based model checking. The main idea behind this approach
is based on the facts stating that: (i) a class of temporal logic formula (LTL
formula) can be translated into a finite automaton [24, p. 121] and (ii) a
finite automaton can be represented as a set of axioms [7, p. 90].
We propose an approach to solve the problem motivated in Section 4.1 by
constructing the ontology of the atomic propositions, which are used in the
model checking process. Thus, the ontology can be used to reason whether
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an atomic proposition occurring in the formula is equal or more general to
another atomic proposition occurring in the Kripke model.
To integrate the ontology reasoning process in the model checking process,
we represent the Kripke model in the description logic-based knowledge base
and represent a subset of CTL* semantics in terms of description logic lan-
guage, which has the description logic semantics. Our intention is to perform
the model checking process by using the reasoning service of the DL-based
knowledge base. Obviously, the DL-based knowledge base also supports the
ontology reasoning process. Thus, we can perform the model checking pro-
cess together with the ontology reasoning process only by using the reasoning
service of the DL-based knowledge base.
We intend to perform the model checking process by using instance check-
ing reasoning service, which has already been discussed in Section 4.2.1. In
our case, we want the model checking
K, s  f
to be equivalent to
KB  D(x),
which is the instance checking query.
It should be noted that the entailment () of the model checking has a
different semantics compared to the instance checking. The semantics of the
model checking entailment can be found in Figure 4.3, whereas the semantics
of description logic reasoning, particularly instance checking, can be found
in Figure 4.1. Therefore, if the entailment symbol () appears immediately
after a Kripke model and a state (for example, K, s), then it has the CTL*
semantics. On the other hand, if the entailment symbol appears immediately
after a knowledge base (for example, KB), then it has the description logic
semantics.
The knowledge base KB : 〈TKB,AKB〉 consists of TKB = TAP ∪ TONT ∪ Tf
and AKB. The constructions of the Tboxes and Abox are presented in the
next subsections. TAP contains the concepts, which represent the atomic
propositions in AP . TONT contains the ontology that represent the equiva-
lence and generalization relationships between the atomic propositions. Tf
contains the concepts representing the temporal formulas. AKB is the as-
sertion box representing the Kripke model. The concept D represents the
formula f and the individual x represents the state s.
The currently known description logic reasoner that supports epistemic
operator is only the Pellet reasoner [74]. However, the reasoner still has some
restrictions:
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• It only allows the appearance of the epistemic operator in the query
language.
For example, the instance checking KB  D(x) is actually a query
operation. Thus, the Pellet reasoning engine would only allow the oc-
currence of epistemic operator K in concept D and not in any concepts
stored in knowledge base KB.
• It does not support relationship restriction having epistemic operator
(∀KR.D).
According to the theoretical definition of the epistemic operator K,
the operator can appear immediately before a concept (KC), or inside
an existential quantifier (∃KR.D) or inside a relationship restriction
(∀KR.D). Due to the limitation of the implementation, Pellet does
not allow the occurrence of epistemic operator inside a relationship
restriction.
Due to these limitations, we will focus only on a subset of CTL* formulas
that has the form of E [φ], where φ is a LTL formula. For example, we only
allow such formula: f = E (check loan appl ∧ F approve loan appl).
Our approach to realize description logic-based model checking is divided
into the following steps:
1. representing the Kripke model in Aboxes (constructing AKB),
2. translating the formulas into concepts (constructing Tf ),
3. defining the CTL* semantics in terms of SHK description logic lan-
guage semantics and
4. defining the ontology of atomic propositions (constructing TAP and
TONT ).
These steps are depicted in Figure 4.4. The left side of this figure shows
the components required for the traditional model checking process. The
right side of this figure shows the components required for the model checking
process, which is performed by using the description logic-based knowledge
base. The arrows denote the translations of the components. We propose
these translations and the construction of the ontology of atomic propositions
in order to enable description logic-based model checking. These steps are
explained in the next sections.
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Figure 4.4: Translation of the components required in model checking
4.4.1 Representation of the Kripke Model as ABoxes
The Kripke model is represented as a set of assertions, which is contained in
Abox called AKB. AKB is divided into two Aboxes, they are ARL and AL.
ARL contains the assertions about state transitions that correspond to set
RL of Kripke model K. For example, the assertion next(xi, xj) represents
the state transitions between states si and sj of the Kripke model K. Note
that the individuals xi and xj represent the states si and sj of the Kripke
model, respectively.
AL contains the assertions about the labels of each state. For example,
the assertion V (xj) represents the presence of label p in the state s. Thus,
this assertion is defined for each p ∈ L(s). Note that the concept V represents
the collection of individuals representing the states that have the label p.
4.4.2 Formal Semantics of Restricted CTL* Formulas
in Description Logics
In this section, we propose the representation of CTL* logic semantics in
terms of DL language family SHK semantics. As previously stated at the
beginning of Section 4.4, we aim at using the instance checking reasoning to
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perform the model checking process. Since we want to perform finite model
checking (closed-world assumption) that enables negation-as-failure property
[33], we require the usage of epistemic operator K that assumes the common
domain and rigid term of the knowledge base.
We only consider the restricted CTL* formulas, which is defined as fol-
lows:
g1 ::= p|>|¬p|(g1 ∧ g2)|(g1 ∨ g2)|
(g1Ug2)|X g1|G g1|F g1 (4.16)
f1 ::= E [g1]. (4.17)
Figure 4.5: Syntax rules of the restricted CTL* formula
It should be noted that the quantifier (E ), temporal (U,F,G,X) and
boolean (¬,∧,∨) operators are the same with the operators of the CTL*
formulas. The difference lies in the path quantifier and the negation. We
only allow the existential path quantifier (E ) and the occurrence of negation
immediately before an atomic proposition.
Recall the definitions of p, g1, g2, s, pi and KB, x from Section 4.2.2 and
the first part of Section 4.4, respectively. Let Di and Daux and be the con-
cept representing the sub formula gi and the additional auxiliary concept,
respectively. The symbol σ denotes a sequence of Abox individuals, which is
the description logics representation of trace pi. Thus, σi denotes the Abox
individual at the index i.
We propose the translation of the CTL* logic semantics to SHK seman-
tics that are defined in Figure 4.6. The complete proofs of this translation
can be found in Appendix A. The left hand of the equations are the se-
mantics of CTL* and the right hand of the equations are the corresponding
translations, which are represented in description logic language semantics.
The purpose of the epistemic operator, which is used to represent CTL*
semantics in terms of description logic semantics, is to enable the closed-
world reasoning. Closed-world reasoning facilitates the evaluation of failure
as negation. To understand the meaning of the failure as negation, let us
consider the formal semantics of CTL* showed in Figure 4.3. Based on
CTL* semantics, we conclude that s 2 p is equivalent to s  ¬p. This means
that the failure of the entailment is equivalent to the negation.
In description logic representation, we define
s 2 p (4.28)
s  ¬p (4.29)
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s  pi ⇔ KB  KVi(x) (4.18)
s  ¬pi ⇔ KB  ¬KVi(x) (4.19)
s  E (g1) ⇔ KB  D1(x) (4.20)
pi  g1 ⇔ KB  D1(σ0) (4.21)
pi  g1 ∨ g2 ⇔ KB  (D1 unionsqD2)(σ0) (4.22)
pi  g1 ∧ g2 ⇔ KB  (D1 uD2)(σ0) (4.23)
pi  X g1 ⇔ KB  (∃Knext.D1)(σ0) (4.24)
pi  G g1 ⇔ 〈TKB ∪ {Daux ≡ D1 u ∃Knext.Daux},AKB〉
 Daux (σ0) (4.25)
pi  F g1 ⇔ KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1) (σ0) (4.26)
pi  g1Ug2 ⇔ 〈TKB ∪ {Daux ≡ D2 unionsq (D1 u ∃Knext.Daux u ∃future.D2)}
,AKB〉  Daux (σ0) (4.27)
Figure 4.6: Formal semantics of a subset of CTL* logic in SHK
as
KB 2 V (x) (4.30)
KB  ¬V (x), (4.31)
respectively. The individual x represents the state s and the concept V
represents the set of individuals having the label p. Equation 4.30 states that
it could not be deduced from the knowledge base that x is a member of V .
Equation 4.31 states that the individual x is not a member of the concept V .
In the CTL* semantics, both equations are equivalent.
However, in description logic semantics, Equation 4.30 and Equation 4.31
are not equivalent, although both equations represent Equation 4.28 and
Equation 4.29, respectively. This is due to the fact that description logic
semantics have the open-world reasoning property. This means that if the
knowledge base cannot deduce that x is a member of V , it does not necessarily
imply that x is not a member of V . Since the knowledge base does not
have sufficient knowledge to answer the query, it cannot deduce the fact in
answering the query.
Therefore, we introduce the epistemic operator K in order to have the
closed-world reasoning property in the description logic reasoning. The epis-
temic operator K immediately appears in the atomic proposition and the
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state transition. (see equations 4.18, 4.19, 4.24 - 4.25 and 4.27.)
Expressing the semantics of modal operators X and F in description
logic is very simple, since we use next relationship and transitive relationship
future ∈ R+ to build the semantics. It should be noted that the relationship
next is a sub-relationship of future. Thus, we define the transitivity of future
and the assertion next v future in the Tbox.
To express the semantics of modal operator G, we use the cyclic con-
cept definition for expressing the models of infinite traces that satisfy the G
operator. Since the Tbox contains cyclic concept definitions, we require a
particular interpretation semantics, which are used in the reasoning engine.
It should be noted that the description logic language formalism has three
different types of interpretation semantics [68]. They are: least-fixpoint se-
mantics, greatest fixpoint semantics and descriptive semantics. The least
(greatest) fixpoint semantics consider the smallest (largest) set of models
with cyclic relationships, which satisfy cyclic concept definitions. The de-
scriptive semantics, however, do not consider the models with cyclic rela-
tionships [7]. Thus, the descriptive semantics can not be used to represent
the semantics of G modal operator, which is only satisfied by a cyclic model
containing some infinite traces.
If the Tbox does not contain any cyclic concept definition, then these
interpretation semantics are all the same. Thus, the choice of the interpre-
tation semantics used in the reasoning engine will not affect the reasoning
result [96]. The descriptive semantics are usually used in most reasoning
engines, due to their simplicity of implementation.
However, if the Tbox contains some cyclic concept definitions, then these
three interpretation semantics with regard to the cyclic concepts differ from
each other [96]. Baader points out that the least-fixpoint semantics always
consider a set of empty models, which satisfy the cyclic concepts’ interpreta-
tion [6]. Such interpretation semantics are uninteresting to us. On the other
hand, the greatest-fixpoint semantics can interpret cyclic concept definitions
as the largest set of models, containing the cyclic relationships. This suits
our need to correctly interpret the G modal operator. Therefore, we require
that the reasoning engine should support the greatest-fixpoint semantics in
order to correctly represent the semantic of G modal operator.
Although the translation of the semantic of U operator uses cyclic concept
definition, we can use descriptive semantics to correctly capture the meaning
of U operator. This is due to the fact that U operator can be satisfied by
finite traces.
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Soundness and Correctness of the CTL* Logic. The most important
properties of any logic are the soundness and completeness properties. In a
nutshell, these properties assure that the truth values of the derivation of any
formula, which is either derived using natural deduction (`) or interpretation
model (), are equivalent. In [60] soundness and correctness are defined as
follows:
Definition 23 (Soundness) A formal system FS is sound, if and only if
for each set of formulas Z and every formula A:
Z ` A⇒ Z  A.
This definition says that every A, which is derivable from Z using the deduc-
tion rules of the corresponding logic, is also satisfied by the interpretation
models, which satisfy all formulas in Z.
Definition 24 (Completeness) A formal system FS is complete, if and
only if, for each set of formulas Z and every formula A:
Z  A⇒ Z ` A.
Conversely to the Definition 23, this definition says that every A, which is
satisfied by the interpretation models satisfying all formulas in Z, is derivable
from Z by using the deduction rules of the corresponding logic.
The original interpretation model of restricted CTL* is namely Kripke
model. In this thesis, we represent the Kripke model in terms of Description
Logic language and use the Description Logic inference mechanism to perform
the logical entailment () of the formal semantics of restricted CTL*. In
other words, we try to perform the entailment of restricted CTL*, which is
based on Kripke model, by using the Description Logic representation and
its inference mechanism.
As we can see in Figure 4.6, each semantic entailment of restricted CTL*
is semantically equivalent to the corresponding concept represented in De-
scription Logic according to the inference mechanism (instance checking).
Therefore, we say that we emulate the formal semantics of restricted CTL*
by using Description Logic representation and its inference mechanism. This
implies that our Description Logic-based representation of the semantics of
restricted CTL* also preserve the soundness and the correctness of restricted
CTL*.
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4.4.3 Translating CTL* Formulas into Tbox Concepts
Recall that the restricted CTL* formulas has the form of E [φ], where φ is the
LTL formula enclosed in a E path quantifier. Therefore, we only translate
the LTL formula φ into Tbox concepts. Further, the negation occuring inside
the LTL formula only appears beside the atomic propositions. The first step
in this translation is to decompose φ into a parse tree.
Definition 25 A parse tree Tf of the formula f is a binary tree, whose
nodes represent the sub formula of f except the root node, which represents
the formula f itself.
Now we can perform the translation of the LTL formula φ, by visiting
the nodes in the parse tree starting from the leaf nodes and toward the root
node. Suppose that we have a counter idx, which has the initial value 0. For
each visit in the node, we create a new axiom in the Tbox Tf according to
the rules in Figure 4.7 and increase the counter idx. The concepts Di and
Dj refer to the concepts created after translating the previous sub formulas
gi and gj, respectively.
LTL formula concepts added to Tf
p Didx ≡ KV
¬p Didx ≡ ¬KV
gi ∨ gj Didx ≡ Di unionsqDj
gi ∧ gj Didx ≡ Di uDj
Xgi Didx ≡ ∃Knext.Di
Ggi Didx ≡ Di u ∃Knext.(Didx unionsqDi)
Fgi Didx ≡ Di unionsq ∃future.Di
giUgj Didx ≡ Dj unionsq (Di u ∃Knext.Didx u ∃future.Dj)
Figure 4.7: Translation table of a subset of CTL* sub formulas into SHK
concepts
It is worth noting that the concept generated by translating G gi accord-
ing to Figure 4.7 differs from the concept defined in the Equation 4.25, which
is semantically equivalent to G gi. The concept generated by the translation
rule represents the formula, which accepts both finite and infinite traces of
G gi. This is due to the fact that the instances of the instances of concept
Y ≡ Di u ∃Knext.(Y unionsq Di) have a next connection either to an instance of
Y or of Di.
On the other hand, the concept defined in Equation 4.25 accepts only
infinite traces. This is due to the fact that the instances of concept X ≡
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Di u ∃Knext.X have only a next connection to an instance of X, which also
has a connection to an instance of X. Thus, only infinite traces are accepted.
4.4.4 Ontology of Atomic Propositions
The ontology of atomic propositions TONT provides the common vocabu-
lary that aims at bridging the semantic gap, which occurs during the model
checking process. The semantic gap exists when the Kripke model and the
temporal logic formula use different vocabularies of atomic propositions.
In order to identify this problem, let us consider Equation 4.3 (s  p ⇔
p ∈ L(s)) in Page 41, which is the semantic of CTL*. According to the
equation, state s satisfies formula p (s  p), if and only if, state s has a label
called p, which appears in the formula (p ∈ L(s)). A problem arises if we
use another atomic proposition to represent the formula. Consider Example
12 that explains this problem in more detail.
Example 12 Let Kripke model K : 〈W = I = {z}, RL = ∅, L = {z 7→
{start}}, AP = {start, Anfang}〉 and formula f = Anfang. According to
CTL* semantics, we can see that z 2 Anfang, since start 6= Anfang and
Anfang /∈ L(z) , although we interpret that the atomic proposition start
is equivalent to Anfang. Therefore, the original model checking technique
cannot fulfill our requirements.
We solve this problem by introducing semantic bridges between atomic
propositions start and Anfang. This is possible, since we perform the model
checking by using the description logic reasoning engine. First, we define the
following Tboxes, TAP and TONT .
Definition 26 (TAP ) Tbox TAP is constructed by defining a concept for each
atomic proposition in AP . The names of these concepts are uniquely defined.
The above definition states that Tbox TAP contains only the concepts,
which represent the atomic propositions. Since the name of the concepts
should be unique, the mapping between AP and TAP is an injection.
Definition 27 (TONT ) Tbox TONT contains the equivalence (≡) and the gen-
eralization (A) between two concepts in TAP , which represent two different
atomic propositions.
Let C1 and C2 be the concepts in TAP . If the two atomic propositions
represented by C1 and C2 are equivalent, then C1 ≡ C2 is defined in TONT . On
the other hand, if the atomic proposition represented by C1 is more general
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than the atomic proposition represented by C2, then C1 w C2 is defined in
TONT .
We then construct the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let p ∈ L(s) ⊂ AP , q ∈ AP and V,Q ∈ TAP . x, V , Q
and TAP represent s, p, q and AP ,respectively. Thus, s  q if and only if,
KB  Q w V ∧ KB  KV (x).
Proof 1 “⇒”: We will use an indirect proof. Let us assume that KB 2 Q w
V ∨ KB 2 KV (x). KB 2 KV (x) is impossible, since according to Equation
4.18 p ∈ L(s) is equivalent to KB  KV (x). Thus, only KB 2 Q w V may
be true. However, this implies that KB 2 KQ(x), because (i) the Abox of KB
does not define the assertion “Q(x)”, but only defines the assertion “V (x)”
and (ii) KB 2 Q w V . Thus, according to Equation 4.18, KB 2 KQ(x) is
equivalent to s 2 q, which contradicts the assumption.
“⇐”: According to description logics semantics, the statement KB 
Q w V ∧KB  KV (x) implies that KB  KQ(x). Furthermore, according to
the Equation 4.18, it is equivalent to s  q.
This proposition states that although p, which is the atomic proposition
occurring in the Kripke model, and q, which is the atomic proposition oc-
curring in formula, are different atomic propositions, which have the same
interpretation, the model checking can be performed. This is possible, since
TONT provides the semantic bridge between these atomic propositions. This
kind of semantic bridge is only facilitated in the description logic-based model
checking.
Now let us consider the following example, which explains the purpose of
the ontology of atomic propositions in more detail:
Example 13 Let Kripke model K : 〈W = I = {z}, RL = ∅, L = {z 7→
{start}}, AP = {start, Anfang}〉 and formula f = Anfang. According to
the translations defined Section 4.4.1 and 4.4.3, we have knowledge base KB
representing Kripke model K and formula f , which is defined as follows:
KB : 〈AKB = {C Start(x)}, TKB = {C Start,C Anfang,C Start ≡ C Anfang}〉.
According to TKB, we have KB  C Anfang w C Start. Further, due
to assertion C Start(x), we have KB  KC Start(x). Thus, according to
Proposition 1, this is equivalent to s  Anfang.
From Example 13, we can see that by using the description logic-based
model checking and the appropriate ontology, in this case C Start ≡ C Anfang,
we can derive that s satisfies formula Anfang. Obviously, the ontology ex-
presses our interpretation of atomic propositions, which says that start is
equivalent to Anfang.
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4.5 Relationship between Temporal Logic For-
mulas
The representation of the temporal logic formula, especially the subset of
CTL* formulas, as a description logic concept allows us to use the subsump-
tion relationship and thus to define a partial order relation ≺ between the
temporal logic formulas, especially a subset of CTL* formulas.
Definition 28 Let g1 and g2 be the restricted CTL* formulas. We define
the relation g1 ≺ g2 if and only if, ∀pi ∈ Ψ : (pi  g1 ⇒ pi  g2). Ψ is the
non-empty set of the possible execution paths.
Proposition 2 Let Dg1 and Dg2 be the SHK concepts representing the for-
mulas g1 and g2, respectively. KB  Dg1 @ Dg2 if and only if, g1 ≺ g2.
Proof 2 “⇒”: According to the description logics semantics, KB  Dg1 @
Dg2 implies that ∀x ∈ IN : (KB  Dg1(x)⇒ KB  Dg2(x)). With the formal
semantics defined in Figure 4.6 we can construct that ∀pi ∈ Ψ : (pi  g1 ⇒
pi  g2). Therefore, according to Definition 28, g1 ≺ g2.
“⇐”: According to Definition 28, g1 ≺ g2 implies that ∀pi ∈ Ψ : (pi  g1 ⇒
pi  g2). By using the formal semantics defined in Figure 4.6, we can prove
that ∀x ∈ IN : (KB  Dg1(x)⇒ KB  Dg2(x)).
Such a relationship is very useful for comparing different policies specified
as temporal logic formulas. For example, one may want to find out whether a
policy is more general than the other policies. This can be done by performing
the subsumption reasoning w.r.t. the Tbox.
4.6 Finding Traces of a formula
A trace1 of the restricted CTL* temporal formula is the sequence of states
that satisfies the corresponding formula. In this section we present an ap-
proach, which finds the witness of the restricted CTL* formula by using the
instance retrieval reasoning. The instance retrieval reasoning is another form
of instance checking. It collects a set of individuals, which are members of a
particular concept. It can be performed by executing instance checking for
each individual stored in the knowledge base.
We are interested only in finding traces that have a finite trace [36, 59].
Furthermore, the set of traces generated by this process is always finite, as
we will see later.
1also known as a path or a witness
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The construction of the traces employs the post-processing recursion tech-
nique. Figure 4.8 shows the algorithm. The algorithm takes variable n, which
is from the datatype node. This datatype represents the node of the parse
tree. Thus, each node has at most two references to other nodes. To retrieve
the traces of a formula, this algorithm takes the root of the parse tree Tf as
its input. The algorithm ends by returning a set of traces S.
4.6.1 Additional Functions
In this section we will explain the sub functions used in the algorithm shown
in Figure 4.8. Some of these sub functions find the set of traces by em-
ploying the graph traversal algorithm. Each visited state is marked to avoid
redundant cycles in the traces. The functions are explained as follows:
• getStates(K)
This function takes Kripke model K as its parameter and returns a set
of states of the model K.
• getSubFormula(n)
This function takes node n of the parse tree as its parameter and returns
the sub formula represented by this node.
• nodeType(n)
This function takes node n of the parse tree as its parameter and returns
the type of the nodes, which are atomic proposition, ∧, ∨, X, G, F
and U.
• concat(pi1, pi2)
This function takes two traces pi1 and pi2 as its parameters and returns
the concatenation of pi1 followed by pi2.
• head(pi)
This function takes trace pi as its parameter and returns the first state
of the trace.
• findTraceX(si, sj, K, f)
This function takes two states si and sj, model K and sub formula f
as its parameters. If si is succeeded by sj, this function returns a trace
consisting only of si. Otherwise, it returns an empty set.
• findTraceG(si, sj, K, f)
This function takes two states si and sj, model K and sub formula
f as its parameters. It returns a set of all traces within the model
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Input: Node n of the parse tree
Input: Kripke Model K
tr1 ← ∅ ; tr2 ← ∅ ; trout ← ∅ ;1
switch nodeType(n) do2
case atomicProposition3
foreach s ∈ getStates(K) ∧K, s  getSubFormula(n) do4
tr1 ← tr1 ∪ {s} ; /* add a one-state trace */5
case ∧-node6
tr1 ← getTraces(n.sub1,K) ;7
tr2 ← getTraces(n.sub2,K) ;8
trout ← tr1 ∩ tr2 ;9
case ∨-node10
tr1 ← getTraces(n.sub1,K) ;11
tr2 ← getTraces(n.sub2,K) ;12
trout ← tr1 ∪ tr2 ;13
case X-node14
tr1 ← getTraces(n.sub1,K) ;15
foreach s ∈ getStates(K) ∧K, s  getSubFormula(n) do16
foreach pi ∈ tr1 do17
temp← findTraceX(s, head(pi),K) ;18
if temp 6= ∅ then19
foreach ρ ∈ temp do20
trout ← trout ∪ {concat(ρ, pi)} ;21
case G-node22
tr1 ← getTraces(n.sub1,K) ;23
foreach s ∈ getStates(K) ∧K, s  getSubFormula(n) do24
foreach pi ∈ tr1 do25
temp← findTraceG(s, head(pi),K, getSubFormula(n.sub1)) ;26
if temp 6= ∅ then27
foreach ρ ∈ temp do28
trout ← trout ∪ {concat(ρ, pi)} ;29
else if s = head(pi) then30
trout ← trout ∪ {pi} ;31
case F-node32
tr1 ← getTraces(n.sub1,K) ;33
foreach s ∈ getStates(K) ∧K, s  getSubFormula(n) do34
foreach pi ∈ tr1 do35
temp← findTraceF(s, head(pi),K) ;36
if temp 6= ∅ then37
foreach ρ ∈ temp do38
trout ← trout ∪ {concat(ρ, pi)} ;39
else if s = head(pi) then40
trout ← trout ∪ {pi} ;41
case U-node42
tr2 ← getTraces(n.sub2,K) ;43
foreach s ∈ getStates(K) ∧K, s  getSubFormula(n) do44
foreach pi ∈ tr2 do45
temp← findTraceG(s, head(pi),K, getSubFormula(n.sub1)) ;46
if temp 6= ∅ then47
foreach ρ ∈ temp do48
trout ← trout ∪ {concat(ρ, pi)} ;49
else if s = head(pi) then50
trout ← trout ∪ {pi} ;51
return tr ;52
Figure 4.8: getTraces(n)
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K, which start from si and end at sj. These traces fulfill formula
f . Since f is a sub formula from the type G α, each state of these
traces fulfills α. It should be noted that the last state of the traces,
sj, is omitted from the traces. This set is constructed by employing
the graph search algorithm. The set returned by this function should
be the set of minimal all-state-visiting traces with respect to formula
f (see Definition 30 on the next page). The detailed algorithm of this
function is presented in Section 4.6.2.
• findTraceF(si, sj, K, f)
This function takes two states si and sj, model K and sub formula f
as its parameters. It returns a set of traces within the model K, which
start from si and end at sj. It should be noted that the last state of the
traces, sj, is omitted from the traces. Sub formula f has the form F α.
Thus, at least a state in each traces, which are collected by this func-
tion, satisfies sub formula α. Similar to the function findTraceG(),
this function is realized by employing the graph search algorithm. Fur-
thermore, the set returned by this function should also be the set of
minimal all-state-visiting traces with respect to formula f . Since the
algorithm of this function is almost similar to findTraceG(si, sj, K, f),
we discuss further the algorithm in Section 4.6.2.
The set of execution traces returned by these sub functions fulfills the
finite set of finite visiting-all-nodes traces property, which will be defined
below.
Definition 29 (states of a trace) the function states returns all distinct
states occurring in a trace.
Example 14 Let pi = s0s1s3s2s2s4. Thus, states(pi) = {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4}.
Definition 30 (All-state-visiting traces) Let Ψ be the set of all possible
traces within the model K and let states(pi) be the the set of states appearing
in the trace pi. pi0 and pilast is the first and the last state of the trace pi.
A set Γ ⊂ Ψ is defined as the set of minimal all-state-visiting traces w.r.t.
model K, formula f and states sa and sb, if and only if,⋃
∀pi ∈ Ψ : pi  f ∧
pi0 = sa ∧ pilast = sb
states(pi) =
⋃
∀ν ∈ Γ
states(ν) (4.32)
and
∀ν ∈ Γ : ∃n ∈ N : length(ν) < n (4.33)
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are true.
The first condition in Equation 4.32 says that the union of states(pi) for
each possible trace pi ∈ Ψ, which starts from state sa and ends at state sb and
satisfies formula f , is equal to the union of states(ν) for each ν ∈ Γ. This
condition also means that set Γ contains the traces, which visit all states that
are also visited by all possible traces that satisfy formula f , start from sa
and ends at sb. The second condition in Equation 4.33 says that the length
of all traces in Γ are finite.
It should be noted that the set of all-state-visiting traces is not always
unique for a given model and formula. Let us consider Example 15.
Example 15 Let us consider a Kripke model K, which is shown in Figure
4.9. The set Γ of the model w.r.t. to formula g = F β and states sa =
s1 s3
s2
s4
s5
Figure 4.9: Kripke model K
s1 and sb = s5 is {s1s2s3s4s5}. On the other hand, one can also define
{s1s2s3s5, s1s3s4s5} as the set Γ.
4.6.2 Finding the Traces of F g1 and G g1 Formula
This sub section explains the usage of the strongly connected components to
find the traces for F g1 and G g1 formulas. The algorithm to find these traces
relies on the graph search algorithms to find the traces. In order to increase
the efficiency, we use the strongly connected components of a directed graph.
The algorithms to find the traces for F g1 and G g1 are very similar.
However, they differ in the fulfillment of the states of the traces. More
precisely, for each trace of F g1, at least one state of the trace should satisfy
g1. This condition clearly represents that g1 will eventually hold in future.
On the other hand, For each trace of G g1, all of the states within this trace
should satisfy g1. Thus, this condition represents that g1 should hold in every
state of the trace.
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Therefore, in order to check whether a trace satisfies F g1, we can check
the states of the trace. If a state in the corresponding trace exists, which
satisfies g1, then the trace fulfills F g1. On the other hand, if we want to
check whether a trace satisfies G g1 or not, then we should check that all
states within the trace satisfy g1.
Since we use description logic-based model checking, we can easily use
the instance checking service, to check whether some or all states in a set
satisfy formula g1.
Strongly connected components. According to [26], a strongly con-
nected component (SCC) of a directed graph G = (V,E) is a sub graph
of G, whose every two nodes within the component are transitively reachable
from each other. Therefore, a cycle that visits all nodes within this strongly
connected component exists.
To give a better understanding of the SCC concept, we present graph G =
(V,E) with V = {a, b, c, d, e, f} and E = {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a), (a, d), (d, e), (e, f),
(f, d)}. This graph is shown in Figure 4.10.
ac
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ed
f
Figure 4.10: Graph G with two strongly connected components
This graph has two strongly connected components, which are denoted by
the shaded regions. Let us consider the component, which consists of nodes
a, b and c. As we can see, every node in this component is reachable from any
other node within this component due to the cycle of edges. Therefore, this
component is called strongly connected component. The strongly connected
components of graph G can be represented as directed graph, whose nodes
are the strongly connected components. This is shown in Figure 4.11. Thus,
one can efficiently find the traces of F g1 and G g1 formulas.
abc def
Figure 4.11: The acyclic component graph SCC(G)
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Constructing the SCC. One can compute the SCC by employing two
depth-first searches on the graph G. The second run of the DFS is performed
on the inverted graph, whose edges are inverted, namely Gbot. The algorithm
can be found in [26].
Finding the Traces of F g1 and G g1 formula. Prior to finding the
traces of F g1 formula, the strongly connected components of the Kripke
model should be computed. We distinguish two cases in finding the traces
of this formula.
In the first case, both start and end node of the trace belong to the same
strongly connected component. Therefore, we compute a single trace from
the start node to the end node, which visits all nodes within this component.
Such a trace may visit some nodes twice or more. In order to compute
this trace, we need to compute a cycle that visits all nodes in the strongly
connected component. Thus, the trace is constructed by running a sequence
in the cycle from the start node to the end node, which visits every node in
the cycle at least once.
The following algorithm computes the cycle:
It should be noted that the algorithm in Figure 4.12 always terminates.
Since the depth first search is performed on the strongly connected com-
ponent and the strategy to choose the next node is to pick the next node
with the lowest visit number, all nodes in the components will be eventually
visited. Therefore, it will terminate.
In the second case, the start node and the end node are contained in
different strongly connected components. Therefore, a connecting trace be-
tween the two components should be constructed. This trace is constructed
by performing depth first search on the acyclic graph of the SCC, whose
nodes represent the strongly connected components. It starts from the com-
ponent containing the start node and ends at the component containing the
end node. This search returns a sequence of edges, whose endpoints belong
to two different and neighboring components. In the next step, we should
compute the cycle of the components, which is already presented in the first
case. In particular, algorithm in Figure 4.12 is used to find such cycle. In the
last step, based on the sequence of edges and the cycles of the components,
we can construct the trace starting from the start node to the end node that
belong to the two different strongly connected components.
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Input: An arbitrary node a of a strongly connected component c
Output: A sequence trmax
visitedNodes ← 0 ;1
trmax ← ∅ ;2
i ← a ;3
addVisit (a) ;4
visitedNodes++ ;5
addSequence (trmax,a) ;6
while visitedNodes < totalNodes (c) do7
vst ←∞ ;8
foreach j ∈ nextNode(a) do9
if visited (j) < vst then10
vst ← visited (j) ;11
i ← j;12
if visited (i) == 0 then13
visitedNodes++;14
addVisit (i) ;15
if i == a then16
return trmax ;17
while i 6= a do18
vst ←∞ ;19
foreach j ∈ nextNode(a) do20
if visited (j) < vst then21
vst ← visited (j) ;22
i ← j;23
addVisit (i) ;24
Figure 4.12: Algorithm to compute the all-state-visiting cyclic trace in
a strongly connected component
4.7 Finite Set of Generated Traces
The set of traces generated by the algorithm in Figure 4.8 is a finite set. This
is important, since it implies that the algorithm always terminates. In the
following, we will show that the set of the generated traces is always finite.
Proposition 3 The set of traces returned by algorithm in Figure 4.8 is al-
ways finite.
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Proof 3 Algorithm in Figure 4.8 visits each sub formula node of parse tree Tf
starting from the root node by using recursion. In each visit, the algorithm
finds the sub traces satisfying the corresponding sub formula and concatenates
the traces, when necessary. To find these sub traces, this algorithm calls the
sub functions findTraceX(), findTraceG() and findTraceF().
Recall the sub functions findTraceX(), findTraceG() and
findTraceF(). These sub functions always return a finite set of traces,
due to the minimal all-state-visiting traces property defined in Definition 30.
Since the parse tree Tf is finite, the number of visited node is also finite and
thus, the number of calls to the sub functions findTraceX(), findTraceG()
and findTraceF() is also finite. Therefore, this trace generation process gen-
erates a finite set of traces.
4.8 Example
In this section we will show an example of description logic-based model
checking. Let us consider that the model K representing the workflow uses
German language to describe the tasks. On the other hand, the atomic
propositions appearing in the formula f use the English language.
Kripke model as Abox assertions. Let K : 〈W, I,RL, L,AP 〉 be the
Kripke model representing the a workflow
W : {s1, s2, s3}
I : {s1}
RL : {(s1, s2), (s2, s3)}
L : {s1 7→ {bestellung annehmen}, s2 7→ {rechnung senden},
s3 7→ {zahlung annehmen}}
Thus, we can represent K as Abox assertions:
AKB = {BestellungAnnehmen(x1),RechnungSenden(x2),
ZahlungAnnehmen(x3), next(x1, x2), next(x2, x3)}
Defining the ontology of the common vocabulary. Before we define
the ontology in Tbox named TONT , we define Tbox TAP . TAP contains the
CHAPTER 4. DESCRIPTION LOGIC-BASED MODEL CHECKING 64
concepts, which uniquely represents the atomic propositions in AP .
TAP = {ReceiveOrder,BestellungAnnehmen,
SendInvoice,RechnungSenden,
ReceivePayment,ZahlungAnnehmen}
The ontology is defined by TONT , which is defined as follows:
TONT = {ReceiveOrder ≡ BestellungAnnehmen,
SendInvoice ≡ RechnungSenden,
ReceivePayment ≡ ZahlungAnnehmen}
Translation of the formula. We specify the restricted CTL* formula,
which will be translated into description logic concepts, as
f = E (receive order ∧ F (send invoice ∧ F receive payment)).
The parse tree of this formula is shown in Figure 4.13. The numbers appear-
ing near the nodes are the index number of each node, which also denotes
the processing order.
^
7
3
F
^
F
1
6
5
4
2
receive_order
send_invoice
receive_payment
Figure 4.13: The parse tree of formula f
Starting from the root node, for each visit in a child node, an assertion
is defined. Thus, the set of assertions defined by the translation process
is stored in Tf . It should be noted that the assertions defined in Tf are
automatically generated according to Section 4.4.3. The translation schema
is taken from the Table 4.7.
For example, let us consider the node #1. Since this node represents only
a trivial sub formula receive payement, an assertion D1 ≡ KReceivePayment
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is defined. On the other hand, the node #5 represents a more complex sub
formula, which is the conjunction of two sub formulas represented by node
#2 and #4. Thus, the assertion defined in Tf is D5 ≡ D2 u D4.
The whole set of concepts can be seen as follows:
Tf = {D1 ≡ KReceivePayment,
D2 ≡ KSendInvoice,D3 ≡ KReceiveOrder,
D4 ≡ D1 unionsq ∃future.D1,D5 ≡ D2 u D4,
D6 ≡ D5 unionsq ∃future.D5,D7 ≡ D3 u D6}
Performing Model Checking. Previously, we have defined AKB, TAP and
Tf , which are the components of the knowledge base KB : 〈TAP ∪ Tf ,AKB〉.
Thus, we can simply perform model checking of
K, s1  f
as an instance checking
KB  D7(x1).
Since we only want to check, whether state s1 satisfies formula f =
E (receive order ∧ F (send invoice ∧ F receive payment)), we do not need
the algorithms defined in Section 4.6.
4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we considered the combination between the description logic
formalism and the temporal logic formalism from another perspective. We
provide the temporal logic reasoning on top of the description logic reasoning
by expressing the temporal logic semantics in terms of the description logic
language, which has its own formal semantics. We also defined ontology of
atomic propositions that appear both in the state labels and in the temporal
logic formulas. This approach facilitates the verification of the model, which
uses different vocabularies used in the specification formulas. Such a case
occurs when one tries to evaluate the formulas written in other vocabularies
than used by the model. The next contribution of our work is that we allow
the specification of CTL* formulas without the A operator. Since we can
represent a formula as a complex concept, we could define the partial order
relationships between formulas. This is very useful in the field of security
research. Suppose that we specify the security policies in term of formulas.
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By using the subsumption relation, we could check whether a policy encom-
passes another policy or not. Just like the two sides of a coin, our approach
has also some limitations and disadvantages. It is rather complex to specify
the CTL* formula in the description language SHK. Furthermore, we also
do not support the A path quantifier in the formulas, since the current de-
scription logic reasoning engine does not support epistemic operator inside a
relation restriction (i.e. ∀KR.C).
Despite of these limitations, this work would bring benefits to other fields,
such as software engineering verification between heterogeneous domains and
the semantic web services matchmaking [73, 109]. For example, we can use
the ontology-supported model checking to perform the software verification
and use the method presented in Section 4.5 to compare two temporal logic
formulas, which represent the behavior of a service producer and the require-
ments of a service consumer, respectively. Certainly, some specifications can
be represented by temporal logic formulas, which only have the existential
quantifier.
Chapter 5
Refinement Patterns
5.1 Introduction
The last part of Chapter 3 mentioned the necessity of expert knowledge to
refine abstract policies. In the following paragraphs, we present this argu-
ment.
Currently, most policy refinement processes are performed manually. The
stakeholders and security experts discuss the stakeholders’ protection plans
with regard to the workflow. These plans influence the success of business
objectives. As a result of such discussions, high-level workflow policies are
specified as an informal text document. This document serves as a reference
for deriving low-level and enforceable workflow policies. The security expert
then works together with the security administrator to derive the necessary
low-level workflow policies by considering the document containing the high-
level policies. The goal of this step is to generate low-level policies, which
satisfy the high-level policies and can be enforced by the workflow manage-
ment system.
Obviously, the security expert plays an important role in this policy re-
finement process. He has the necessary domain-specific knowledge to capture
the stakeholders’ protection intent as high-level policies. On the other hand,
the security expert also has profound knowledge in the security engineering
area, which is required to derive the enforceable security policies.
The main concept of refinement patterns has been published in [78]. How-
ever, we extend the concept and present it in this chapter.
Motivation. Our goal is to capture expert knowledge about solving a par-
ticular kind of problem, and in this case, the problem of refining workflow
policies. However, adopting knowledge from experts is not a trivial task.
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Some experts gain their knowledge through experience in solving the prob-
lems. Thus, we need a well-proven method to capture the expert knowledge
in problem solving. Furthermore, we need that the expert knowledge to be
machine interpretable. Therefore, a formal representation of the captured
knowledge is required. Based on these requirements, we will define policy
refinement patterns adapted from pattern paradigms and represent them in
formal notation.
Outline. Since we are adapting the pattern paradigm, we will explain it
in the next section. Section 5.3 discusses related work, which deals with the
adaptation of the pattern paradigm and the pattern formalization. Section
5.4 describes our definition of policy refinement patterns. In Section 5.5,
we define the different classifications of the policy refinement patterns. Sec-
tion 5.6 defines the formal representation of the policy refinement patterns
database. Section 5.7 discusses an approach to mine the policy refinement
patterns. Section 5.8 presents the example of a policy refinement pattern.
Section 5.9 concludes this chapter with a summary.
5.2 Background
To design a building, architects consider many non-technical and human-
related factors, for example, social or psychology factors. This is necessary,
due to the fact that people live and interact in the building and have their
own needs. Therefore, architects design constructions, which fulfill the needs
emerging from these factors.
Christopher Alexander proposed the pattern method in his work [4], which
structurally captures expert knowledge. Each pattern has three general parts,
a context, a problem and a solution. The context describes the environ-
ment, in which the pattern applies. It covers both temporal and spatial
aspects of the environment that represent a scenario. Furthermore, forces1
exist within the context that should be resolved. The forces characterize
the problem in the context. Finally, the solution proposes a configuration
or a design which resolves the existing forces in the context. Collected pat-
terns do not exist independently; they have one or more relationships with
other patterns. These relationships reflect the conflicts, compatibilities and
dependencies between patterns applied within a context.
1In our work, we interpret forces as requirements and problems.
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5.3 Related Work
This section presents several approaches that are related to ours.
Pattern Approach in Software Engineering. The most known adap-
tation of pattern paradigms is the design patterns. The goal of the design
pattern approach is to capture the best-practice solutions to recurring prob-
lems in object-oriented software design. This approach is made famous by
the book of Gamma et al. [42].
The history of design patterns began with the experiment conducted by
Kent Beck and Ward Cunningham [12]. They used the pattern language
approach to write down the reference guide to designing window-based user
interface for Smalltalk as a collection of patterns. They presented the pat-
terns to a team of application specialists, who only have a basic knowledge
of Smalltalk’s user interface mechanisms. Apparently, the team was able to
specify very reasonable interfaces in Smalltalk language after one day prac-
tice. This success initiated the adoption of the pattern method to capture
expert knowledge about designing software architecture, since design pat-
terns facilitate the reuse of the expert knowledge in building object-oriented
software.
The structure of a pattern defined by Christopher Alexander has only
the essential parts, namely problem, context and solution [4]. However, the
structure of a design pattern, which is adopted from the Alexander’s defi-
nition of pattern, consists of four parts, pattern name, context and problem,
solution and consequences [42]. These parts are written in informal texts.
Additionally, the solution is also described by using UML diagrams. Thus,
the design pattern has an informal or semi-formal representation.
Nevertheless, the informal or semi-formal representation of the design
patterns causes the ambiguous interpretation of design patterns. Garlan et
al. stated that some problems arise during the reuse of design patterns,
since the developers may ambiguously identify the design patterns due to
the informal representation [43]. Therefore, wrong patterns may be applied
by the developers.
Pattern Approach in Security Engineering. Schumacher presented in
[91] a security engineering process, which is based on the pattern paradigm.
He defined security patterns, which aim at capturing the expert knowledge in
security improvement. He attempted to formalize security patterns by using
Frame Logic. The formalization of the security patterns enables the auto-
mated search of security patterns from the pattern catalogue. It helps the
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security administrators to find the right security patterns from a large col-
lection of patterns efficiently. The structure of a security pattern consists of
name, context, problem and solution, which is similar to the structure defined
by Christopher Alexander. Additionally, each security pattern can have a re-
lationship to other patterns. There are several types of relationships between
security patterns., they are refines, uses and conflicts. Each description of
the context, problem and solution contains a set of terminologies.
It should be noted that, for our purpose, frame logic is not expressive
enough to represent the refinement patterns. Although description logic
originates from frame logic [7], frame logic lacks several extensions, which
are needed to perform the description logic-based model checking. This is
necessary since we want to perform automated pattern matching. These ex-
tensions are the addition of the epistemic operator K and the hierarchical
definition of relationships between the concepts.
Pattern-based Code Generation The pattern approach was developed
in order to communicate expert knowledge (best-practice knowledge) be-
tween humans. However, we also aim at generating policies from patterns.
We will investigate existing approaches that aim for generating code from
design patterns.
Budinsky et al. presented an approach to automatic code generation from
design patterns [20]. To achieve their goal, they augmented each design pat-
tern with a template of code, which corresponds to the solution of the design
pattern. The description of each design pattern is represented in hypertext
format. Thus, the user interacts with the pattern catalogue through the
web-browser user interface.
To generate the code from the design patterns, the user should select one.
Through the web-browser interface, the user can read the pattern description
and enter additional information, which serves as the parameter values for
the code template. Finally, the user can generate the code from the template,
which is filled by the parameter values entered before.
5.4 The Structure of a Refinement Pattern
The structure of a refinement pattern consists of three parts, namely, con-
text, problem and solution. Thus, it is similar to the basic structure of a
pattern. These parts are defined in the next subsections.
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5.4.1 The Context of a Refinement Pattern
The context of a pattern points out the temporal and spatial location, in
which the pattern can be applied. In our case, the refinement pattern should
be applied to a certain execution trace within the workflow. The experts
know that the execution trace fulfills the desired abstract security property,
which is subject to policy refinement. Therefore, the context of this pat-
tern characterizes the execution trace of the workflow, which is described by
formula φctx. Example 16 shows the context of a pattern.
Example 16 Let us consider formula φctx = E(apply loan application∧
F approve loan application). Informally, this formula satisfies any sequence
that starts with “apply loan application” task and eventually succeeded by
“approve loan application” task. Therefore, the context of the pattern char-
acterizes a fragment of task execution sequence, which starts with “apply loan
application” and eventually executes “approve loan application”.
5.4.2 The Problem of a Refinement Pattern
The problem of a pattern describes the unfulfilled goals or requirements
within the context, which should be solved. In our case, the problem de-
scribed by the refinement pattern represents the abstract property, which
will be refined by the refinement pattern. However, the desired abstract se-
curity property is represented as the state labels along the execution trace.
Therefore, the problem of the refinement pattern can be represented as an
atomic proposition prb. Let us consider Example 17.
Example 17 prb = secure loan application process informally says that
all states within the fragment of the context has the label “secure loan appli-
cation process”. It means also that the security property called “secure loan
application process” holds within the fragment of the task execution sequence.
5.4.3 The Solution of a Refinement Pattern
The solution of a pattern describes the constructive design proposed by ex-
perts, which should solve the problem mentioned before. In other words,
the solution of a pattern should extend the existing or generate a new con-
struction. This construction is the best-practice solution. It means that this
solution has been applied in several similar problems within similar contexts.
Furthermore, the experts conclude that this solution can address these prob-
lems. Therefore, this solution has been proven to be effective to the problem
within the context, which are described by the pattern.
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In our case, the solution of a refinement pattern has two purposes. First,
it describes the addition of new labels to the states within the fragment of
task execution sequence, which is matched by the problem and the context.
These addition of new labels are proposed by the workflow security experts.
The second purpose of the solution of the refinement patterns is to generate
an enforceable policy, which can be interpreted by machine. In our work,
we consider Extensible Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML) as our
enforceable policy. The enforceable policy shall address the security problem
within the context, which are described by the corresponding pattern.
The security experts have applied this solution in recurring problems
and found out that this solution, either the addition of state labels or the
generation of enforceable policy, is effective in addressing the corresponding
problems. This means that the validity of the solution is proved by the
empirical facts. In general, we conclude that a best-practice empirical proof
is sufficient to claim that a solution of the refinement pattern is effective
in addressing the corresponding security problem within the fragment of
task execution sequence. However, although not necessary, we will add a
mathematical proof, which verify that that the solution solves the problem
within the context.
Abstract Solution
The abstract solution describes the security properties, which should be
added as a new set of state labels of the Kripke model. According to the ex-
perts, these security properties should satisfy the security property described
in the problem of the pattern. Since the less abstract desired properties are
represented in the Kripke model as state labels along the execution traces
matched by the context, we can represent the solution only as a set of atomic
propositions. Let us consider Example 18.
Example 18 Let sln be a set consisting of atomic propositions, which is
defined as follows: sln = {prevent fictive loan application,
prevent unauthorized access}. Informally, the sln propose a set of new
state labels, which should be added in every states of the traces, which are
matched during the pattern matching.
Concrete Solution
The concrete solution describes the template of the enforceable policy, from
which an enforceable policy will be generated, if this solution is instantiated.
We use the XACML standard to specify the enforceable policies. Thus, the
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solution of the pattern describes the template of the XACML policy, which
uses the XML standard.
Every template has several parameters, which will be filled by task names.
The task names are taken from the state labels of the execution traces, which
match with the context and the problem of the corresponding pattern. In this
work, only task names determine the parameters of the generated XACML
policies. To give a better understanding of the concrete solution, an example
of the solution for separation of duty policy presented as follows.
Example Solution for Separation of Duty. The “separation of duty”
concept was first introduced by Saltzer and Schoeder [83]. They introduced
this concept as one of the eight design principles for the protection of the
information in IT-system.
The motivation of this concept is to avoid the accidental execution of two
sensitive tasks by a single user that can cause harm to the stakeholders (or to
everyone). Obviously, allowing the execution of two sensitive tasks by a single
user may pose more risks to the stakeholders than separating the permission
to execute the two sensitive tasks by two users. Another motivation of this
concept is to split the responsibility and the authority in executing the two
sensitive tasks into two users. Thus, it discourages potential fraud.
In the original concept of separation of duty, the order of the tasks’ ex-
ecution, which can cause harm, is not considered. If any of the two tasks
is executed by a user, the execution of the other task by the user should
be prohibited. In our work, however, we consider the sequence of the tasks’
execution, which may cause harm. For example, the subsequent execution
of createLoanAppl and approveLoanAppl is considered as harmful, whereas
the subsequent execution of approveLoanAppl and createLoanAppl is not
harmful. Therefore, the corresponding separation of duty policy generated
by the solution of the pattern only prevents the subsequent execution of
createLoanAppl, which is followed by approveLoanAppl.
To realize separation of duty mechanism with XACML policy, we adapt
the work by Jason Crampton [27]. The basic idea of his work is to create
the triggering policy and to maintain a dynamic blacklist written in XACML
policies. If a user executes one of the sensitive tasks, which should be sepa-
rated, then the triggering policy dynamically creates an XACML prohibition
policy. This policy denies the execution of the other sensitive tasks by the
same user. The detailed discussion of the Crampton’s approach, which uses
XACML policy to enforce the separation of duty mechanism can be found in
[27].
In this case, the concrete solution shall generate the triggering XACML
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<PolicySet ... PolicySetId="Permission:Set" ... >
<Policy ... PolicyId="permission:po:create" ... >
<Target>
TaskID = "Parameter #1"
</Target>
<Obligations ... >
<Obligation FulfillOn="Permit" ... >
addDenyPermissionToSubjectBlacklist
("Parameter #2")
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
</Policy>
.
.
.
</PolicySet>
Figure 5.1: The template of an enforceable XACML policy for separation of
duty
policy, which prevents the subsequent execution of two sensitive tasks. Figure
5.1 shows the template of the triggering XACML policy. To generate the
XACML policy from the template, the Parameter #1 and Parameter #2
should be substituted by the names of the first and the second sensitive
tasks, respectively.
5.5 Classification of Policy Refinement Pat-
terns
In this section, we will define the classification of policy refinement patterns,
which will be used in policy decomposition. The purpose of this classification
is to guide the pattern administrator to identify the dependencies between
the patterns.
Each decomposition of a policy by a refinement pattern introduces several
new policies. If these policies could be further decomposed, other patterns
would decompose these policies. Thus, we see that the previous pattern
should be first applied, before the other patterns are applied.
In the following, we present the classification of the refinement patterns:
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• Abstract refinement pattern
The abstract refinement pattern is intended to decompose specified
policy (Nspec) and abstract policy (Nabs) into several abstract policies.
Thus, this kind of patterns propose abstract policies as their solutions.
• Concrete refinement pattern
The mechanism refinement pattern decomposes abstract policy (Nabs)
into several concrete policies (Ncon). The concrete policies state the
application of security mechanisms or authorization constraints, which
can fulfill the abstract policy.
• Enforceable refinement pattern
This pattern instantiates a template of enforceable policy specification,
which is derived from a concrete policy. This pattern proposes a tem-
plate of machine-interpretable policy specification. In our case, the
pattern generates XACML policies from templates.
The following table shows the overview of categorization of the policy
refinement patterns:
pattern type type of type of
the refined policy the generated policies
abstract specified or abstract policy
refinement pattern abstract policy
concrete abstract policy concrete policy
refinement pattern
enforceable concrete policy enforceable policy
refinement pattern
Table 5.1: Classification of the workflow policy refinement patterns
5.6 Formal Representation of the Database
The formal representation of the pattern database allows the machine inter-
pretation of policy refinement patterns. This is important, since we want
to perform an automatic pattern matching. In the pattern matching, the
applicability of each pattern is checked. If the pattern is applicable to the
Kripke model representing the workflow behavior and workflow policies, then
the pattern matching has found a set of execution traces, which match the
description of the context and the problem. Thus, the solution can be applied
in order to refine the abstract workflow policies.
CHAPTER 5. REFINEMENT PATTERNS 76
As previously mentioned in Section 5.4, the context of a pattern is rep-
resented as a temporal logic formula. On the other hand, the problem and
the solution of the pattern is represented as an atomic proposition and a set
of atomic propositions, respectively. Since we already defined the restricted
CTL* semantics on top of the description logic semantics SHK, we can rep-
resent the context, the problem and the solution of the pattern in terms of
description logic concepts.
A refinement pattern database is a description logic-based knowledge
base, which consists of several Tboxes. These Tboxes are represented by
description logic language SHK, which was introduced in Section 4. Let
TKB be the Tbox representing all Tboxes. The Tbox is defined as follows:
TKB := Tctx︸︷︷︸
Tf
∪Ttaskname ∪ Tsecurityproperty︸ ︷︷ ︸
TAP
∪
TPattern ∪ TONT
Tctx is the Tbox that describes the context of each pattern. It contains
the ontologies that represent the translated temporal logic formulas of the
context of the patterns (see Section 4.4.3). Therefore, Tctx is from the type of
Tf . On the other hand, we do not see any Tboxes, which represent problems
and solutions, as a part of the TKB. This is due to the fact that prb and sln are
elements of AP , and AP is already represented by Tsecurityproperty ∪Ttaskname.
Ttaskname and Tsecurityproperty are from the type of TAP , which define the
atomic propositions in terms of concepts (see Section 4.4.4). Ttaskname is
constructed by defining a unique concept name for each atomic proposition
representing the task name in APtaskname. Tsecurityproperty is constructed by
defining a unique concept name for each atomic proposition representing
the security property in APsecurityproperty. Additionally, TONT represents the
semantic relations between different concepts of Tsecurityproperty and Ttaskname.
The TPattern Tbox contains the definition of concepts, which formally
define the abstract refinement pattern, concrete refinement pattern and en-
forceable refinement pattern. Formally, TPattern = TARP ∪TCRP ∪TERP . These
concepts are formally defined as follows:
Definition 31 An abstract refinement pattern and a concrete refinement
pattern are represented by the concepts AbsRefPatt and ConRefPatt, respec-
tively. These are defined as follows:
AbsRefPatt ≡ ConRefPatt ≡
∃hasContext.Dctx u ∃hasProblem.Dprb u ∃hasSolution.Dsln . . .
∃hasSolution.Dsln.
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Dctx ∈ Tctx represents temporal logic formula φctx. The transformation of
the temporal formula into the description logic concept is defined in Section
4.4.3. Dprb represents atomic proposition prb and Dsln represents an atomic
proposition within sln. Since this concept may have several relationships
with different concepts representing the solutions, each pattern has a set of
solutions.
Let us consider the next example, which illustrates the abstract refine-
ment pattern:
Example 19 The concept PreventFictiveLoanApplicationPattern ≡
∃hasContext.D1 u ∃hasProblem.PreventFictiveLoanApplicationu
∃hasSolution.ApplySoD represents the pattern called “Prevent Fictive Loan
Application”. Furthermore, the concept has a relationships with concepts D1,
which is defined in the Tctx. This Tbox is defined as: Tctx = {D1 ≡
(KSubmitLoanApplicationu (KApproveLoanApplication
unionsq∃future.ApproveLoanApplication))}.
Definition 32 An enforceable refinement pattern is represented by the con-
cept
EnfRefPatt ≡ ∃hasContext.Dctx u ∃hasProblem.Dprb u
∃hasSolution.XACMLTemplate.
Dctx ∈ Tctx represents the temporal formula φctx. Dprb represents atomic
proposition prb. The solution of this pattern (sln) is the template of a security
policy, which is machine interpretable. Since we take XACML as our exam-
ple, the concept XACMLTemplate represents the template of the XACML pol-
icy, which realizes the desired authorization constraint. The concept XACML-
Template is an OWL concept, which can store the template.
Example 20 shows an enforceable refinement pattern.
Example 20 The concept ApplySoDXacmlPattern ≡
∃hasContext.D1u∃hasProblem.D4u∃hasSolution.XacmlSoD represents the pat-
tern called “apply separation of duty with XACML policy”. Additionally, this
concept has relationships with concepts D1 and D4. The concept D1 is al-
ready defined in Example 19 and D4 is defined in Tprb = {D4 ≡ ApplySoDu
∃Knext.(ApplySoDunionsqD4)}. Since we use OWL to represent the Tbox, a con-
cept may contain a string. Therefore, XacmlSoD, which is the solution, is
represented in OWL as follows:
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<owl:Class rdf:ID="XacmlSoD">
<rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/
XMLSchema#string">&lt;PolicySet PolicySetId=
"Permission:Set" &gt;&lt;Policy PolicyId=
"permission:po:create" &gt;&lt;Target&gt;TaskID =
"Param#1"&lt;/Target&gt;&lt;Obligations&gt;&lt;
Obligation FulfillOn="Permit"&gt;
addDenyPermissionToSubjectBlacklist ("Param#2")&lt;
/Obligation&gt; &lt;/Obligations&gt; &lt;/Policy&gt;
&lt;/PolicySet&gt;</rdfs:comment>
</owl:Class>
From the definitions above, all refinement patterns are represented by
the concepts that have three kinds of relationships. These relationships are
hasContext, hasProblem and hasSolution.
5.7 Mining Policy Refinement Patterns
Several approaches for pattern mining are identified by Kerth and Cunning-
ham [55]. They are:
• Sociological approach:
In this approach, several experts are asked how they solve particular
problems and why this was a good solution. Currently, interviews and
questionnaire are used to gather the knowledge from the experts. Fur-
thermore, an approach called shepherding is also used to control the
quality of the gathered patterns. In this approach [48], one writes his
own experience in solving a problem as a pattern. Thus, he sends the
pattern to a supervisor, who reviews the pattern. This phase is known
as shepherding. The supervisor, which is also known as the shepherd,
has the job to help the pattern author improve the quality of his pat-
tern. Thus, the shepherd should be an experienced pattern author and
has the necessary background knowledge. In the end, the pattern is
introduced in a workshop and will be evaluated.
• Introspective approach:
In this approach, one analyzes the solutions, which he has made, and
tries to identify his solutions that successfully address the problem.
However, this approach only captures patterns, which are only limited
to personal experiences.
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• Artifactual approach:
In this approach, one analyzes the solutions, which others have made,
and tries to identify the commonalities or similarities in their solutions.
Thus, these findings are written as a pattern, which generally describes
the solution.
In the scope of a master thesis [1], we present a novel approach to capture
the expert knowledge in refining workflow policies as refinement patterns.
Inspired by the Wikipedia, which gather an enormous knowledge through
collaborative works of several authors, we use the semantic wiki system [98,
93, 87] to acquire workflow refinement patterns. As we can see from the
previous categories of pattern mining approaches, we classify the approach
presented in the master thesis as sociological approach. This approach aims
for the following goals:
• A more effective way to gather expert knowledge by motivating all ex-
perts to proactively collaborate together in writing down their knowl-
edge,
• The knowledge written by the experts can be automatically trans-
formed into ontologies, which is machine interpretable
Therefore, this approach offers some advantages compared to the tradi-
tional sociological approach. Since the work is collaboratively executed by
the experts around the world, who use the semantic wiki platform, we could
expect these advantages:
• The pattern database contains the actual and up-to-date patterns.
Since the patterns authoring and evaluation process is performed on-
line, thus all experts and pattern authors can instantly review and
improve the patterns.
• More involvement and participation of the experts in writing down
their knowledge as patterns is expected. This is possible, because the
on-line semantic wiki platform facilitates the collaborative work around
the world.
Nevertheless, we also identify the following disadvantages of a wiki sys-
tem:
• The administration of the semantic wiki system is needed to prevent
pranks. Such problems are widely known in the wikipedia platform
that leads to the degradation of its quality. However, this problem can
be addressed by recruiting administrators and experts, who supervise
the system.
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• The experts should write their knowledge in a rigid structure, which
offers less flexibility in writing the knowledge. However, the current
structure should be sufficient for our approach.
As stated before, we use a semantic wiki tool to capture the expert
knowledge from humans. This tool has the similar user interface to the
ordinary wiki engine. It has the web interface, which experts can interact
with. Through this interface, the users document their knowledge as arti-
cles. Like any other wiki-based knowledge management systems, semantic
wiki also documents expert knowledge as articles. The experts can create,
edit and revise the articles. Furthermore, the experts can also discuss, make
correction and keep several versions of the articles. An article commonly
contains a terminology and its explanation. Therefore, the semantic wiki
tool translate the article into a concept. Furthermore, the article can also
have links to any other articles. These links are used to create the semantic
relationships between the concepts. Thus, the semantic wiki tool has the
ability to automatically transform the articles and their links into ontologies,
which comprise of concepts and relationships.
In our work, the experts write the articles that describe workflow tasks,
security properties and refinement patterns. It means that each time the
experts write or correct the articles, the semantic wiki tool can automatically
generate the corresponding ontologies. Therefore, the semantic wiki also
plays a significant role in bridging the knowledge transfer between human
and machine.
However, we also require that the semantic wiki tool should also be able
to document the temporal logic formulas, which describe the context and the
problem of the patterns. Therefore, we extended the semantic wiki tool by
adding a simple parser of temporal logic formulas and a formula to concept
translator module [1].
Usually, the experts should first store the articles describing the termi-
nologies of workflow tasks and security properties. Thus, the experts can
create articles about refinement patterns. Each creation of article about the
refinement patterns, a template is used. This template contains three parts,
which are the context, the problem and the solution of the pattern. Each
of this part has two type of descriptions, namely, informal and formal de-
scriptions. The informal description is the textual description of the context,
the problem or the solution. On the other hand, in the formal description,
the experts can specify the temporal formulas or the define the set of secu-
rity properties. The former is needed to describe the context and problem,
whereas the latter is needed to describe the solution. By using this approach,
we can automatically derive the necessary ontologies, which describe the re-
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finement patterns, from the semantic wiki tool.
The source of the mining process can range from the BSI IT baseline
protection catalog [19] to ISO 27002:2005 [53]. However, we will present an
approach to extract the expert knowledge from the BSI IT baseline protection
catalog.
Importing BSI IT Baseline protection catalog. The IT baseline pro-
tection catalog is a document that describes both the identification of the
threats in IT environment and the safeguards addressing the threats. It is
developed by Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt f’´ur Sicher-
heit in der Informationstechnik). Hence, it is also known as BSI IT baseline
protection catalog.
The catalog is divided into three sub catalogs: Modules, Threats and
Safeguards. The modules serves as the main entry point for identifying and
addressing the threats in IT environment. It means that the administra-
tor should first read the modules, in order to identify the classification of
his asset, which is exposed to the security risk. Further, each entry in the
modules is linked both to some entries in the threat and to some entries in
the safeguards. The links between modules and threats indicate that the
threats may pertain to the components, to which they are related. On the
other hand, the links between modules and safeguards determine the security
measures, which address the threats related to the considered components.
The aim of the IT baseline protection is to facilitate the security admin-
istrator in composing security concepts and mechanisms, which address the
security risks. The composed security concepts and mechanisms are based on
the standard security measures proposed by the IT baseline protection cata-
logs. Since these security concepts are meant to be interpreted and realized
by the administrator, they cannot be directly enforced and realized in the
machine. Therefore, the refinement patterns derived from the IT baseline
protection are from the type of the abstract refinement patterns.
Deriving refinement patterns from the IT baseline protection is relatively
simple, since the categorization of the IT baseline protection sub catalogs
almost reflects the sub parts of a refinement pattern. The modules, threats
and safeguards are related to the context, problem and solution of the pat-
tern, respectively. However, there are some differences. The refinement pat-
tern database aggregates each context, problem and solution into a triplet,
which is called pattern. Thus, this database contains a collection of pat-
terns. On the other hand, the IT baseline protection does not contain such
aggregation. Therefore, the experts, who read the IT-baseline protection,
should construct the triplet (context, problem, solution) aggregation during
CHAPTER 5. REFINEMENT PATTERNS 82
the derivation process.
Another obstacle in deriving refinement patterns from IT baseline protec-
tion lies in the description of the entries in the modules. The entries in the
modules contain only the static description of the object (asset). In contrast,
the context of the pattern describes the fragment of the organizational pro-
cess. Hence, it describes the activities that use the considered object (asset).
Thus, deriving the context from the modules requires the construction of the
scenario, which describes the activities using the considered object (asset).
In the following, we explain the two steps, which are required to derive
a refinement pattern from the IT baseline protection. These processes are
repeated until each threat in the corresponding modules is aggregated to-
gether with the corresponding measure in a refinement pattern. These steps
are explained as follows:
Step 1: Constructing the context and the problem. This step begins
with the analysis of the entries in the modules. As already discussed above,
deriving context from the modules requires the construction of the scenario.
Each scenario describes a threat occurring within the considered modules.
Since each entry of the modules contains some links to the threats, several
scenarios describing the threats should be constructed. Based on these sce-
narios, a pair of the context description and the problem description of a
refinement pattern is then constructed.
Step 2: Adding the solution. The entry of the modules also contains
the links to the corresponding safeguards, which can address the threats. For
each threat occurring in the modules, the appropriate security measures are
determined by the links. Thus, the solution of the pattern is derived from the
security measures. It should be noted that the solution may contain several
security measures. Furthermore, the security measures described in the safe-
guards of IT baseline protection does not contain any machine-enforceable
security policies. Thus, we can only derive abstract refinement pattern from
the IT baseline protection.
The following example shows a refinement pattern derived from the IT
baseline protection.
Example 21 Let us consider the module “Servers under Windows NT” (B
3.103) in IT baseline protection catalog. This module describes the oper-
ation of servers, which run on Windows NT operating system. From this
module, we should derive the context of the refinement patterns. Since this
module does not describe the scenario as a sequence of events, we should
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therefore construct the sequence of events by ourselves. We construct the se-
quence as follows: φctx = E(Admin Login ∧ F (Admin Operates Server ∧
F Admin Logout)). It means that the administrator logs in into the server
and operates the servers. Finally, he will then log out from the server.
The module has several links to some threats. Since we only want to
extract only a refinement pattern, we consider the threat, which is called
“Computer Viruses” (T 5.23). It means that during the whole process of
operating the server, there is a threat, which is caused by computer viruses.
Thus, we identify this as a problem of the pattern describe the problem as
follows: prb = computer virus.
Furthermore, this module also points out the safeguards that address this
problem. These safeguards are “Disable automatic CD-ROM recognition” (S
4.57), “protect registry” (S 4.75) and “safe-guarding boot up procedure” (S
4.49). Thus, the solution is defined as follows: sln = {protect registry,
disable automatic cdrom recognition, protect registry} The prb, ctx and sln
are then grouped together as a triplet of the refinement pattern.
5.8 Example
In this section we will present an example of the refinement pattern both in
informal and in formal representation. We take the refinement pattern from
the type of plan refinement pattern as the example. This pattern is derived
from the paper by Schaad and Moffett [86].
Introduction. The name of this pattern is “Protect Loan Application Pro-
cess”. The purpose of this pattern is to derive less abstract workflow policies,
which fulfill the stakeholders’ protection intent with regard to a loan appli-
cation process.
Context. The context of this pattern is the fragment of the tasks’ execution
sequence with regard to the loan application process. Typically, the fragment
starts with the task named “loan application submission” and ends with the
task named “send e-money payment to client”. Formally, this fragment is
represented as φctx = E(loan appl submission ∧ F send payment).
Problem. The problem found in the above mentioned context is the ab-
stract desired property called “secure the loan application process”. This
problem is represented as prb = protect loan appl process.
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Solution. The solution to this problem is to propose policies that:
• prevent fictive loan,
• prevent unauthorized access to the sensitive financial tasks in loan ap-
plication process.
This solution is represented as sln = {prevent fictive loan application,
prevent unauthorized access}.
Description logic representation. The set of concepts defining this pat-
tern is defined as follows. It should be noted that the abbreviation “plap”
stands for “protect loan application process”.
{Patplap ≡ ∃hasContext.Dctx plap u ∃hasProblem.Dprb plap u
∃hasSolution.Dsln plap 1 u ∃hasSolution.Dsln plap 2;
Dctx plap ≡ D2 u D3;
D2 ≡ KLoanApplSubmission;
D3 ≡ D1 u ∃future.D1;
D1 ≡ KSendPayment;
Dprb plap = ProtectLoanApplProcess;
Dsln plap 1 ≡ PreventFictiveLoan;
Dsln plap 2 ≡ PreventUnauthroizedAccessInLoanApplProcess}
The concept Patplap represents the pattern itself. This concept has four
relationships. They are a relationship to a context (Dctx plap), a relationship
to a problem (Dprb plap) and two relationships to two solutions (Dsln plap 1
and Dsln plap 2). The original representation of the context is temporal logic
formula. Since we need the description logic representation of the context, we
translate it to concepts according to the translation rules defined in Section
4.4.3.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter we defined the structure, the representation and the classifica-
tion of policy refinement patterns. These definitions shall guide the pattern
authors in writing the patterns. The pattern paradigm is an effective method
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to structurally document the expert knowledge. Therefore, it has been used
several fields of computer science [18, 42, 91].
Furthermore, this section also briefly discussed a novel approach in pat-
tern mining, which was realized within the scope of a master thesis [1]. In
this approach, we took the advantage of wiki system and semantic web tech-
nology (i) to effectively capture the expert knowledge and (ii) to write the
expert knowledge in machine interpretable representation. As a result, it can
be immediately used by the policy refinement process.
Nevertheless, our approach still has some limitations. The refinement
patterns can only capture the known security problem with the corresponding
solution. Thus, a new identified security problem cannot be addressed by the
refinement patterns. Another limitation of the refinement patterns is that
the solutions of abstract refinement patterns cannot propose state labels with
parameters.
In the next chapter, we will discuss the policy refinement process, which
uses the building blocks presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to generate
the policy refinement tree defined in Chapter 3.
Chapter 6
Automated Policy Refinement
Process
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the automated policy refinement process, which is built
upon the building blocks. These building blocks are defined in the previous
chapters. They are:
• formalization of the workflow behavior and the high-level policy speci-
fication,
• the definition of the policy refinement tree,
• the definition of policy refinement patterns and
• the definition of description logic-based model checking.
The first building block deals with the the formal representation of the
workflow behavior and the high-level policy specification in a Kripke model.
The automated refinement process is performed by the machine, which should
be able to interpret and to analyze the workflow behavior and the high-level
policy. Therefore, the workflow behavior and the high-level policy should be
formally represented.
Although we can specify the workflow policies as state labels, as defined
in Section 2.4, this method is not expressive enough to represent the depen-
dencies between a policy and its sub policies. The sub policies and their
dependencies are generated by the refinement process. Therefore, we pro-
pose the second building block, which is the policy refinement tree. With
the policy refinement tree, we can specify the dependencies between a policy
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and its sub policies. These dependencies are categorized into OR and AND
connections. The former means that according to the refinement process, the
policy is fulfilled, if and only if, all of its sub policies are fulfilled. The latter
means that according to the refinement process, the policy is fulfilled, if and
only if, one of its sub policies is fulfilled. Thus, we can also conclude that
the refinement process results in a policy refinement tree.
The third building block defines the policy refinement patterns. Pre-
viously in the end of Chapter 3, we argued that the refinement of policies
requires expert knowledge. In this building block, we use pattern paradigm to
capture the expert knowledge in refining workflow policies. Furthermore, we
also define the formal representation of policy refinement patterns. Since the
machine should also be able to interpret the expert knowledge, formalization
of the policy refinement patterns is required.
The fourth building block defines a novel approach in combining descrip-
tion logic formalism with temporal logic formalism. By combining both
formalism, we establish the description logic-based model checking, which
facilitates the automated pattern matching. The pattern matching is con-
ducted during the refinement process and aims for finding the fragment of
the execution trace in the workflow that matches the description of the re-
finement patterns. This particular fragment of the execution trace represents
the abstract workflow policy, which is subject to the refinement process.
The concept of the automated policy refinement process has already been
published in [79] and [81].
Motivation. The high-level policies specified by the stakeholders are still
too abstract to be enforced by the machine. By consulting the refinement
patterns database, the policy refinement process should iteratively decom-
pose each abstract policy into several less abstract policies. Intuitively, one
can see the hierarchical composition relationships between the policy and
its sub-policies as a policy refinement tree, which is defined in Chapter 3.
The policy refinement process stops if all leaves of the policy refinement tree
represent concrete policies.
Outline. This chapter begins with the discussion of the related work in
the policy refinement process. Subsequently, three important steps in the
policy refinement process are discussed. Section 6.3 discusses the pattern
matching step, which should find the abstract policies that are subject to
the refinement. Section 6.4 discusses the instantiation process of pattern
solutions. Section 6.5 presents the algorithm of the refinement process. This
section is then followed by an example in Section 6.6. Discussion about the
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policy refinement algorithm can be found in 6.7. Section 6.8 summarizes this
chapter.
6.2 Related Work
Workflow constraint generation. In the field of workflow constraint
specification process, our work is similar to the work of Neumann and Strem-
beck [69, 70, 95]. In their work, a goal-oriented method is proposed to derive
workflow constraints. Although we use the policy-refinement tree structure
to derive the low-level policies, which also include workflow constraints, each
node of the policy refinement tree can be generally interpreted as a goal.
Each node of the tree represents the intention, the objective, the plan that
states the desired control of system’s behavior. Nevertheless, our approach
is capable of the automated policy refinement process.
LTL model checking-based refinement. Another related work is the
work by Rubio-Loyola et al. [82]. Their work uses the goal refinement tree
approach to manually refine the abstract policies. This refinement tree is
manually constructed by security experts, who use the refinement pattern
database. In contrast, our approach makes use of the formalized refinement
patterns, which are acquired from the expert knowledge, to automatically
construct the refinement tree.
Their work and ours use temporal logic model checking to perform the
refinement of policy. In their work, they use model checking to find the
execution traces in the model of the managed system, in which the concrete
policies can be applied. On the other hand, our work uses model checking
both for applying concrete policies in the particular execution traces as well
as for refining policies. More precisely, we use model checking to perform
pattern matching that proposes the refinement of an abstract policy.
Abduction refinement technique. The abduction-based refinement tech-
nique proposed by Bandara et al. [10] also uses a goal refinement tree ap-
proach to refine abstract policies. However, compared to our work, they use
event calculus instead of temporal logic formalism. Furthermore, instead of
using refinement patterns to refine the policies, they use the abduction rea-
soning technique. Their approach does not provide an automated refinement
process and relies only on the knowledge of the policy administrator, who
uses this approach. In contrast, our approach can perform the automated
policy refinement process, which is supported by expert knowledge.
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6.3 Pattern Matching
The pattern matching is performed in order to find a set of execution traces
within the model, which match the description of the context and the solution
of a pattern. Since the pattern’s context is represented as a temporal logic
formula and the workflow’s behavior is represented as Kripke model, we
can solve the pattern matching problem by employing the temporal logic
model checking technique. Let φctx be the temporal formula representing the
context of the pattern. Furthermore, the Kripke model K should represent
the workflow behavior. Let states be a function that maps each sequence into
a set of its states. Thus, pattern matching should return a set of execution
traces that is defined as follows:
{pi | (K, pi  φctx) ∧ (∀z ∈ states(pi) : prb ∈ L(z))}.
However, a problem arises when we use the original temporal logic model
checking to perform the pattern matching. This is due to the fact that
the languages or terminologies used to specify the temporal formulas of the
patterns’ contexts and problems differ with the languages or terminologies
used to label the states of the model.
To solve this problem, we already proposed an approach called descrip-
tion logic-based model checking, which is presented in Chapter 4. In this
approach, the model and the formulas are translated into the description
logic-based knowledge representation. The model is translated into a set of
assertions stored in the ABox and the temporal logic formulas are translated
into description logic concepts, which are stored in the TBox. In this case,
the formulas φctx are represented by the concept Dctx. The atomic propo-
sition prb is represented by the concept Dprb. The sequence of states pi is
translated into sequence of individuals σ. These translations are explained
in Section 4.4 and Section A. Both ABox and TBox are the component of
the knowledge base KB. Thus, the description logic-based model checking
process returns the set:
Πmatch = {σ | (KB  Dctx(σ0)) ∧ (∀y ∈ states(σ) : KB  Dprb(y))},
which contains the set of execution traces. Moreover, we use the algorithm
introduced in Section 4.6 to retrieve the trace pi.
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6.4 Pattern Instantiation
If the set Πmatch is not empty, then the solution of the pattern can be ap-
plied to these traces. Thus, depending on the solution, the abstract or the
concrete solution should be instantiated. This process is also called pattern
instantiation.
In the following we will discuss the instantiation of the abstract solution
and then of the concrete solution.
6.4.1 Instantiating Abstract Solution
Instantiating an abstract solution is simple. The abstract solution is instan-
tiated by adding new state labels, which are proposed by this solution, into
each states of all execution traces, which match the context and the problem
of the corresponding pattern.
Recall that the abstract solution is described as a set of atomic propo-
sitions sln = {prop0, . . . , propn}, where propi is the atomic proposition rep-
resenting the desired property. The instantiation of the abstract solution
implies that each of the desired properties denoted by propi shall hold along
each execution trace pi ∈ Πmatch.
Thus, for each propi of sln and for each pi ∈ Πmatch, all states of the
model M appearing in trace pi should be labeled with propi. These new labels
represent the less abstract policies, which are classified either as protection
plan or as protection event policies.
Pseudo code representing the instantiation of the abstract solution is
presented as follows:
Input: abstract solution sln, trace pi, labeling function of the Kripke
model L
Output: labeling function L
foreach k ∈ sln do1
foreach s ∈ states(pi) do2
L← L ∪ {s 7→ {k}} ;3
return L ;4
6.4.2 Instantiating Concrete Solution
The instantiation process of a concrete solution differs from the instantiation
of the abstract solution. In this step, there will be no addition of state labels
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to the model. Instead, a concrete policy, such as the XACML policy, will
be generated. Instantiating the concrete solution should also consider the
context, which is also contained in the same pattern of the solution. We call
this context as concrete context. Recall that the context describes a sequence
of task executions, in which the problem exists. Thus, the syntax rule of the
concrete context is defined as follows:
φi ::=
{
Ti ∧ F φi−1 , i > 0
T0 , i = 0
,
where i ∈ N. This formula describes the sequential execution of n tasks.
T1 . . . Tn are the task names (Ti ∈ APtaskname). It should be noted that Ti
preceeds Ti−1 for all i ∈ N. Such formula is satisfied by the execution trace:
sidx0 . . . sidx1 . . . sidxn
on which the following conditions hold:
0 ≤ idx0 < idx1 < idx2 < . . . < idxn,
Tn ∈ L(sidx0),
Tn−1 ∈ L(sidx1),
...
T0 ∈ L(sidxn),
and
Tn, . . . , T0 ∈ APtaskname.
The atomic propositions Tn, Tn−1, . . . , T0 are the state labels of sidxn ,. . .,sidx0 ,
respectively. Furthermore, these atomic propositions represent the task names.
These atomic propositions are used to fill the parameter values of the XACML
template. Thus, the XACML policy is generated by taking the task names
as its parameter values.
6.4.3 An Example of Generating Separation of Duty
Policy in XACML
As an example, we show the generation of separation of duty policy in
XACML, which is adapted from the work by Crampton [27].
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Let us consider an execution trace pi ∈ Πmatch. the trace pi is a sequence
of s1s2s3. The states have the following labels:
s1 7→ {createAppl, ApplySoD, preventF ictiveLoanApplication},
s2 7→ {checkAppl, ApplySoD, preventF ictiveLoanApplication},
s3 7→ {approveAppl, ApplySoD, preventF ictiveLoanApplication},
where createAppl, checkAppl, approveAppl ∈ APtaskname and ApplySoD,
preventF ictiveLoanApplication ∈ APsecurityproperty. As we can see, each
state has a state label representing the task name and some state labels
representing the security properties.
Suppose that we use the necessary common vocabulary of the tasks’
names represented by an ontology, such that
createAppl ≡ submit loan application
approveAppl ≡ approve loan application.
Thus, by using description logic model checking, we know that pi 
φctx sod 2, from
φctx sod 2 = E(submit loan application ∧ F (approve loan application)).
To instantiate the concrete solution of the trace pi, the refinement process
generates the XACML policy by using the XACML policy template, which
is stored as a concept. This was already discussed in Section 5.4.3.
The parameters of the template are filled by the atomic propositions,
which are taken from the labels of the corresponding state s1 and s3. They
are createAppl and approveAppl. It should be noted that only the labels,
which represent the task names, are taken. Furthermore, each state has only
a state label, which represents the task name. Figure 6.1 shows the XACML
policy template, which has been already filled with the values createAppl
and approveAppl.
6.5 Policy Refinement Algorithm
The policy refinement algorithm is an iteration of pattern matching and pat-
tern instantiation steps, which are already introduced above. This iteration
stops if there is no abstract policy that can be further refined by the patterns
in the catalog or the leaves of the refinement tree represent the concrete poli-
cies. In the latter case, the refinement process is successfully finished. The
policy refinement process is depicted in Algorithm 6.2.
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<PolicySet ... PolicySetId="Permission:Set" ... >
<Policy ... PolicyId="permission:po:create" ... >
<Rule ... >
<Target>
TaskID = "createAppl"
</Target>
<Obligations ... >
<Obligation FulfillOn="Permit" ... >
addDenyPermissionToSubjectBlacklist
("approveAppl")
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
</Policy>
.
.
.
</PolicySet>
Figure 6.1: The generated XACML policy
Input: pattern database Π,Kripke Model M
Output: XACML Policies XPL,Refinement Tree T
T ← ∅ ; while true do1
Match← ∅ ;2
foreach pat ∈ Π do3
Tr ← getTraces(parseTreeOf(pat.ctx ∧ pat.prb),M) ;4
foreach t ∈ Tr do5
ProposedSolution← ∅ ;6
foreach s ∈ sln(pat) do7
if NodeIsNotFound(T, s, t) then8
ProposedSolution← ProposedSolution ∪ {s} ;9
Match←Match ∪ {(t, P roposedSolution)}10
if Match = ∅ then11
return;12
foreach n ∈Match do13
foreach l ∈ n.ProposedSolution do14
if l.s is abstract solution then15
addLabel(l.s, n.t) ;16
T.addNodeToLeaf(l.s, n.t) ;17
else if n.s is auth. constraint solution then18
generateXACMLAuth(l.s, n.t) ;19
else if p is SoD solution then20
generateXACMLSoD(l.s, n.t) ;21
Figure 6.2: The algorithm for pattern refinement
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Pattern Matching. (line 3-10)
Since we have the formalization of the workflow, its policies and the pol-
icy refinement patterns, we could perform an automated pattern matching
by using model checking techniques. This is done by evaluating the LTL for-
mulas of context and problem of every pattern in the catalog over the model
that represents both the workflow and its policies.
Basically, the pattern matching, as already explained in Section 6.3, is
performed by getTraces(p,M), which takes a pattern and the model as its
input and returns some the execution paths. It returns the execution traces,
which match the problem and the context of pattern p. The loop between
lines 7-9, which calls the NodeIsNotFound(T, s, t) function, checks whether
the matched patterns are already instantiated or not.
Pattern Instantiation. (line 14-22)
We differentiate between the instantiation of the abstract solutions and
of the concrete solutions. The instantiation of the abstract solutions only
involves the creation of new state labels within the execution path, which
satisfies the restricted CTL* formula of context and problem. On the other
hand, instantiating the concrete solution requires the generation of the work-
flow constraints.
XACML Policy Generation. (line 19-22)
The constraint generation step is considered as a special case of the pat-
tern instantiation step that has a concrete solution. This process takes the
execution path and the pattern name as the input, and generates an XACML
policy as its output. In our case, we consider in generating XACML policy
that specifies either the authentication constraints or the authorization con-
straints. An authentication constraint restrict the execution of certain tasks
only to subjects, which have a specific assertion about their authentication
method. Such constraint can be expressed in XACML. On the other hand,
we consider only the authorization constraints, which specify the separation
of duties.
The generated XACML policy consists of a target and a rule. The target
of this policy describes the situation, in which the policy applies. The target
specifies the name of the task (resource) and the requesting subject, which
has an attribute assertion about its authentication method. The rule part of
this policy states the permission of the specified subject to execute this task.
The input of this step, which consists of an execution path and a pattern,
determines the target of the generated XACML policy. The execution path
satisfying the context has only one task, the name of which is inserted into
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the target of the policy. The concrete solution of the pattern is also inserted
into the subject’s attribute assertion of the target.
6.6 Example
In this section we will present a trivial example of the policy refinement
process.
6.6.1 Workflow and its High-Level Policies
First, we will present the set of states, state transitions and state labels
representing the workflow behavior as follows:
W = {s1, s2, s3, s4}
I = {s1}
RL = {(s1, s2), (s2, s3), (s3, s4)}
Lwf = {s1 7→ {SubmitLoanAppl}, s2 7→ {CheckLoanAppl},
s3 7→ {ApproveLoanAppl}, s4 7→ {SendPayment}}.
Additionally, the stakeholders specify their high-level policies by labeling
all states within the model with the atomic propositions representing their
desired properties. In this example, the stakeholders intend to achieve a
secure loan application process. This property is denoted by the atomic
proposition
secureLoanApplProcess. Thus, the following set of mappings represents the
high-level policies:
Lpol = {s1 7→ {SecureLoanAppProc}, s2 7→ {SecureLoanAppProc},
s3 7→ {SecureLoanAppProc}, s4 7→ {SecureLoanAppProc}}.
The set of atomic propositions is defined as:
AP = {SubmitLoanAppl, CheckLoanAppl, ApproveLoanAppl,
SendPayment, SecureLoanAppProc}.
Finally, we define the Kripke model representing the workflow’s behavior and
its high-level policies as:
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K = 〈W,RL,Lwf ∪ Lpol, AP 〉
Figure 6.4 graphically depicts the Kripke model of the workflow in the
initial phase. As we can see, the state label SecureLoanAppProc represents
s1
s2
s3
s4
{ SubmitLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc }
{ CheckLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc }
{ ApproveLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc }
{ SendPayment, SecureLoanAppProc }
Figure 6.3: Kripke model of the workflow in the initial phase
a high-level policy of the stakeholders. However, we use the policy refinement
tree to structurally represent the policies. Let Tpol be the policy refinement
tree. Initially, Tpol has the following components:
ω
Nspec = {({s1, s2, s3, s4}, secureLoanAppProc)}
Nabs = ∅
Ncon = ∅
AndGate = {(ω, {({s1, s2, s3, s4}, secureLoanAppProc)}
OrGate = ∅
app = ∅
The policy refinement tree is graphically depicted in Figure 6.4.
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SecureLoanAppProc
root policy
and
s1
s2
s3
s4
{ SubmitLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc }
{ CheckLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc }
{ ApproveLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc }
{ SendPayment, SecureLoanAppProc }
P1
P1´
Figure 6.4: Refinement tree in the initial phase
6.6.2 Refinement Patterns
As for the example, we present three refinement patterns, two abstract refine-
ment patterns and a concrete refinement pattern. For the sake of simplicity,
we will not present them in form of description logic notation, instead, as
tuples.
The first pattern is referred to as Pat1 or to as “Secure Loan Application
Process” (slap) pattern. It has the purpose to refine “Secure Loan Applica-
tion Process” policy into two less-abstract policies, namely “Prevent Fictive
Loan” and “ revent U authorized Access in Loan Application”. This pat-
tern is denoted by the tuple (φslap ctx, slap prb, slap sln). It should be noted
that the abbreviation “LAP” in the atomic propositions stands for “loan
application process”. They are defined as follows:
φslap ctx = E(SubmitLoanAppl ∧ F (CheckLoanAppl ∧
F (ApproveLoanAppl ∧ F SendPayment)))
slap prb = SecureLoanAppProc
slap sln = {preventF ictiveLoan, preventUnauthAccessInLAP}
The second pattern is referred to as Pat2 or to as “Separating Check Loan
and Approve Loan Tasks to Prevent Fictive Loan” (stpf). It has the purpose
to derive the necessary protection event, which can prevent fraud in the loan
application process. In this case, this pattern suggests the separation of the
two tasks, namely “check loan” and “approve loan”. This pattern is denoted
by the tuple (φstpf ctx, stpf prb, stpf sln). They are defined as follows:
φstpf ctx = E(SubmitLoanApp ∧ F (ApproveLoanAppl))
stpf prb = preventF ictiveLoan
stpf sln = {applySoD}
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The third pattern is a concrete pattern. It is referred to as Pat3 or to as
“Generating XACML Policy for Separation of Duty” (asod). This pattern
is denoted by the tuple (φasod ctx, asod prb,XacmlSoD). The context and the
problem are defined as follows:
φasod ctx = E(SubmitLoanApp ∧ F (ApproveLoanAppl)),
asod prb = applySoD,
where the solution of the pattern is a template of an XACML policy. The
template is already presented in Figure 5.1 and Example 20.
6.6.3 Refinement Steps
Pattern Matching - 1st Iteration. In the pattern matching step of the
first iteration, the context and the problem of Pat1 should match the follow-
ing set of traces:
Trmatch 1 = {s1s2s3s4},
due to the fact that ∀tr ∈ Trmatch : (tr  φslap ctx) ∧ ∀z ∈ states(tr) :
slap prb ∈ L(z).
Pattern Instantiation - 1st Iteration. Based on the set Trmatch 1, the
solution of pattern Pat1 should be instantiated. In this step, all states of
each trace in Transmatch 1 should be given the label proposed by slap sln. In
this case, the new labels are
preventFraudInLoanAppl andpreventUnauthAccessInLoanAppl. Thus, the
labeling set L of the model K will be added with new state labels:
L′ = L ∪ {s1 7→ {preventF ictiveLoan, preventUnauthAccessInLAP},
s2 7→ {preventF ictiveLoan, preventUnauthAccessInLAP},
s3 7→ {preventF ictiveLoan, preventUnauthAccessInLAP},
s4 7→ {preventF ictiveLoan, preventUnauthAccessInLAP}}
This model is depicted in Figure 6.5.
Moreover, some new policies and gates are added into refinement tree
Tpol.
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s1
s2
s3
s4
{ SubmitLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP }
{ CheckLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP  }
{ ApproveLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP  }
{ SendPayment, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP  }
Figure 6.5: Kripke model of the workflow after the first iteration
N ′abs = Nabs ∪ {(s1s2s3s4, SolutionOfPattern1),
(s1s2s3s4, preventF ictiveLoan),
(s1s2s3s4, preventUnauthAccessInLAP )}
N ′con = ∅
AndGate′ = AndGate ∪ {
((s1s2s3s4, SolutionOfPattern1),
{(s1s2s3s4, preventF ictiveLoan)}),
((s1s2s3s4, SolutionOfPattern1),
{(s1s2s3s4, preventUnauthAccessInLAP )})}
OrGate′ = OrGate ∪ {(({s1, s2, s3, s4}, secureLoanAppProc)
, {(s1s2s3s4, SolutionOfPattern1)})}
As we can see, the policy P ′1 acts as the intermediary policy between
the abstract policy and the sub policies, which are proposed by the pattern
Pat1. It should be noted that this kind of policy is connected with the
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abstract policy and the generated sub policies by the OR gate and AND gate,
respectively. It means that the solution is an alternative to refine the abstract
policy, and fulfilled only by enforcing all of the sub policies. The current
refinement tree is shown in Figure 6.6.
SecureLoanAppProc;
{s1,s2,s3,s4}
preventFictiveLoan;
(s1s2s3s4)
preventUnauthAccessInLAP;
(s1s2s3s4)
root policy
and
SolutionOfPattern1;
(s1s2s3s4)
or
and
P1
P1´
P2 P3
Figure 6.6: Refinement tree after the first iteration
Pattern Matching - 2nd Iteration. Pattern Pat1 will be ignored in the
second iteration of the pattern matchin process, due to the fact that it already
has a match with the same execution path found in the first iteration. In
this iteration, the context and the problem of Pat2 will match the following
set of traces:
Trmatch 2 = {s1s2s3},
due to the fact that ∀tr ∈ Trmatch : (tr  φstpf ctx) ∧ ∀z ∈ states(tr) :
stpf prb ∈ L(z).
Pattern Instantiation - 2nd Iteration. Based on the set Trmatch 2, the
solution of pattern Pat2 should be instantiated. In this step, all states of
each trace in Trmatch 2 should be given the label proposed by φstpf sln. In this
case, the new label is applySoD. Thus, the labeling set L of the model K
will be added with new state labels:
L′′ = L′ ∪ {s1 7→ {applySoD},
s2 7→ {applySoD},
s3 7→ {applySoD}}
This model is depicted in Figure 6.7.
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s1
s2
s3
s4
{ SubmitLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP, applySoD }
{ CheckLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP, applySoD  }
{ ApproveLoanAppl, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP, applySoD  }
{ SendPayment, SecureLoanAppProc, preventFictiveLoan, 
preventUnauthAccessInLAP  }
Figure 6.7: Kripke model of the workflow after the first iteration
Moreover, the refinement tree Tpol will be added with new nodes and
relationships:
N ′′abs = N
′
abs ∪ {(s1s2s3s4, SolutionOfPattern2),
(s1s2s3, apply separation of duty)}
N ′′con = ∅
AndGate′′ = AndGate′ ∪ {((s1s2s3s4, SolutionOfPattern2),
{(s1s2s3, apply separation of duty)})}
OrGate′′ = OrGate′ ∪ {((s1s2s3s4, preventF ictiveLoan),
{(s1s2s3s4, SolutionOfPattern2)})}
Again, we see that the policy P ′2 acts as the intermediary policy between
the abstract policy and the sub policies, which are proposed by the pattern
Pat2. The current refinement tree is shown in Figure 6.8.
Pattern Matching - 3rd Iteration. Again, the patterns Pat1 and Pat2
will be ignored. In the third iteration, the context and the problem of Pat3
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SecureLoanAppProc;
{s1,s2,s3,s4}
preventFictiveLoan;
(s1s2s3s4)
preventUnauthAccessInLAP;
(s1s2s3s4)
root policy
and
SolutionOfPattern1;
(s1s2s3s4)
or
and
applySoD;
(s1s2s3)
SolutionOfPattern2;
(s1s2s3)
and
or
P1
P1´
P2 P3
P2´
P4
Figure 6.8: Refinement tree after the second iteration
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will match the following set of traces:
Trmatch 3 = {s1s2s3},
due to the fact that ∀tr ∈ Trmatch : (tr  φasod ctx) ∧ ∀z ∈ states(tr) :
asod prb ∈ L(z).
Pattern Instantiation - 3rd Iteration. Based on the set Trmatch 3, the
solution of pattern Pat3 should be instantiated. In this step, an XACML
policy will be generated and the refinement tree Tpol will be added with new
nodes and relationships:
N ′′′abs = N
′′
abs ∪ {(s1s2s3, SolutionOfPattern3)}
N ′′′con = N
′′
con ∪ {(s1s2s3, XacmlSoD)}
AndGate′′′ = AndGate′′ ∪
{((s1s2s3, SolutionOfPattern3), {(s1s2s3, XacmlSoD)})}
OrGate′′′ = OrGate′′ ∪ {((s1s2s3, apply separation of duty),
{(s1s2s3, SolutionOfPattern3)})}
Thus, there is no change made in the Kripke model. The current refine-
ment tree is shown in Figure 6.9.
Since the generation of the separation of duty policy in XACML is already
discussed in Section 6.4.3, we will not discuss further about the XACML
policy generation.
6.7 Discussion
In this section, we give our analysis and limitations of the policy refinement
process. Section 6.7.1 and 6.7.2 present some scenarios, which could occur
in the policy refinement process. The rest of this section presents the other
limitation of this research work.
6.7.1 Incomplete Policy Refinement Due to the Lack
of Knowledge
Let us assume that the refinement patterns database does not have the suf-
ficient patterns. This can cause that the refinement process cannot derive
the enforceable policies. In this case, the refinement process will prematurely
terminate and the policy refinement tree would not be completely built. One
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Figure 6.9: Refinement tree after the third iteration
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can see that the leaves of the policy refinement tree are not from the type of
the concrete policies.
In this case, the tool can only partially generate workflow policies. More-
over, the generated workflow policies cannot fulfill the high-level policies. To
solve this problem, we need to acquire more refinement patterns.
6.7.2 Refinement with Bad Pattern Quality
Let us assume that the database has some refinement patterns with bad
quality. The refinement process finishes without any error and the policy
refinement tree is completely built.
Although the policies are completely generated, these generated policies
cannot fulfill the high-level policies. This problem is known if the generated
policies are verified or the administrator discovers any malicious behavior
during monitoring.
6.7.3 Limitations of the Generated Policies
XACML Policies Limitations. In our case, we only consider in deriving
concrete policies, which specify authorization constraints and/or authentica-
tion constraints. It is well known that XACML policies cannot be used to
specify policies, which consider the status nor the history of the access con-
trol. For example, XACML policies cannot be used to specify chinese wall
policies.
Lack of Expressiveness in Specifying Semantic and Security Con-
straints. Biskup and Sprick [16] proposed an approach, which allows us
to specify semantic and security constraints. These constraints could be
specified for a workflow. Our approach, however, does not consider such con-
straints. We specify our workflow constraints either as a set of state labels
or as enforceable policies. On the other hand, their approach specify the
constraints as logical formulas.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter we learnt how building blocks are used together to realize
the description logic-based model checking. We presented the algorithm to
build the policy refinement tree by using the refinement patterns stored in
the database.
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The pattern matching is solved by employing the model checking tech-
nique, which is modified in order to fulfill our need. The pattern instantiation
process is either the addition of new state labels in the Kripke model or the
generation of the XACML policies.
In the next chapter, we will present the architecture of the policy refine-
ment tool, which is developed as a proof of concept of this work.
Chapter 7
The Policy Refinement Tool
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapters presented the concepts required in realizing the auto-
mated and pattern-based workflow policy refinement process. Moreover, they
also discuss the theoretical foundation needed for our concepts. In this chap-
ter, we will discuss the implementation of the automated policy refinement
tool. In implementing the refinement tool, we strive to maximally utilize
existing standards and tools.
Outline. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses
the standards and the tools that are used to realize the policy refinement
tool. The second part explains the architecture of the refinement tool. The
last part of this chapter discusses the contributions of our work in Sicari
project.
7.2 Standards and Tools
Our goal in implementing the refinement tool is to maximally utilize existing
standards, libraries or tools. With this goal, we can facilitate the extensi-
bility of the refinement tool and also reduce the implementation effort. In
the following, we will present the standards and tools that are used in the
implementation of the refinement tool.
7.2.1 Web Ontology Language (OWL)
Web Ontology Language (OWL) is the standard for representing
the machine-interpretable knowledge in form of a mark-up language stored
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and transferred over the internet, which is also known as the web.
For the past decades, several researchers are aware that the web would
benefit from some structure and explicit semantics for some of its content.
This clearly enables the interpretation of web content by machines and obvi-
ously facilitates the conceptual search of web content. In comparison to the
traditional textual or syntactical search, the conceptual search allows the re-
trieval of a set of web instances having the same interpretation, even if these
instances are represented in different texts.
The development of the OWL standard is based on two existing stan-
dards, namely DAML (DARPA Agent Mark-up Language) and OIL (Ontol-
ogy Inference Layer). The DAML standard was established from the DARPA
Program in 1999 [8]. It aims to utilize agents and programs to interpret,
search and process web content [49]. The language of the DAML standard
is written in the form of a mark-up language. At the same time, the OIL
standard was being developed. It has also the same goal with the DARPA
standard. However, the developers of OIL placed a stronger emphasis on for-
mal foundations. Thus, the semantics of the OIL language can be specified
via a mapping to the semantics of the Description Logic SHOQ(D) [41, 51].
Consequently, the two approaches were combined and resulted in the
DAML + OIL. The DAML+OIL is represented by using the RDFS standard.
Later on, the DAML + OIL was renamed into OWL, and currently there are
three classes of OWL languages: (i) OWL Lite, (ii) OWL DL, and (iii) OWL
Full. In our work, we use the OWL DL language, but has more expressive
power (SHOQ(D)) than OWL Lite, but it has a more efficient reasoning
algorithm compared to OWL Full. To specify, edit and manipulate the OWL
language, we use the Protege Ontology Editor.
7.2.2 Protege Ontology Editor
The Protege Ontology Editor [66] is a license-free and open-source software
that can be freely downloaded1. The purpose of Protege is to create, manage,
view and edit the knowledge represented in OWL language by providing a
graphical user interface. It also has the DIG interface, which allows the
user to attach existing description logic reasoners with the Protege Ontology
Editor. This has the advantage, that one can perform the query directly
from the graphical user interface of the Protege Ontology Editor.
We mainly use the Protege Ontology Editor to specify the refinement
patterns and to perform experiments related to description logic-based model
checking.
1http://protege.stanford.edu/
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7.2.3 Extensible Access Control Mark-up Language
The Extensible Access Control Mark-up Language is a standard developed
by OASIS-OPEN consortium [71]. The goal of this standard is to provide an
open standard for specifying access control policies, which is free of license
and can be freely extended by the users. The access control policies are
intended to control the permission to access web resources, which are specified
by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). The current version of the XACML
standard is Version 2.0. Although the next revision, Version 3.0, is currently
being developed.
7.3 The Modules of the Policy Refinement
Tool
In this section we will explain the architecture of the refinement tool and its
modules. The whole architecture can be seen in Figure 7.1.
Separation of 
duty policy 
generator
Authentication 
constraint policy 
generator
Workflow behavior and its 
high level policies as Kripke 
model
Security Pattern 
Database
Policy refiner
XACML policy 
generator
Patterns in OWL 
format
Description Logic 
reasoning engine
XACML 
Policies
XACML 
Policies
Description 
Logic-based 
model checker
ABox and TBox 
in system 
memory
Figure 7.1: The architecture of the automated policy refiner
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7.3.1 Policy Refiner
This is the main module of the policy refinement tool. It takes the Kripke
model of the behavior of workflow and high-level policies as the input and
generates the policy refinement tree and concrete policies as the output. The
Kripke model is forwarded to the description logic reasoning engine, which
stores the Kripke model in the Abox. In this prototype, the input of this
module is written in OWL format.
The objective of this module is to refine the high-level workflow poli-
cies by using refinement patterns. This module performs the iteration of
the refinement step, which consists of the pattern matching and pattern in-
stantiation processes. It consults the description logic-based model checking
to find the refinement patterns, which can refine the – currently unrefined
– abstract workflow policies (see Section 6.3). This is done by performing
model checking for each pattern in the database. Obviously, this process is
the most time consuming part of the policy refinement process. This is due
to tha fact that the model checking process is performed for all refinement
patterns in the database, which are repeated for each refinement step. If
patterns are found, the solutions of the patterns are instantiated by adding
the new state labels in the Kripke model stored in the Abox (see Section
6.4). This refinement step is repeated until all abstract policies are refined.
Additionally, this module also builds the policy refinement tree. Rep-
resenting the refinement tree is relatively straightforward. It is represented
by the graph data structure, which is stored internally by the policy refiner
module.
The Graphical User Interface of the Policy Refiner can be seen in Figure
7.2.
On the left pane, we see the policy refinement tree. This hierarchical
structure is represented by using the explorer tree. The right pane presents
the policy. It shows the execution path and the desired security property,
which should hold in the execution path.
7.3.2 Description Logic reasoning engine
We conduct our experiment with several existing description logic reasoning
engines, such as Pellet reasoner [74] and Racer [47] to realize this module.
We use the Protege-OWL API [94] to interact with the reasoner.
The task of this module is to manage the knowledge base represented
in the TBox and the Abox, which are stored in the system’s memory. Fur-
thermore, it also accepts the assertions and queries sent by the policy refiner
and description logic-based model checker modules, respectively. The pol-
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Figure 7.2: The user interface of policy refiner tool
icy refiner sends the assertions in order to represent the Kripke model in the
Abox. The description logic-based model checker sends the instance checking
queries in order to perform the model checking process.
In the initialization phase, the module reads the refinement patterns
database stored in the OWL file and loads them into the TBox stored in
the system’s memory.
7.3.3 Description Logic-based model checker
Although this module can perform the model checking process, the main
task of the module is to perform the automated pattern matching on behalf
of the policy refiner module. For each refinement step, the module receives
the query from the policy refinement module. The query asks for a set of
the tuples containing the pattern’s identifier and a set of execution traces,
in which the pattern’s solution can be applied. To answer this query, the
module performs the pattern matching as described in Section 6.3 by means
of description logic-based model checking.
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7.3.4 XACML Policy Generator
This module facilitates the generation of the enforceable XACML policies
according to the policy refinement tree, which is generated by the policy
refiner module. Clearly, the leaves of the policy refinement tree denote the
enforceable low-level policies. However, we need to generate the correspond-
ing machine interpretable and enforceable policies, such as XACML policies,
in order to achieve the desired high-level policies. The module takes the
refinement tree as its input.
The module, however, does not generate the XACML policies itself, but
it acts as a proxy between the policy refiner and the real XACML policy
generators. Thus, the module implements the abstract factory pattern [42].
It determines, which kinds of concrete solutions are being instantiated and
forwards them to the corresponding XACML generator modules.
In our work, we consider only two kinds of policies that should be gen-
erated. They are authorization constraint policy and separation of duty
policy. According to Figure 7.1, we have two modules called authentication
constraint policy generator and separation of duty policy generator that in-
teract with the XACML policy generator module. This is due to the fact
that we consider only two mechanism refinement patterns that generate the
authentication constraint policy and the separation of duty policy, respec-
tively. Obviously, adding some new mechanism refinement patterns should
also integrate new constraint generator modules in this architecture.
To generate the XACML policy, we use the Xerces library provided by
the Apache XML Project [99] and use the XML schema file defined in the
XACML specification [71].
7.4 Contributions to Sicari Project
The result of our research work is placed within the sub project policies,
which deals with the realization of the policy-based system management on
the Sicari platform. The architecture of the policy-based system management
is presented in Figure 7.3. Policy Enforcement Point, Policy Decision Point,
Policy Validation and Policy Refinement Tool modules are developed within
the sub project “Policies”. These modules are depicted in Figure 7.3. It
should be noted that we use XACML standard to specify our enforceable
policies.
The Policy Enforcement Point monitors each access requests on sensitive
resources and consults with the Policy Decision Point, which determines the
permission or denial of the access requests.
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Figure 7.3: The architecture of the Sicari platform
The Policy Validation Point checks whether the generated enforceable
policies comply with the stakeholders’ high-level policies. This module makes
use of the Simple Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT), which is devel-
oped by Fraunhofer SIT and provides a formal tool to verify the properties
of the modeled system. By using the SHVT tool, we aim for verifying the
compliance between the generated workflow security policies and the high-
level policies. To achieve this goal, one should construct the accessibility
graph. This graph represents the behavior of the enforcement system, which
accepts the generated workflow policies. The query is specified according to
the high-level workflow policies. If the query finds the desired states, then
the high-level policies comply with the behavior of the enforcement system,
which accepts the generated workflow policies. It should be noted that both
of the tasks, the construction of the accessibility graph and the specification
of the query are specified manually.
The last module, which is the proof of concept of the research presented in
this thesis, aims at automatically generating the enforceable policies from the
stakeholders’ high-level policies by using expert knowledge stored in machine-
interpretable representation.
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7.5 Summary
In the first half of this chapter, we studied the standards and tools that are
used to realize the refinement tool. We strived to use the existing standards
and tools in order to minimize the implementation effort and also to enable
the modularity and extensibility of the refinement tool.
In the second half of this chapter we present the architecture and its
modules. The architecture and its modules should give the overview to the
reader, who may want to extend or modify the existing implementation.
Chapter 8
Summary and Outlook
The importance of policy-based system management increases as the com-
plexity of the managed system arises. The policy-based system management
approach significantly helps the stakeholders to control the behavior of the
managed system, which should follow the desired behavior of the stakehold-
ers. In this case, the system should follow the protection intent of the stake-
holders, which is specified in terms of high-level policies. Since these policies
cannot be directly enforced, the security experts should manually refine the
high-level policies into low-level, enforceable policies, which can be directly
enforced by the machine.
However, the manual refinement process posses some disadvantages. One
of the advantages is that the manual refinement process is susceptible to
human errors. A simple error in the derivation of sub policies in the early
stages of the refinement process could lead into critical flaws that appear
in the low-level, enforceable policies. The other disadvantage of the manual
refinement process is that it requires security expert knowledge in refining
policies. As the matter of fact, security experts are rare to be found.
In our study, we take the workflow scenario as our proof of concept.
Obviously, one may also apply this approach to automate the policy refine-
ment process in any other policy-based system management (firewall routers,
web servers, etc) provided that the behavior of the considered systems can
be formally represented as Kripke models and the corresponding refinement
patterns exist.
We will summarize the results of this work, which are structured in the
following chapters:
Chapter 2: Workflows and Policies. Since we make use of workflow
scenario as a proof of concept, we described in this chapter the formal repre-
sentation of the workflow by using a Kripke model. We then presented the
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method to specify workflow policies as the state labels of the corresponding
Kripke model. In this chapter, we also presented the classification of the
workflow policies according to their abstraction levels. They are, namely,
specified workflow policies, abstract workflow policies and concrete workflow
policies. It should be noted that the policies in different abstraction levels
have dependencies. In other words, the fulfillment of a policy depends on the
fulfillments of its decomposed sub policies. This motivated us to construct
the policy refinement tree, which was presented in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Policy Refinement Tree. In the previous chapter we stud-
ied the different abstraction levels of workflow policies. These policies were
represented as the state labels of the Kripke model. However, this kind of
representation aggravates the analysis of the fulfillment of the high-level poli-
cies. Therefore, this chapter presented the definition of hierarchical structure
of the workflow policies as a policy refinement tree. Every policy refinement
tree corresponded to a Kripke model. The structure of the policy refinement
tree was adopted from the fault tree analysis method. In this chapter, we
also presented the formal representation of the policy refinement tree.
Chapter 4: Description Logic-based Model Checking. The first
building block of the automated policy refinement process was concerned
with the novel approach in combining the temporal logic formalism with the
description logic formalism. We used the temporal model checking approach
to perform the automated pattern matching step. Since we had the Kripke
model representing the workflow’s behavior and its policies, we were able to
perform the pattern matching step if we represent the patterns in terms of
temporal formulas. However, due to the fact that the atomic propositions
used to construct the Kripke model and to specify the temporal formulas
were different, traditional model checking approaches could not be used to
perform the automated pattern matching step. We aimed to enable the pat-
tern matching step, which used the model checking approach, by combining
temporal logic formalism with the description logic formalism. Thus, we
called this approach description logic-based model checking.
Chapter 5: Refinement Patterns. This chapter presented the second
building block of the automated policy refinement process. In this chapter we
presented the definition of the refinement patterns adopted from the work
by Alexander. In this chapter we also presented the categorization of the
refinement patterns and the formalization of the refinement patterns.
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Chapter 6: Policy Refinement Process. This chapter defined the algo-
rithm that realized the automated policy refinement process. This algorithm
used of the previously defined building blocks, namely the description logic-
based model checking and the refinement patterns.
Chapter 7: Architecture. This chapter presented the tools and stan-
dards that were used to implement the automated policy refinement tool.
Scientific Contribution In this work, we investigated the approach to
automate the policy refinement process, which is supported by expert knowl-
edge. In order to realize our main goal, we formalized the behavior of the
considered system and its high level policies and also presented the formal
representation of the refinement patterns, which capture the expert knowl-
edge.
The expert knowledge-based policy refinement process performs several
iterations, which consist of pattern matching and pattern instantiation. The
most challenging part is the pattern matching problem, since it searches for
a set of refinement patterns, which can refine the abstract policies.
To enable the automated pattern matching we extended the traditional
model checking technique by combining the temporal logic formalism with
description logic formalism. This approach enabled ontology-supported tem-
poral reasoning without introducing additional computation complexity to
the existing description logic reasoning engine. It also allows us to perform
both semantic and temporal reasoning on a semantic web reasoning engine.
8.1 Future Work
In the following we present the open issues that can be used as future work.
• Refinement pattern engineering
We are aware that the quality of the refinement patterns depends on
the pattern mining process. To improve the quality of the refinement
patterns, appropriate methods and concepts should be developed.
• Choosing the best set of generated enforceable policies
Our concept of the automated policy refinement process generates all
possible set of enforceable policies. However, only a subset of this gen-
erated policies are needed to be enforced in order to fulfill the specified
abstract policies.
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In the field of fault tree analysis, there is an approach, which solves
the similar problem. The aim of this approach is to find a subset of
basic events (leaves of the fault tree) that can cause the main failure
to occur. This approach is called minimal cut set algorithm.
In our case, however, we should consider several factors in order to find
a subset of enforceable policies, which satisfy the specified policies.
These factors are: (i) the cost of enforcing enforceable policies and (ii)
the cost of loss due to the unfulfilled policies.
To give an overview of this problem, let us consider the matrix in Fig-
ure 8.1. This matrix depicts the policy enforcement cost of securing
user authentication process. Each row denotes the enforced policies by
the administrator. For the sake of simplicity, we consider three com-
binations of the possible policy enforcements. These are “password”,
“password + CAPTCHA” and “smartcard”. On the other hand, the
attacker has also several strategies to compromise the authentication
process. These are “scriptbot” and “scriptbot + OCR engine”. These
strategies are represented as columns. As we can see, this matrix re-
sembles the normal form game, which is known in the field of game
theory [50]. Each element of this matrix represents the loss or gain
(negative or positive value) for each player (administrator or hacker).
Thus, each player should choose a row or a column, which results in the
least loss or most gain for each player. Intuitively, the most rational
choice for both players is to choose the second strategy (password +
CAPTCHA and scriptbot + OCR engine). This choice is also known
as Nash equilibrium [67].
• Application of hierarchical finite state machines to define fine-granular
abstraction levels of security policies
The presented classification of security policies is too simple for the real-
world scenario. This definition serves only as a general categorization
of the security policies.
The abstract policy class, which is one of the abstraction levels of work-
flow policies, can be further divided into several sub levels. The number
of layer division depends on the organizational processes or workflows,
in which the security policies apply.
Based on this fact, the height of the abstraction level of the secu-
rity policies strongly depends on the detail of the considered workflow.
However, specifying the workflow in more detail, from organizational
level down to implementation architecture level, is very impracticable.
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Figure 8.1: The cost matrix of a policy enforcement
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To solve this problem, one may also adapt the hierarchical automata
[62] or hierarchical finite state machines [44, 5] to facilitate the hierar-
chical representation of the workflows. The hierarchical representation
allows the specification of a workflow in several abstraction level. This
is useful when the workflow engineer or system analyst wants to collab-
orately and independently specify a workflow at the organizational level
or at the system architecture level, respectively. Thus, the specification
of workflow in more detail is then practicable.
• Verification of the Refined Low-Level Policies
The set of refined low-level policies generated from this refinement pro-
cess only denotes that some security mechanisms should be enforced
within particular traces of the Kripke model, which represents the be-
havior of the system.
According to expert knowledge, these assertions shall exclude any oc-
currence of malicious traces in the Kripke model. However, the refined
policies only assert that they will exclude any malicious traces, which
are known to security experts. Furthermore, these policies are only
derived from best-practice solutions.
The policy verification process can be seen as a complement to this
work. The verification process analyzes the enforcement process of
the refined low-level security policies within the considered system and
proves, whether the low-level security policies satisfy the high-level se-
curity policies.
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Appendix A
Proofs of the CTL* Semantics
To construct our proof presented in Figure 4.6, we shall consider the epis-
temic operator in description logic presented by Donini et al. [31]. The
introduction of K operator allows us to denote the membership of an indi-
vidual to a concept, which is explicitly asserted by the corresponding TBox.
In other words, the concept KC denotes a set of instances, which are known
by the knowledge base as the members of the concept C [31, p. 11]. This
understanding plays a significant role in constructing the proof, as we shall
see later.
This chapter begins with the introduction of the Kripke model and its
representation in DL-based knowledge base. Section A.4 presents the con-
struction of the CTL* semantics on top of the Description Logic semantics
including their proofs.
A.1 Description Logics Knowledge Base
A description logic knowledge base consists of two compartments and a rea-
soning engine. These two compartments are called terminology box (TBox)
and assertion box (ABox).
The TBox contains the definitions of terminologies and their relationships
to other terminologies. In other words, the TBox contains the ontology. In
description logics, these terminologies are known as concepts. A concept can
be defined as more general than or equivalent to another concept. It can
also have several semantic relationships to another concepts. These semantic
relationships are known as roles. The TBox is constructed by the description
logic language, which will be explained below.
The ABox contains the assertions, which state the membership of an
entity to a particular concept. In description logics, an entity is known as
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individual. Such assertions are usually written as C(a), where C and a are
the concept and the individual, respectively. The ABox also contains the
assertions stating the binary relationships between the individuals. These
assertions are written as R(a, b), whereas R is the role name and a and b are
the individuals.
A.1.1 Description Logics Language
There are several definitions of DL language, which are used to construct
the TBox. The most general and simple language is the AL language, which
is known as ”attributive language”. Other languages are defined by adding
new extensions this base language. For example, the ALC language is the
AL language added with the negation.
In our study we consider the SHK language. This language is based on
ALC and extended by adding the: (i) role transitivity, (ii) role hierarchy and
(iii) K epistemic operator.
Thus, every SHK concept can be defined by the following syntax:
SHK ::= ⊥ | > | A | ¬C | KC | C unionsq D | C u D | ∃R.C | ∀R.C.
A is the name of an atomic concept and C and D are the names of the
complex concepts, which are recursively defined by this syntax. R is the role
name.
A.1.2 Formal Semantics of SHK
The formal semantics of description logics is based on the interpretation I,
which consists of a non-empty set ∆ and interpretation functions that assign
every atomic concept A to a set AI ⊆ ∆ and every atomic role R to a binary
relation RI ⊆ ∆×∆. Furthermore, the interpretation functions also assign
an individual a to aI ∈ ∆. Figure A.1 shows the formal semantics of SHK.
A.1.3 Rigid Term Assumption
An important property of the interpretation of DL semantics in presence of
epistemic operator is the rigid term assumption. Donini et al. state in [32]
that for all interpretations, every individual is assigned to the same element
of the domain interpretation ∆. This means that all interpretations have
fixed assignments from each individual to a fixed element of interpretation
domain ∆. Formally, we have ∀I,J ∈ W : xI = xJ .
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>I = ∆
⊥I = ∅
AI ,W = AI
RI ,W = RI
(¬A)I,W = ∆ \ AI,W
(C uD)I,W = CI,W ∩DI,W
(C unionsqD)I,W = CI,W ∪DI,W
(∀R.C)I,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∀b : (a, b) ∈ RI,W → b ∈ CI,W}
(∃R.C)I,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∃b : (a, b) ∈ RI,W ∧ b ∈ CI,W}
(KC)I,W =
⋂
J∈W
CJ ,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∀J ∈ W : a ∈ CI,W}
(KR)I,W =
⋂
J∈W
RJ ,W = {a ∈ ∆ | ∀J ∈ W : (a, b) ∈ RI,W}
Figure A.1: Formal semantics of SHK
A.2 Kripke Model
A.2.1 Representing Kripke Model in Description Logic
First, we present the notations used in Kripke model as follows:
K : 〈W, I,RL, L〉
W : a set of states
I ⊂ W : a set of initial states
RL ⊆ W ×W : a set of relations between states
L : W → 2AP , a function that maps
a state to a set of atomic propositions
AP : a set of atomic propositions
pi ∈ AP : an atomic proposition
s : state
pi : a sequence of states in Kripke model
pii : the state at i-th position in path pi, i ≥ 0
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To represent the Kripke model in DL-based knowledge base, we define
the SHK knowledge base KB : 〈TKB,AKB〉. It consists of a terminology box
TKB and an assertion box AKB.
Before we define TKB and AKB, we define the following sets:
• X = {x|x is an individual of the assertion box}
• G = {V |V is a concept of the terminology box}
and the following functions:
• t1 : W → X maps each state s ∈ W into a unique individual x ∈ X.
• t2 : RL→ U ⊂ X ×X, (a, b) 7→ (t1(a), t1(b)).
• t3 : AP → TAP maps each atomic proposition p ∈ AP into a unique
concept V ∈ TAP .
• t4 : W → 2AP ×W,a 7→ (L(a), a).
• t5 : 2AP → 2TAP , a 7→ {b ∈ TAP |∀c ∈ a : t3(c) = b}.
• t6 : 2AP ×W → 2TAP ×X, (a, b) 7→ (t5(a), t1(b)).
• t7 : 2TAP ×X → 2TAP×X ,
(a, b) 7→ {(c, d) ∈ TAP ×X|∀e ∈ TAP : (e ∈ a→ c = e ∧ d = b)}.
• t8 : W → 2TAP×X ,
a 7→ {(b, c) ∈ 2TAP×X |(b, c) ∈ t7(t6(t4(a)))}
• t9 : F → Tf , fi 7→ Di
The Kripke model is represented in the knowledge base by performing
these mappings:
• Mapping the states into individuals
Each state s ∈ W is uniquely mapped into an individual x ∈ X. This
process is performed by using the function t1.
• Mapping the labels into concepts
Each label p ∈ AP is mapped into a concept V ∈ TAP that is performed
by using the function t2.
• Mapping the state transitions into ABox assertions
Each tupel (s1, s2) ∈ RL is mapped into a tupel (x1, x2) ∈ U , which is
performed by using the function t3. This tupel is used to generate an
ABox assertion next(x1, x2), which is stored in the ABox AL.
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• Mapping the state labels into ABox assertions
We perform the transformation by using the mapping function t8 that
maps each state s ∈ W into a set of tupels (p, x) ∈ 2TAP×X . More
specifically, the function t8 performs the following mapping: W →
2AP × W → 2TAP × X → 2TAP×X . Each tupel is used to costruct
an ABox assertion. This assertion is then stored in the ABox AR.
Each assertion represents a label, which is given to a certain state. For
example, the tupel (Label1, x1) generates the assertion Label1(x1). This
assertion states that the state represented by the individual x1 has the
label, which is represented by the concept Label1.
From Section 4.4.3, we know that Tf contains the concepts of the trans-
lated restricted CTL* formulas. The translation is performed by the function
t9. Furthermore, we define an additional role definition future ≡ next. The
role future is a transitive role (future ∈ R+).
Thus, we construct the TBox TKB = TAP ∪ TONT ∪ Tf and the ABox
AKB = AL ∪ ARL.
In summary, we present the notations used to construct Kripke model in
description logic knowledge base as follows:
x : a unique name of individual in Abox representing a state of the
Kripke model
σ : a sequence of ABox instances which is connected by transition
relationship next(xi, xj)
σi : the individual at the i-th position in sequence σ representing the
state pii, i ≥ 0
Vi : an atomic concept representing a propositional atom
D : A concept of TBox representing the restricted CTL* formula
TAP : a set of concepts representing the atomic propositions
TONT : a set of definitions representing the generalization or
equivalence between two atomic propositions
Tf : a set of concepts representing the restricted CTL* formulas
TKB : TAP ∪ TONT ∪ Tf
ARL : a set of assertions about relationships between states
AL : a set of assertions about states labeling
AKB : ABox for model checking the Kripke model
AKB = AL ∪ ARL
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KB : 〈TKB,AKB〉 , The DL knowledge base
A.3 CTL* Semantics
This section presents the semantics of CTL* that serve the purpose of a
reference for the proof, since we want to construct the CTL* semantics on
top of the Description Logic semantics. The semantics is presented in Figure
A.2.
s  pi ⇔ pi ∈ L(s)
s  ¬f1 ⇔ s 2 f1
s  f1 ∨ f2 ⇔ s  f1 ∨ s  f2
s  f1 ∧ f2 ⇔ s  f1 ∧ s  f2
s  E (g1) ⇔ there is a path pi starting with s such that pi  g1
pi  f1 ⇔ pi0  f1
pi  ¬g1 ⇔ pi 2 g1
pi  g1 ∨ g2 ⇔ pi  g1 ∨ pi  g2
pi  g1 ∧ g2 ⇔ pi  g1 ∧ pi  g2
pi  X g1 ⇔ pi1  g1
pi  G g1 ⇔ ∀i ∈ N0 : pii  g1
pi  F g1 ⇔ ∃i ∈ N0 : pii  g1
pi  g1Ug2 ⇔ ∃j ∈ N0 : pij  g2 ∧ ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , j − 1} : pii  g1
Figure A.2: CTL* semantics
A.4 CTL* Semantics in Description Logic
We present the construction of the subset of CTL* semantics in Description
Logic semantics. The CTL* semantics is shown in Figure A.3. Since we
deal only with the restricted CTL* formula, which has the form of E [α]
where E is the existential path quantifier and α is LTL formula. The LTL
formula α should be written in the form of negation-normal-form by pushing
the negation (¬) inwards to atomic propositions.
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s  pi ⇔ KB  KVi(x) (A.1)
s  ¬pi ⇔ KB  ¬KVi(x) (A.2)
s  E (g1) ⇔ KB  D1(x) (A.3)
pi  g1 ⇔ KB  D1(σ0) (A.4)
pi  g1 ∨ g2 ⇔ KB  (D1 unionsqD2)(σ0) (A.5)
pi  g1 ∧ g2 ⇔ KB  (D1 uD2)(σ0) (A.6)
pi  X g1 ⇔ KB  (∃Knext.D1)(σ0) (A.7)
pi  G g1 ⇔ 〈TKB ∪ {Daux ≡ D1 u ∃Knext.Daux},AKB〉
 Daux (σ0) (A.8)
pi  F g1 ⇔ KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1) (σ0) (A.9)
pi  g1Ug2 ⇔ 〈TKB ∪ {Daux ≡ D2 unionsq (D1 u ∃Knext.Daux u ∃future.D2)}
,AKB〉  Daux (σ0) (A.10)
Figure A.3: Formal semantics of a subset of CTL* logic in SHK
The semantics presented in Figure A.3 shows the CTL semantics, which
are emulated on top of the description logic semantics. It should be noted
that we define an assertion future ≡ next, which is used in Equation A.9.
A.4.1 Proofs
Before we present the proofs, we will show the lemmas, which support the
proofs.
Lemma 1 Let KB be consistent and W be a set of interpretations satisfying
KB.
KB ⊃ {Vi(x)} ⇔ KB  KVi (x).
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF THE CTL* SEMANTICS 138
Proof 4
”⇒ ” : Suppose that KB 2 KVi (x)
⇒ ∃I ∈ W : xI /∈
⋂
J∈W
V J ,Wi
⇒ ∃I ∈ W , ∃J ∈ W : xI /∈ V Ji
⇒ due to the rigid term assumption, we have ∃I,J ∈ W : xJ /∈ V Ji .
⇒ ∃J ∈ W : xJ /∈ V Ji
However, it contradicts with KB ⊃ {Vi(x)}, since
KB ⊃ {Vi(x)} ⇔ ∀I ∈ W : xI ∈ V Ii .
”⇐ ” : Suppose that KB ∩ {Vi(x)} = ∅.
⇒ Since there’s no assertion Vi(x) exists, it implies
∃I,J ∈ W : xI /∈ V Ii ∧ xJ ∈ V Ji .
This is due to the open-world semantics of the description logics.
⇒ ∃I : xI /∈ V Ii . However, this contradicts with KB  KVi(x), since
KB  KVi(x)⇔ ∀I ∈ W : xI ∈
⋂
J∈W
V J ,Wi
⇔ ∀I,J ∈ W : xI ∈ V Ji
⇔ due to the rigid term assumption,∀J : xJ ∈ V Ji .

Lemma 2 Let KB be consistent and W be a set of interpretations satisfying
KB.
KB ∩ {Vi(x)} = ∅ ⇔ KB  ¬KVi (x).
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Proof 5
”⇒ ” : Suppose that KB 2 ¬KVi(x).
⇒ ∃I ∈ W : xI /∈ ∆ \
⋂
J∈W
V J ,Wi
⇒ ∃I ∈ W ,∀J ∈ W : xI ∈ V Ji
⇒ Due to the rigid term assumption, ∀J ∈ W : xJ ∈ V Ji
However, it contradicts with
KB ∩ {Vi(x)} = ∅ ⇔ ∃I ∈ W : xI ∈ V Ii ∧
∃J ∈ W : xJ /∈ V Ji .
”⇐ ” : suppose that KB ⊃ {Vi(x)}.
⇒ ∀I ∈ W : xI ∈ V Ii
⇒ due to the rigid term assumption, we have
∀J ∈ W ,∀I ∈ W : xJ ∈ V Ii .
⇒ ∀J ∈ W ,∀I ∈ W : xJ ∈ V I,Wi
⇒ ∀J ∈ W : xJ ∈
⋂
I∈W
V I,Wi
⇒ ∀J ∈ W : xJ /∈ ∆ \
⋂
I∈W
V I,Wi
⇒ due to the rigid term assumption, we have
∃J ∈ W : xJ /∈ ∆ \
⋂
I∈W
V I,Wi .
⇒ KB 2 ¬KVi(x). This contradicts with KB  ¬KVi(x).

Lemma 3 Let KB be consistent and W be a set of interpretations satisfying
KB. Furthermore, KB  D1(x1).
KB ⊃ {next(x0, x1)} ⇔ KB  (∃Knext.D1)(x1).
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Proof 6
”⇒ ” : KB ⊃ {next(x0, x1)}
⇒ ∀I ∈ W : (xI0 , xI1 ) ∈ next I
⇒ due to the rigid term assumption, we have
∀J , I ∈ W : (xJ0 , xJ1 ) ∈ next I
⇒ ∀J , I ∈ W : (xJ0 , xJ1 ) ∈ next I,W
⇒ ∀J ∈ W : (xJ0 , xJ1 ) ∈
⋂
I∈W
next I,W
⇒ since KB  D1(x1), we have
∀J ∈ W ,∃b ∈ ∆ : ((xJ0 , b) ∈
⋂
I∈W
next I,W ∧ b ∈ DJ1 )
⇒ ∀J ∈ W ,∃b ∈ ∆ : ((xJ0 , b) ∈ (Knext) J ,W ∧ b ∈ DJ1 )
⇒ ∀J ∈ W : xJ0 ∈ (∃Knext.D1)J ,W
⇒ KB  (∃Knext.D1)(x0).
”⇐ ” : KB  (∃Knext.D1)(x0)
⇒ ∀I ∈ W ,∃b ∈ ∆ : (xI0 , b) ∈ next I ∧ b ∈ DI1
⇒ since KB  D1(x1), we have ∀I ∈ W : (xI0 , xI1 ) ∈ next I
⇒ KB ⊃ {next(x0, x1)}.

Lemma 4 Let KB be consistent and W be a set of interpretations satisfying
KB.
∃k ∈ IN,∃l ≤ k : KB ⊃ {next(σk, σl)}∧
∀i ∈ IN : (i ≤ k → KB  D1(σi)) ∧ (i < k → KB ⊃ {next(σi, σi+1)})
⇔
KB ∪ {Daux ≡ D1 u ∃Knext.Daux}  Daux(σ0)
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF THE CTL* SEMANTICS 141
Proof 7
”⇒ ” :
case 1: (k = 0)
KB  D1(σ0) ∧ KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ0)}
⇒ ∀I ∈ W : DI1 ⊃ {σI0 } ∧ next I ⊃ {(σI0 , σI0 ).}
Clearly, ∀I ∈ W : σI0 ∈ DIaux,
since ∀I ∈ W : σI0 ∈ DI1 and
∀I ∈ W : (σI0 , σI0 ) ∈ next I rigid term assumption⇔
∀I ∈ W : (σI0 , σI0 ) ∈
⋂
J∈W
next J .
case 2: (k > 0)
∃k > 0,∃l ≤ k,∀m ∈ {0, . . . , k} : KB  D1(σm) ∧
KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1), . . . , next(σk−1, σk), next(σk, σl)}
⇒ ∀I ∈ W : DI1 ⊃ {σI0 , . . . , σIk} ∧
next I ⊃ {(σI0 , σI1 ), . . . , (σIk−1, σIk ), (σIk , σIl )}
⇒ ∀I ∈ W : there’s a cycle in the next
assertions and ∀m ∈ {0, . . . , k} : σIm ∈ DI1 ,
we have ∀I ∈ W : σI0 ∈ DIaux.
”⇐ ” :
KB ∪ {Daux ≡ D1 u ∃Knext.Daux}  Daux(σ0)
⇒ ∃k ≥ 0,∃l ≤ k,∀I ∈ W :
next I = {(σI0 , σI1 ), . . . , (σIk−1, σIk ), (σIk , σIl )}
∧∀m ∈ {0, . . . , k} : σIm ∈ DI1
⇒ ∃k ≥ 0,∃l ≤ k :
KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1), . . . , next(σk−1, σk), next(σk, σl)} ∧
∀m ∈ {0, . . . , k} : KB  D1(σm)
⇒ ∃k ∈ IN,∃l ≤ k : KB ⊃ {next(σk, σl)} ∧ ∀i ∈ IN :
(i ≤ k → KB  D1(σi)) ∧ (i < k → KB ⊃ {next(σi, σi+1)}).

Lemma 5 Let KB be consistent and W be a set of interpretations satisfying
KB.
∃k ≥ 0 : KB  D1(σk) ∧ ∀l<k : KB ⊃ {next(σl, σl+1)}
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⇔
KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0).
Proof 8
”⇒ ” :
k = 0 :
KB  D1(σ0)
⇒ KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0).
k > 0 :
∃k > 0, ∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : KB ⊃ {next(σl, σl+1)} ∧ KB  D1(σk)
⇒ ∃k > 0,∀I ∈ W :
∧
0≤l≤k−1
(σIl , σ
I
l+1) ∈ next I ∧
σIk ∈ DI1
⇒ since future ≡ next,
∃k > 0,∀I ∈ W :
∧
0≤l≤k−1
(σIl , σ
I
l+1) ∈ future I ∧
σIk ∈ DI1
⇒ since future is a transitive role, we have
∃k > 0,∀I ∈ W : (σI0 , σIk ) ∈ future I ∧ σIk ∈ DI1
⇒ ∃k > 0,∀I ∈ W ,∃b ∈ ∆ : (σI0 , b) ∈ future I ∧ b = σIk ∈ DI1
⇒ ∃k > 0 : KB  (∃future.D1)(σ0)
⇒ ∃k > 0 : KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0).
”⇐ ” :
k = 0 :
suppose that KB 2 D1(σ0)
⇒ since there’s no sequence of role assertions next starting
from σ0 and we have KB 2 ∃future.D1(σ0).
⇒ KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0).
k > 0 :
Suppose that
∀k > 0,∃l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : KB ∩ {next(σl, σl+1)} = ∅︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
∨
KB 2 D1(σk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
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case 1: (a is true)
∀k > 0,∃l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : KB ∩ {next(σl, σl+1)} = ∅
⇒ let l = 0, thus we have
∀k > 0 : KB ∩ {next(σ0, σ1)} = ∅
∀k > 0 : KB 2 (∃next.{σ1})(σ0)
⇒ since next(σl, σl+1) is the sequence of role assertions starting
from σ0 to σk, we have ∀k > 0 : KB 2 (∃next.>)(σ0)
⇒ ∀k > 0 : KB 2 (∃next.D1)(σ0)
⇒ since ∀k > 0 : KB 2 D1(σ0) and future ≡ next, we have
∀k > 0 : KB 2 (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0). However, it contradicts with
KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0).
case 2: (b is true)
KB 2 D1(σk)
⇒ KB 2 (∃future.D1)(σ0)
⇒ since k > 0, we have KB 2 D1(σ0)
⇒ KB 2 (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0). However, it contradicts with
KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1)(σ0).

Lemma 6 Let KB be consistent and W be a set of interpretations satisfying
KB.
(∃k > 0 : KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1), . . . , next(σk−1, σk)} ∧ KB  D2(σk)∧
∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : KB  D1(σl)) ∨ KB  D2(σ0)
⇔
KB ∪ {Daux ≡ D2 unionsq (D1 u ∃Knext.Daux u ∃future.D2)}  Daux(σ0)
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Proof 9
”⇒ ” :
(∃k > 0 : KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1), . . . , next(σk−1, σk)} ∧ KB  D2(σk) ∧
∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : KB  D1(σl)) ∨ KB  D2(σ0)
⇒ (∃k > 0,∀I ∈ W :
∧
0≤l<k
((σIl , σ
I
l+1) ∈ next I ∧ σIl ∈ DI1 ) ∧ σIk ∈ DI2 )
∨∀J ∈ W : σJ0 ∈ DJ2
⇒ Additionally, we know that
∀I ∈ W ,∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k} : σIl ∈ (Dz ≡ D2 unionsq ∃Knext.Dz)I
∧σI0 ∈ (∃future.D2)I since KB  D2(σk) and
KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1), . . . , next(σk−1, σk)}. Thus we have
KB ∪ {Dz ≡ D2 unionsq ∃Knext.Dz}  Dz(σ0) ∧ KB  (D2 unionsqD1)(σ0)
∧KB  (D2 unionsq ∃future.D2)(σ0)
⇒ KB ∪ {Daux ≡ (D2 unionsqD1) u (D2 unionsq ∃Knext.Daux) u
(D2 unionsq ∃future.D2)}  Daux(σ0)
⇒ KB ∪ {Daux ≡ D2 unionsq (D1 u ∃Knext.Daux u ∃future.D2)}  Daux(σ0).
”⇐ ” :
KB ∪ {Daux ≡ D2 unionsq (D1 u ∃Knext.Daux u ∃future.D2)}  Daux(σ0)
case 1:
⇒ KB  D2(σ0).
case 2:
⇒ KB ∪ {Daux ≡ D1 u ∃Knext.Daux u ∃future.D2}  Daux(σ0)
⇒ ∃k > 0,∀I ∈ W :
∧
0≤l<k
((σIl , σ
I
l+1) ∈ next I ∧ σIl ∈ DI1 ) ∧ σIk ∈ DI2
⇒ ∃k > 0,∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : KB ⊃ {next(σl, σl+1)} ∧ KB  D1(σl)
∧KB  D2(σk).

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Proof to A.1 :
s  pi ⇔ pi ∈ L(s)
⇔ since t1 and t3 are injective functions,
s and pi are uniquely
mapped to x and Vi, respectively. Obviously,
t8(s) is a set of tupels
that denotes the labelings of state s in
the knowledge base representation. It means that
(x, Vi) ∈ t8(s).
⇔ KB ⊃ {Vi(x)}
Lemma 1⇔ KB  KVi (x)
Proof to A.2 :
s  pi ⇔ pi /∈ L(s)
⇔ According to the mapping functions t1 and t3,
x and Vi uniquely represent the state s and
label Vi, respectively. Thus, (x, Vi) /∈ t8(s)
⇔ KB ∩ {Vi(x)} = ∅
a member of concept Vi
Lemma 2⇔ KB  ¬KVi (x)
Proof to A.3 :
s  E (g1) ⇔ there is a path pi starting from s, such that pi  g1
⇔ since t1 maps each state in the path pi into a distinct individual
and t9 maps each path formula g1 of the restricted CTL*
into a concept D1, there is a sequence σ
starting from x, such that x is a member of concept D1.
⇔ KB  D1(x)
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Proof to A.4 :
pi  g ⇔ pi0  E(g1)
⇔ the first state pi0 of path pi has the label pi
⇔ due to the functions t1, t2 and t9,
we have a sequence σ, which is connected by the assertions
next(σi, σi+1). The first instance of the sequence, σ0,
is a member of concept D1
⇔ KB  D1(σ0)
⇔ KB  D1(σ0)
Proof to A.5 :
pi  g1 ∨ g2 ⇔ pi  g1 ∨ pi  g2
⇔ KB  D1(σ0) ∨ KB  D2(σ0)
⇔ KB  (D1 unionsqD2)(σ0)
Proof to A.6 :
pi  g1 ∧ g2 ⇔ pi  g1 ∧ pi  g2
⇔ KB  D1(σ0) ∧ KB  D2(σ0)
⇔ KB  (D1 uD2)(σ0)
Proof to A.7 :
pi  X g1 ⇔ pi1  g1
⇔ RL ⊃ {(σ0, σ1)} ∧ pi1  g1
⇔ due to the mapping functions t1, t2 and t9, we have
KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1)} ∧ KB  D1(σ0)
Lemma 3⇔ KB  (∃next.D1)(σ0)
Proof to A.8 :
Note that the additional concept definition Daux is required to define a cyclic
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concept that represents the infinite sequence of σ. This additional concept
is added to existing TBox to perform the reasoning.
pi  G g1 ⇔ ∀i ∈ IN0 : pii  g1
⇔ since the model only has a finite set of states, path pi
contains repeated sequences of states. Thus
∃k > 0, ∃m ≤ k : RL ⊃ {(pi0, pi1), . . . , (pik−1, pik), (pik, pim)} ∧
∀l ≤ k : pil  g1
⇔ due to the mapping functions t1, t2 and t9, we have
∃k > 0, ∃m ≤ k,∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k} : KB  D1(σl) ∧
KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1), . . . , next(σk−1, σk), next(σk, σm)}
Lemma 4⇔ KB ∪ {Daux ≡ D1 u ∃Knext.Daux}  Daux(σ0).
Proof to A.9 :
pi  Fg1 ⇔ ∃i ∈ IN : pii  g1 ∧ ∀k ∈ IN : k < i→ RL ⊃ {pik, pik+1}
⇔ due to the mapping functions t1, t2 and t9, we have
∃i ∈ IN,KB  D1(σi) ∧
∀k ∈ IN : k < i→ KB ⊃ {next(σi, σi+1)}
Lemma 5⇔ KB  (D1 unionsq ∃future.D1) (σ0).
Proof to A.10 :
This proof is almost similar to the Proof A.8. It means that we also need
an additional concept called Daux.
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pi  g1 U g2 ⇔ ∃j ∈ N : pij  g2 ∧ ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , j − 1} : pii  g1
⇔ (pi0  g2 ∨ ∃k > 0 : RL ⊃ {(pi0, pi1), . . . , (pik−1, pik)} ∧
pik  g2 ∧ ∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : pil  g1
⇔ due to the mapping functions t1, t2 and t9, we have
(∃k > 0 :
KB ⊃ {next(σ0, σ1), . . . , next(σk−1, σk)}
∧KB  D2(σk) ∧
∀l ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : KB  D1(σl)) ∨ KB  D2(σ0)
Lemma 6⇔ KB ∪
{Daux ≡ D2 unionsq (D1 u ∃Knext.Daux u ∃future.D2)} 
Daux(σ0)
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